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Abstract
In the field of artificial intelligence, possession of commonsense knowledge has
long been considered to be a requirementto construct a machine that pos-
sesses artificial general intelligence. The conventional approach to providing
this commonsense knowledge is to manually encode the required knowledge,
a process that is both tedious and costly. After an analysis of classical condi-
tioning, it was deemed that constructing a system based upon the stimulus-
stimulus interpretation of classical conditioning could allow for commonsense
knowledge to be learned through a machine directly and passively observing its
environment. Based upon these principles, a system was constructed that uses
a stream of events, that have been observed within the environment, to learn
rules regarding what event is likely to follow after the observation of another
event. The system makes use of a feedback loop between three sub-systems:
one that associates events that occur together, a second that accumulates ev-
idence that a given association is significant and a third that recognises the
significant associations. The recognition of past associations allows for both
the creation of evidence for and against the existence of a particular associa-
tion, and also allows for more complex associations to be created by treating
instances of strongly associated event pairs to be themselves events. Testing
the abilities of the system involved simulating the three different learning en-
vironments. The results found that measures of significance based on classical
conditioning generally outperformed a probability-based measure. This thesis
contributes a theory of how a stimulus-stimulus interpretation classical condi-
tioning can be used to create commonsense knowledge and an observation that
a significant sub-set of classical conditioning phenomena likely exist to aid in
the elimination of noise. This thesis also represents a significant departure
from existing reinforcement learning systems as the system presented in this
thesis does not perform any form of action selection.
- iii -
Acknowledgements
I would first like to thank my supervisor, Brandon Bennett. Not only due
to the great deal of formal support that was given in a patient and reliable
manner, but due to the intellectual growth that he cultivated. I always enjoyed
the challenges to my ideas and debates we engaged in. I also would like to
thank Brandon for getting me the opportunity in the first place. While I know
I wasn’t the model student and this journey has certainly had its more than
its fair share of ups and downs, we got there in the end.
My family, especially my mum, my dad and my sister, deserve an enormous
amount of thanks. I would not have been able to do this if it wasn’t for
their unquestioning love and support not just in the context of my PhD, but
throughout my life.
My friends have been another source of strength that has allowed me to
finish this journey. If I didn’t have an escape, then I would not have been
able to keep up with the amount of work that is needed. There has been
a great deal specific pieces of help from my friends, though I will not give
names for fear of forgetting someone, Instead I will say this: If you know me
and think you deserve credit for helping me in some manner, then consider
yourself thanked.
I would like to thank my viva examiners, Eduardo Alonso and John Stell,
and my mock viva examiner Marc de Kamps for agreeing to take the time to
read this thesis and examine me on its contents.
Throughout the course of my studies, I have been in receipt of a variety of
formal and informal assistance. I would like the thank Vania Dimatrova, Tony
Cohn and Derek Magee for the assistance they have provided. In addition, I
have attended an assortment of workshops and my thanks go to the organisers
and instructors for improving my skills and knowledge. Furthermore I would
like to thank the EPSRC and therefore the U.K. taxpayer for providing me
with the funding to make this research possible.
Finally, if you are reading this thesis out of your own choice, then I thank
you, mysterious reader of obvious good taste, for taking an interest in my
work.
– Timothy A. Furze, 26th July 2013
- iv -
Table of Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Position A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Position B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.3 Position C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Hypothesis A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Hypothesis B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 Classical Conditioning and its Analysis 13
2.1 An Overview of Classical Conditioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 An Analysis of the Criteria for a Passive Learning System . . . 16
2.3 Phenomena Used by the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.1 Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.2 Extinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.3 The Inter-Stimulus Interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.3.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.4 Reacquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.4.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.5 Blocking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.5.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.6 Recovery from Blocking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.6.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.7 Conditioned Inhibition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.7.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.8 Extinction of Conditioned Inhibition . . . . . . . . . . . 27
- v -
2.3.8.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.9 Latent Inhibition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.9.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.10 U.S.-Pre-Exposure Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.10.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.11 Sensory Preconditioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.11.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.12 Secondary Conditioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.12.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Phenomena Not Used by the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.1 Contingency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.1.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.2 Generalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.2.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.3 Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.3.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.4 Configural Cues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.4.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.5 Patterning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4.5.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4.6 The Inter-Trial Interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.6.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.7 Facilitation of Remote Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.7.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4.8 Primacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4.8.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4.9 Temporal Primacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.9.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.10 Learning-to-Learn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.10.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.11 Overshadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4.11.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4.12 Super-Conditioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4.12.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4.13 Backward Blocking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4.13.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4.14 Partial Reinforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4.14.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4.15 Partial Reinforcement Extinction Effect . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.15.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.16 Spontaneous Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.16.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5 Classical Conditioning Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6 Chapter Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
- vi -
3 Related Work 46
3.1 Models of Classical Conditioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.1.1 The Stimulus Substitution Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.1.2 Rescorla-Wagner Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.1.3 Mackintosh’s Attentional Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1.4 The Sometimes-Opponent-Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1.5 The Temporal Difference (T.D.) Model and the
Sutton-Barto (S.B.) Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.1.6 Artificial Neural Network Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 Commonsense Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.1 Knowledge Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.1.1 Temporal Knowledge Representation . . . . . 61
3.2.1.2 Spatial Knowledge Representation . . . . . . . 62
3.2.1.3 Spatiotemporal Knowledge Representation . . 68
3.2.2 Knowledge Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.2.2.1 Knowledge Acquisition Interfaces . . . . . . . 69
3.2.2.2 Knowledge Acquisition through Natural
Language Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2.2.3 Knowledge Acquisition in Relation to
this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3 Reinforcement Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.1 The Reinforcement Learning Problem . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3.2 Value Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3.3 Controlling Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3.4 Stochastic Results and Markov Decision Processes . . . 77
3.3.5 Approaches to the Reinforcement Learning Problem . . 79
3.3.6 Temporal-Difference (TD) Learning . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3.7 Extensions to Temporal Difference Learning . . . . . . . 82
3.3.8 Reinforcement Learning in Relation to this Thesis . . . 83
3.4 Visual Event Sequence Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4.1 Event Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4.2 Object Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5 Chapter Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4 The System 89
4.1 System Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2 Module 1 – Pre-Processor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.1 System Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2.2 Frame State Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2.3 Atomic Event Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Module 2 – Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3.1 Hierarchical Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3.2 Multi-Frame Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3.3 Event Growing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
- vii -
4.3.4 Potential Event Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.3.5 The Moving Window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3.6 Dealing with Multi-Frame Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.3.7 Output Streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.4 Module 3 – Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4.1 Constraints on association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4.2 Event Instance Pair Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.5 Module 4 – Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.5.1 The Significance Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.5.2 Non-Model Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.5.3 The Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.5.3.1 The Fixed Increment Model . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.5.3.2 The Symmetrical Fixed Increment Model . . . 115
4.5.3.3 The Count Only Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5.3.4 The Absolute Acquire-Extinguish Model . . . 116
4.5.3.5 The Iterative Acquire-Extinguish Model . . . . 117
4.5.3.6 The Temporal Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.5.3.7 The Reacquiring Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.5.3.8 The Blocking Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.5.3.9 The Inhibition Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.5.3.10 The Pre-Exposure model . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.6 Formal Description and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.6.1 System Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.6.1.1 Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.6.1.2 Track Boxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.6.1.3 Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.6.1.4 Frame-States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.6.1.5 Event Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.6.1.6 Event Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.6.1.7 Event Association Instances . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.6.1.8 The Moving Window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.6.2 Module 1 – Pre-Processor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.6.3 Module 2 – Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.6.4 Module 3 – Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.6.5 Module 4 – Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.6.6 System Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.7 Chapter Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5 Evaluation Methods 143
5.1 The Learning Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.2 Scenario Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.2.1 Motion Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.2.1.1 The Throwing Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.2.1.2 The Rotating Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
- viii -
5.2.1.3 The Collision Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.2.2 Tracker Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3 Proxy Ground Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.4 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.5 System Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.6 Chapter Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6 Results 168
6.1 The System Design Flaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.2 Proxy Ground Truth Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.3 Qualitative Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.3.1 General Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.3.2 Model Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.3.3 Proxy Ground Truth Weakness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.4 Noise Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
6.5 Computational Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6.6 Chapter Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
7 Conclusions 209
7.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
7.1.1 Hypothesis A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
7.1.2 Hypothesis B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
7.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
7.2.1 The First Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
7.2.2 The Second Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
7.2.3 The Third Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
7.3 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
7.3.1 Revising the Hierarchical Event Type System . . . . . . 215
7.3.2 Separate Processes for Parallel Compounds and Serial
Compounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
7.3.3 The System as a Classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
7.3.4 Generalisation and Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
7.3.5 Further Phenomena of Classical Conditioning . . . . . . 218
7.3.6 Learnable Pre-Processor Atomic Events . . . . . . . . . 219
7.3.7 A Fully Real-Time Version of the System . . . . . . . . 219
7.3.8 A Return to Actions and Rewards . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
7.3.9 Wider Testing of the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
7.3.10 A New Proxy Ground Truth Method . . . . . . . . . . . 222
7.3.11 Stochastic Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
7.3.12 Subjective Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
7.3.13 A Multiple-Environment Reinforcement Learning
Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
7.3.14 Ideas Concerning Classical Conditioning . . . . . . . . . 224
7.3.15 Ideas Concerning Bayesian Learning . . . . . . . . . . . 225
7.3.16 A Universal-Mode Learning System . . . . . . . . . . . 225
- ix -
7.3.17 Ultra-High Fidelity Environmental Modelling . . . . . . 226
A Atomic Event Definitions 228
B Model Equation Derivations 234
B.1 The Count Only Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
B.2 The Iterative Acquire-Extinguish Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
B.2.1 The Positive Evidence Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
B.2.2 The Negative Evidence Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
B.3 The Temporal Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
B.4 The Reacquiring Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
C Proxy Ground Truth Gantt Charts 243
D System Settings 250
Bibliography 252
- x -
List of Algorithms
3.1 TD(λ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.1 isPotentialEvent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.2 translateWindowPosition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.3 addWindowFrame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.4 getWindowFrame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.5 fetchEvent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.6 buildFrameState . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.7 compareObjectLists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.8 recogniseEventTypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.9 generateCompositeEvent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.10 growEvents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.11 growFirstLevel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.12 growHigherLevel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.13 failedPotentialEvents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.14 buildNewAssociations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.15 newEvents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.16 terminatedAssociations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.17 applyModel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.18 getCompostiteEvent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.19 deleteCompostiteEventType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.20 getCompositeEventTypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
- xi -
List of Figures
2.1 An idealised diagram showing the effects of the I.S.I. for a fixed
number of reinforcements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 An idealised diagram showing the effect of Reacquisition. . . . 25
3.1 The thirteen Allan (1983) relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 An example of regions with different relationships to one
another. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 The RCC-8 relations in their conceptual neighbourhood. . . . . 66
3.4 Three possible representations of direction. . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5 A generic example of a Markov Decision Process. . . . . . . . . 79
4.1 The four modules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 An annotated example of the system’s input data. . . . . . . . 93
4.3 A 3-level hierarchy of event types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4 A hierarchy of event types involving only two-component
compound event types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.5 The moving window in relation to a set of event instances. . . . 110
5.1 A sample frame from a video depicting the throwing scenario. . 148
5.2 A selection of frames depicting the kind of movement found in
the throwing scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.3 A sample frame from a video depicting the rotating scenario. . 152
5.4 A selection of frames depicting the kind of movement found in
the rotating scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.5 A sample frame from a video depicting the colliding scenario. . 154
5.6 A selection of frames depicting the kind of movement found in
the colliding scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.7 The effect of adding track-box noise to each of the three learning
scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.8 The key-frames of the throwing scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.9 The key-frames of the rotating scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.10 The key-frames for the eight two-ball sequences of the colliding
scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
- xii -
5.11 The key-frames for the four one-ball sequences of the colliding
scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.1 Two levels of multi-frame events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.2 A serial association with a three-way overlap. . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.3 A plot comparing the model employed against its precision value
for every level of the event-type hierarchy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.4 A plot comparing the model employed against its precision value
for the first level of the event-type hierarchy. . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.5 A plot comparing the model employed against its recall value
for every level of the event-type hierarchy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6.6 A plot comparing the model employed against its recall value
for the first level of the event-type hierarchy. . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.7 A plot comparing the model employed against its F1 value for
the first level of the event-type hierarchy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.8 A plot comparing the model employed against its Matthews
correlation coefficient for the first level of the event-type
hierarchy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.9 A plot comparing the level of noise in the input with the
output’s precision value. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.10 A plot comparing the level of noise in the input with the
output’s recall value. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
6.11 A plot comparing the level of noise in the input with the
output’s F1 measure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
6.12 A plot comparing the level of noise in the input with the
output’s Matthews correlation coefficient. . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.13 A scatter plot comparing the number of rules produced with
the mean frame rate for each input provided to the system. . . 199
6.14 A plot comparing the duration of the input video with the
number of rules produced. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
6.15 A plot comparing the duration of the input video with the mean
frame rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
6.16 A plot comparing the model employed with number of rules
produced. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
6.17 A plot comparing the model employed with the mean
frame rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.18 A plot comparing the level of noise in the input video with the
number of rules produced. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
6.19 A plot comparing the level of noise in the input video with the
mean frame rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
C.1 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of all the
atomic event instances of the throwing scenario. . . . . . . . . . 244
- xiii -
C.2 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of all the
atomic event instances of the rotating scenario. . . . . . . . . . 245
C.3 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence A of the colliding scenario. . . . . 246
C.4 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence B of the colliding scenario. . . . . 246
C.5 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence C of the colliding scenario. . . . . 246
C.6 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence D of the colliding scenario. . . . . 247
C.7 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence E of the colliding scenario. . . . . 247
C.8 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence F of the colliding scenario. . . . . 248
C.9 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence G of the colliding scenario. . . . . 248
C.10 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence H of the colliding scenario. . . . . 249
C.11 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence I of the colliding scenario. . . . . . 249
C.12 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence J of the colliding scenario. . . . . . 249
C.13 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence K of the colliding scenario. . . . . 249
C.14 A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence L of the colliding scenario. . . . . 249
- xiv -
List of Tables
2.1 A summary of the four situations a state-dependent pattern can
be in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 A matrix summarising which phenomena of classical
conditioning contribute to each of the criteria. . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.1 Three examples of spatial knowledge represented as a 4-intersection
matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 The RCC-8 relation predicates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3 The RCC-5 relation predicates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.4 The RCC-3 relation predicates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1 A list of the meanings of the connectedness predicates
available. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2 A list of the meanings of the horizontal and vertical object
interrelation predicates available. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3 A list of the variables used to represent the state of a frame of
system input. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 A list of the fluents used to represent atomic event types along
with their meaning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5 A list of the functions required to be defined by any significance
model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.1 The confusion matrix for comparing two sets of rules. . . . . . 164
6.1 A matrix showing whether a given model was able to match a
specified rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.2 The significance model rankings for the results of the proxy
ground truth comparison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
6.3 The significance model rankings for the results of the qualitative
comparison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
6.4 The significance model rankings for the results of the noise
robustness comparison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
- xv -
6.5 The significance model rankings for the results of the
computational efficiency comparison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
6.6 The overall ranking of the significance models. . . . . . . . . . 208
- xvi -
Chapter 1
Introduction
Throughout the twentieth century, psychology made significant progress
through studying how animals learn, with its findings significantly informing
the study of human psychology. Those same findings have been a rich source
of inspiration for the development of artificial intelligence systems. This thesis
continues this use of psychological ideas within artificial intelligence.
This thesis contributes towards the field of artificial intelligence generally
and more specifically to the sub-fields of machine learning and commonsense
knowledge acquisition. This was done by applying some of the ideas from
psychology to a problem found within artificial intelligence. The psychological
ideas that have been used come from the field of classical conditioning. The
problem within artificial intelligence is known as the knowledge acquisition
bottleneck.
The development of this thesis began with a number of guiding principles,
or positions, on how the general problem of artificial intelligence should be
approached. These positions are stated within this chapter in order for the
reader to gain insight into the basis from which this thesis was built. Af-
ter stating these positions, the chapter will then give an introduction to the
problem this thesis addresses. In considering the problem in reference to the
positions, two hypotheses arose that this thesis seeks to test – a discussion of
the hypotheses comprises the next section of this chapter. Finally, the overall
structure of the thesis is described.
1.1 Positions
The positions of this thesis are those assumptions about how to approach a
problem that are required, either implicitly or explicitly, for progress to occur.
This implies that other positions may be just as valid, and may be held for each
author’s own reasons, but every research project must have them in order to
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conduct the research in the first place. This is because if a project did not hold
any positions, then there would not be any basis on which to make decisions
in the design of the project’s methodology.
For the purposes of clarity, the three positions will be stated, and then
each will be discussed in turn in its own subsection:
Position A: Using the results from psychology to inform the design of arti-
ficial intelligence systems has the best likelihood of long-term success in
the creation of artificial general intelligence systems.
Position B: The ability to model the environment and adapt to changes
within that environment is a requirement for general intelligence.
Position C: On balance, predicate logic is the framework that is most likely
to be successful in representing a complete model of an agent’s environ-
ment.
1.1.1 Position A
In observing artificial intelligence systems, it appears that there are six pri-
mary sources of inspiration to the problem of designing artificial intelligence
systems: Introspection, computational theory, statistics, game theory, biol-
ogy & neuroscience and psychology. There are upsides and downsides to using
every one of these sources of inspiration, and different people’s weightings of
each of those upsides and downsides could lead to a different conclusion as to
which source of inspiration is likely to lead to the best results.
Inspiration from introspection refers to the approach whereby a system de-
signer designs their system based on internal observation of their own thought
processes, relying on the fact that they are themselves an example of what
they seek to build. Some early research in artificial intelligence appears to be
of this sort, and was discussed by McCarthy & Hayes:
“Programs have been written to solve a class of problems that give
humans intellectual difficulty. . . . In the course of designing these
programs intellectual mechanisms of greater or lesser generality are
identified sometimes by introspection, sometimes by mathemati-
cal analysis, and sometimes by experiments with human subjects.
Testing the programs sometimes leads to better understanding of
the intellectual mechanisms and the identification of new ones.”
(McCarthy & Hayes, 1969, pp. 465–466)
In one guise or another, introspection has been long associated with the
study of human thought and can be traced to Socrates (Schultz & Schultz,
1996, p. 77). The approach was used in a rigorous way in the early days of
the foundation of psychology as an independent discipline and had one of the
discipline’s founders, Wundt, as a proponent (Schultz & Schultz, 1996, p. 77).
The central argument for the use of introspection is that due to the subjective
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nature of conscious experience, the only person able to observe it is the person
who is having the experience. In terms of the design of artificial intelligence
systems, the approach also requires little background knowledge and so allows
for quick initial progress, this could be a reason for its early use within artificial
intelligence. Within psychology, the approach is now largely seen as lacking
rigor. The best known argument against introspection is by Watson (1913),
whose main argument is that due to the subjectivity of introspection, the
results gained by using it cannot be reliably confirmed. Watson argued that
one should only observe behaviour and not attempt to theorise on internal
mental states – a school of thought that became known as behaviourism.
In more recent times, introspection in psychology is deemed unreliable as it
requires a-priori knowledge of one’s own unconscious thought process. It has
been shown by psychological experimentation that it is not possible to know
this (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Computational-theoretical, statistical and game-theoretical inspiration ap-
pears to have similar upsides and downsides and so shall be discussed together.
Each of these inspirations holds its basis in mathematical proof. This leads to
the design of systems that can be seen to be highly rational, sometimes having
provably perfect rationality. Their downside, however, is that the computa-
tional resources such systems require can make them infeasible to use in all but
the smallest problem instances. This issue leads to the problem of marshalling
computational resources to optimise between rationality of an action and the
reaction time (Russell et al., 1993).
Using biology and neuroscience for inspiration does imply at least some
level of in-built optimality between rationality and response time, as arguably
evolutionary forces have already had to solve the issue (though whether those
optimisations can apply to any computational version remains to be seen). A
benefit of using neuroscience as a source of inspiration is that it is a source of
ideas for systems that have not been originated by another human. This means
that arguably it provides ideas that may not occur to a human approaching the
problem of artificial intelligence from either an introspective or mathematical
basis. The drawback of using neuroscience or biology as a source of inspiration
is that the level of abstraction is too low to easily derive intelligent behaviour.
To use the well-worn brain-computer analogy, the task of neuroscience is anal-
ogous to attempting to reverse-engineer a database server by analysing the
function of each individual transistor. It is theoretically possible, but would
take a great deal of effort. This is not to say that the work of neuroscience
should not be done, it provides a highly valuable contribution, however this
thesis holds that using the field as a primary source of inspiration for artificial
intelligence systems will only yield advances at a very slow rate. A better role
would be to indirectly influence artificial intelligence by providing a basis and
plausibility checks for psychological theories.
Designing artificial intelligence systems by drawing inspiration from psy-
chology shares the same advantages, to differing extents, as that of biology and
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neuroscience inspired systems, but does not have the drawback of an abstrac-
tion level that is too low to be of direct use. There are other, weaker drawbacks
though. Psychological theories on the whole are vaguer than those of other
approaches. This however can be turned into a positive point as it allows an
artificial intelligence system designer enough leeway to implement the system
in a manner that suits the mostly serial nature of computer processing. An
analogy would be that psychological theory can be used as a form of software
engineering specification. Another drawback is that due to not being able to
properly control all experimental variables, data from experimental psychol-
ogy is inherently noisier than the physical sciences. This leads to a greater
variety of psychological theories that fit the data, but contradict one another,
leading to a higher likelihood of a theory utilised by the artificial intelligence
system designer being incorrect. Poole, Mackworth & Goebel (1998) make an
argument against taking inspiration from psychology, neuroscience or biology.
The argument is one by analogy with the development of flight:
“First note that there are several ways to understand flying. One
is to dissect known flying animals and hypothesize their common
structural features as necessary fundamental characteristics of any
flying agent. With this method an examination of birds, bats, and
insects would suggest that flying involves the flapping of wings made
of some structure covered with feathers or a membrane. . . .An al-
ternate methodology is to try to understand the principles of flying
without restricting ourselves to natural occurrences of flying. This
typically involves the construction of artefacts that embody the hy-
pothesized principles, even if they do not behave like flying animals
in any way except flying. This second method has provided both
useful tools, airplanes, and a better understanding of the princi-
ples underlying flying, namely aerodynamics.”
(Poole et al., 1998, pp. 2–3)
This argument ignores the fact that it was only through the use of ob-
servations of biological flight that the principles of aerodynamics were discov-
ered. Sir George Cayley, in publishing his findings on aerodynamics, effectively
founding the field, made the observation that birds do not flap once full ve-
locity has been reached (Cayley, 1809, p. 167). Poole et al.’s argument is
that by only using examples from nature, it is restricting the space of intelli-
gent entities, and this hampers progress in the development of the underlying
principles. With the analogy, it is quite obvious that aeroplanes and birds
use different methods of flight but both use the same underlying principles.
However, the argument that the principles of aerodynamics came about due
to some elementary derivation is fallacious, as was described earlier. As such,
Poole et al.’s argument that such an approach should also apply to artificial
intelligence is precarious – we don’t yet know enough about the principles of
intelligence to use them without reference to existing intelligent beings.
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Due to the weighting placed on the advantages and disadvantages of each
of these sources of inspiration, this thesis uses psychology. Ultimately, all
sources of inspiration have a place in contributing towards the problem of
artificial intelligence, and any full solution will be a synthesis of ideas from all
fields, but from the point of view of a single project, there will always be one
field that is used more than the others.
1.1.2 Position B
Consider an agent that did not have any model of its environment. Without
any model, the agent would not know the likely consequences of any action it
takes. This would preclude it from selecting the most rational action. General
intelligence is more than just rational action selection; however it would be
surprising if it was not at least part of the picture.
Assuming that the need for some form of model is a requirement, there
are two ways in which an agent can come into possession of a model. Firstly
it could be built in to the agent, either implicitly or explicitly, provided by
an external party or mechanism – such as an agent’s designer or through an
evolutionary process1. Secondly it could learn for it itself through interacting
with the environment. If the environment is dynamic (i.e. the facts and rules of
the environment are subject to change ), then the first system would not have
any mechanism to update its environment to reflect the changes. Therefore,
if the environment does change, in all likelihood the rationality of the agent’s
actions would diminish. Assuming that there is a mechanism for learned rules
to change over time, the second method would be able to adapt and continue
to produce rational actions.
Note that while the above arguments talk of rational action as a measure
of intelligence, it is not the only form of intelligence that this thesis recognises.
It is possible to imagine a fully passive learning system, creating a model of its
environment that the system itself does not act upon, but the model instead
could be queried, like a database. While no metric of rational action could
find such a system to be intelligent, it can be argued to possess some form of
intelligence.
Even an agent that is able to act upon its environment would still need
to learn knowledge in both a passive and active manner. Furze & Bennett
argued:
“For instance, an animal can associate the sound of a rock slide
with the sight of falling rocks. It can also learn to actively avoid
being hit by an incoming rock. Only when both passive and active
learning are together can the animal associate the sound of a rock
slide with danger, without actually being caught in a rock slide. For
1It should be noted that while an evolutionary processes can create sys-
tems that learn from the environment, in this context it is only referring to
immutable knowledge provided through evolution.
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another example, consider using a hairdryer to move a toy sailing
ship. For a system to be able to plan such a course of action
without first observing it, the system would need to have passively
associated air currents with moving sailing ships and observed that
the action of activating a hairdryer causes an air current.”
(Furze & Bennett, 2011, p. 46)
Until the definition of general intelligence has been settled, this can only be
an opinion, though as a position it should be less controversial than position A.
However, there are approaches that can be seen to be incompatible with this
position. One prominent approach is the CYC project.
The CYC project (Lenat et al., 1985; Guha & Lenat, 1990) is a project in
its third decade that aims to create a knowledge database that encompasses
all the knowledge that is usually implicit in human discourse, due to that
knowledge being common to all but the youngest of the species. Lenat (1996)
argues that once the project reaches some threshold of knowledge, then com-
bined with a program to analyse natural language, it could add all of human
knowledge to its database by in effect, reading all of it. This argument for the
system gaining general intelligence-level behaviour if it becomes large enough
is incompatible with the position of this thesis because this database, as it is
hand written, would not be able to adapt to changes in its knowledge. There-
fore any change in the “sum of all human knowledge”, such as widely-held
theories being disproved, could not be adapted to without further interven-
tion.
1.1.3 Position C
To explain the reasoning for this position, first a number of measures for the
worth of a particular framework shall be presented, followed by a discussion of
a selection of frameworks in terms of those measures. The list of frameworks
discussed is exhaustive in neither the number of frameworks nor the depth to
which each framework is discussed to argue that predicate2 logic is the best
with complete authority; hence this is merely a position taken by this thesis
rather than any stronger sort of assertion. As with the other positions, dif-
ferent weightings of the advantages and disadvantages could lead to others to
take a different viewpoint and the reasoning below merely reflects the posi-
tion of this thesis. Note that in order to keep the length of this section from
being far longer than would be in line with its relevance, the descriptions and
definitions of each of the frameworks are assumed to be known by the reader.
2In this thesis, predicate logic primarily refers to first-order logic. However,
as this thesis does not make use of the quantification elements of first-order
logic, the more general term “predicate logic” has been used. In terms of
position C, it is believed that quantification will ultimately be needed even
though it is not used in this thesis.
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There are four measures this thesis has used to determine the worth of a
particular framework:
1. Expressiveness. This refers to what limitations (if any) the framework
has in expressing a model of an environment.
2. Computational efficiency. Computational efficiency refers to how
much memory space a model of a given fidelity expressed in the frame-
work takes up and how quickly a model’s predictions can be retrieved,
added, removed or modified.
3. Inferential capacity. This is how easy it is for the framework to be
used to extrapolate from the environmental model that has been pro-
vided explicitly.
4. Human readability. This measure of human readability is how easy
it is for a human to understand how the model reflects its environment
and how easy it is for a human to manually modify the model.
Four frameworks are discussed: Predicate logic, neural networks, automata
and Markov models. Each of these frameworks is Turing-complete and so in
theory is able classify any input that a human can classify, assuming the
Church-Turing thesis is correct. This means that any of the frameworks are
able in theory to express any model of the environment that a human can.
This may not be the case in a practical sense however.
Predicate logic is arguably the most expressive in practical terms of the
three frameworks, as it is able to explicitly express all parts of an environ-
mental model, or as they are discussed in the literature, theories (with the
term model referring to a structure that satisfies a theory). Theories created
within predicate logic do however vary in efficiency, dependent on the theory’s
complexity, but for real-world cases is arguably better than either of the other
methods discussed. Predicate logic allows for considerable inferential capacity
through its rules of deduction. This system of knowledge representation does
also allow for a trained human to be able to both read and write knowledge in
this format with ease due to the high degree of modularity in how the knowl-
edge is represented. Alonso (2002) suggested a further benefit of predicate
logic, arguing that because predicate logic is able to be easily understood by
humans, this allows for agents based on predicate logic to be safer than other
forms of knowledge representation.
Unlike the other three formalisms, it is less widely known that some types
of neural networks are Turing complete (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943; Hyo¨tyniemi,
1996). This fact is less useful in practice however, as it requires a complex
network for even simple Turing machines. As a practical framework, neural
networks are able to represent concepts that involve continuums in an efficient
manner – by encoding real-valued inputs as input nodes. Neural networks
are however less efficient at representing binary relationships between inputs
(i.e. those relationships that exist or don’t exist), as the only way to represent
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a relationship between a pair of inputs is by applying a high/low weighting
to every possible pair of inputs to represent whether a particular pair has
that property. Neural networks are also relatively poor at allowing for the
knowledge to be created within their structure as concepts can only be input
into the system as examples, rather than general rules. The number of needed
examples could be very high for the system to correctly identify a particular
concept. Once a network is trained on a concept it is able to identify other
unseen examples of a concept fairly robustly, so does demonstrate a reasonable
level of inference. Neural networks are poor for human readability and the
ability to be manually changed, since individual neuron weights affect the
classifications in non-linear ways that are hard for a human to predict.
While automata with the addition a reversible tape for memory are by
definition Turing complete, the expressiveness of automata is severely curtailed
in practice. This is because of the massive proliferation of states automata
require to approximate any continuum or reflect any uncertainty. Automata
are a very good tool for matching particular specific patterns though, and
so were a viable candidate for this thesis. For concrete pattern matching,
automata are also the most efficient of all the systems described, due to only
needing to record one state plus any stack or tape memory with the time taken
for a single input being constant. The efficiency of changing the knowledge
reflected in an automaton is better than for a neural network because it can
be done without needing a large set of examples of the change, but is not as
efficient as predicate logic because new knowledge necessitates at least some
change in the existing structure, which is not required by predicate logic, due
to the modularity inherent in simply adding an extra rule to the existing
theory. Due to its discrete nature, automata cannot easily represent any form
of knowledge best encoded as a real-valued property. This implies that it
is inefficient to create automata that recognise patterns where a wide range
of input values can cause transition to the same state. Automata have a
low inferential capacity because of there being no mechanism to allow for
extrapolation based on existing encoded knowledge. Human readability of
automata is better than for neural networks, but is far behind predicate logic.
Markov models share a number of similarities to automata in terms of
representation of knowledge; such as the need to change existing structures
to accommodate new knowledge, though for some of the knowledge (such as
transition probabilities) the change is minimal. One main difference, due to the
probabilistic transitions in states, is that there is at least some knowledge that
is best encoded as a real-valued property that can be feasibly represented by
the system. The inferential capacity is greatly improved upon, with knowledge
such as being able to infer the likelihood of a particular pattern occurring. The
human readability of such a system is again, similar to that of automata.
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1.2 The Problem
By taking the positions mentioned in the previous section, it is worth consid-
ering the problems that have been identified over time as arising from taking
those positions. While it may not be possible for one person or project to
tackle all of the problems associated with a given position, by holding a par-
ticular stance there is also an implied belief that all the current problems
associated with a stance will be solved in time. With this in mind, this thesis
looks at an attempt to partially solve a single problem connected with the
stated stances. The problem that this thesis is concerned with is referred to
as the “knowledge acquisition bottleneck”. This problem is most associated
with position C – with the literature regarding the problem coming primarily
from those that share the stance, though the problem can be loosely associ-
ated with position B. Position A is more a stance of methodology in relation
to this thesis and the problem it addresses, so has little association with the
problem.
In order to understand the knowledge acquisition bottleneck problem, first
a related concept known as commonsense knowledge needs to be described.
Commonsense knowledge refers to the “every-day” knowledge that every hu-
man knows and uses, such as an expectation that when a ball is thrown into
the air, it will eventually come down again; or that if someone has been walk-
ing in one direction and becomes occluded by a bush, that the person will
eventually re-appear at the other side of the bush. Knowing these sorts of
things is crucial if an agent is to interact within a human world, either in
attempting to understand the large amount of implicit details in any form of
human communication or simply just to carry out a simple robotics task in a
robust manner.
The study of commonsense knowledge has been historically linked strongly
with those that study how that knowledge in general can be represented and
reasoned with and so is traditionally encoded in the tools favoured by that
community of researchers, namely predicate logic. The amount of knowledge
that commonsense knowledge covers is vast, both in breadth and depth. In
addition, this form of knowledge is typically highly inter-dependent, which
means that a large amount of it is needed to be encoded before it can be
used. Up until the last ten years or so, commonsense knowledge was always
encoded manually. Due to the fact that typically large amounts of knowledge
were needed, encoding this knowledge was a task that was both highly tedious
and costly – due to the task needing to be done by highly trained people.
This problem of encoding commonsense knowledge is known as the knowledge
acquisition bottleneck.
This thesis looks at a possible approach to addressing this problem by hav-
ing machines acquire the knowledge from first-hand experience, using classical
conditioning as the method of machine learning. Due to the vast area that
commonsense knowledge covers, this thesis looks at a niche of commonsense
knowledge – that of learning to predict certain types of visual event. These
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predictions, when learned, could be argued to correspond to particular pieces
of knowledge, such as “when a ball is observed to move upwards, it is to be
expected that it will later move downwards”. A fuller description of the knowl-
edge acquisition bottleneck and other approaches that have been used to deal
with the problem can be found in chapter three.
1.3 Hypotheses
In considering the positions taken and the problem undertaken by this thesis,
two inter-related hypotheses arose. These hypotheses shall be simultaneously
tested by this thesis. If they are allowed to stand after testing, then they imply
that the approach to dealing with the knowledge acquisition problem this
thesis takes may be valid. After stating the two hypotheses, each hypothesis
shall be discussed in more detail.
Hypothesis A: The phenomena of classical conditioning can be used as a
mechanism-independent specification for a system that allows an agent
to learn a commonsense knowledge model of its environment.
Hypothesis B: An agent using the phenomena of classical conditioning that
passively observes a dynamic environment will still be able to learn a
partial commonsense knowledge model of that environment.
1.3.1 Hypothesis A
Classical conditioning is a collection of related phenomena that are based on a
single process whereby two stimuli, one of which is biologically relevant to the
animal, when presented to an animal together, form an association in the mind
of the animal – an association that strengthens over repeated presentations.
One proposal about the nature of the classical conditioning phenomena is
that they are the mechanism that allows an animal to learn a model of its
environment (Sokolov, 1960; Schmajuk et al., 1996).
Commonsense knowledge is a field of artificial intelligence that is concerned
with the representation and reasoning of the knowledge of the world that ap-
pears to be self-evident to humans, such as “Trees are usually green” and
“Things that go up, later come down”. When taken a whole, a commonsense
knowledge base effectively comprises a model of the human environment. As
such, if classical conditioning is a mechanism for learning a model of an envi-
ronment, then it should be able to be used to learn commonsense knowledge.
By exposing a computer program that learns through classical conditioning to
a stream of events, this thesis posits that the system will produce a model of
how those events interrelate.
Importantly for this use of classical conditioning to build a commonsense
knowledge base, all the phenomena of classical conditioning are described in
purely behavioural “input-output” terms. This means that as long as the each
input gives the correct output, the process that turns one into the other does
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not necessarily need to be biologically plausible. This is the reasoning for
why the hypothesis states that it is believed that the classical conditioning is
independent of its mechanism. This allows from a more software engineering
perspective, for the list of phenomena of classical conditioning to act as if it
were a feature list of a software specification. In chapter two, each of these
phenomena is described and analysed in terms of how it contributes to a
learning agent.
1.3.2 Hypothesis B
The proposal that classical conditioning specifies the mechanism that allows an
animal to learn a model of its environment can be interpreted to imply that the
phenomena of classical conditioning may not just apply when one of the stimuli
is biologically relevant to the animal. The association may be more general,
but instead it is that case that when an association involves a biologically
relevant stimulus, that the learned association can be observed externally.
This interpretation is effectively that of the stimulus-stimulus interpretation
of classical conditioning, which is further described in chapter two.
A direct implication for not requiring the presence of a biologically relevant
stimulus for learning to occur is that an agent should be able to learn any given
association within the environment, even when the agent has not yet acted
upon the environment. A consequence of this is that it should be possible for
an agent to passively learn an environment and still accrue, through passive
association of stimuli, knowledge of that environment.
There are two qualifiers to this argument: Firstly, the agent’s environment
needs to be dynamic – if an environment is sufficiently constrained that the
agent is the only cause of change an environment then passive observation will
not produce learning, as the environment will not change. Secondly, passive
observation may not necessarily allow for a complete description of an envi-
ronment. If the agent is able to change the environment in ways that would
not occur without the an action arising from the agent, or areas of the environ-
ment are not able to be observed without action arising from the agent, then
a complete description of the environment is not possible based on passive
observation alone.
Work based upon classical conditioning from within machine learning and
artificial intelligence in general has been focused on attempting to maximise
rewards received from the environment based upon the agent’s actions within
that environment. This is usually referred to as the reinforcement learning
problem. In such a problem, passive learning does not occur, as passivity
does not allow for rewards to occur. Therefore, to investigate this hypothe-
sis requires the traditional reinforcement learning problem to be abandoned.
Chapter three looks at reinforcement learning in the context of work related
to this thesis.
The field of artificial intelligence benefits from investigating these two hy-
potheses. Testing both of these hypotheses necessitates the construction of
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a system that firstly implements at least some of the phenomena of classical
conditioning and secondly learns passively. If either or both of the hypotheses
are confirmed by testing the system, then a new learning algorithm will have
been developed in the process, furthering the field of artificial intelligence.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is structured as follows. In chapter two, the background of classical
conditioning and its phenomena are explained. Along-side this description, a
machine learning-based analysis of classical conditioning is presented. This
analysis starts with a first-principles analysis of the criteria what a system
would need to do to learn about its environment passively. These criteria then
are used to analyse the phenomena of classical conditioning, to demonstrate
a correspondence between the two.
Chapter three discusses the work related to this thesis. First the chapter
discusses attempts made to model the phenomena of classical conditioning.
Next the chapter looks at the nature of commonsense knowledge. This is
followed by a review of an existing form of conditioning-based machine learning
known as reinforcement learning. Finally the chapter briefly reviews some of
the research in computer vision into event detection and tracking.
In chapter four the workings of the system are described in detail. This
includes the input processing and a description in turn of each of the four
modules that the system is comprised of. Also included in chapter four is a
description of the mechanism of each of the ten models of classical conditioning
that have been developed.
In chapter five, the methods that are used to evaluate the system are de-
scribed. This includes the systems used for producing the required input data.
This is followed by chapter six which presents the results of that evaluation.
The whole thesis is then rounded off by chapter seven which includes the
conclusions drawn, a review of the contributions of the thesis and a discussion
of potential further research avenues this thesis highlights.
Appendix A lists the logical definitions of all the basic events that are used
to create the patterns of events that are recognised by the system described
by this thesis.
Appendix B provides the mathematical derivations for the equations used
by some of the models of classical conditioning.
Appendix C lists that Gantt charts that were used as part of the effort to
generate a proxy ground truth, as described in section 5.3.
Appendix D lists the various constants that can be set within the system,
along with the values that they were set to in the evaluation.
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Chapter 2
Classical Conditioning and its
Analysis
The ideas that this thesis contributes towards machine learning, and artificial
intelligence more generally, are firmly rooted in the ideas of classical condition-
ing. This chapter will both introduce and analyse those ideas from classical
conditioning. The approach to analysing classical conditioning begins with a
derivation of a list of criteria of what a passive learning system would need to
be able to do in order to learn a model of its environment, regardless of any
function, implementation, or approach. These criteria give a context in which
classical conditioning can be analysed.
Classical conditioning itself consists of many different phenomena, as shall
be discussed in the first section of this chapter. Therefore, in the analysis of
classical conditioning, the form it will take will be to introduce each of the
phenomena in turn and then compare each individual phenomenon against
the criteria that were previously derived. The list of phenomena covered by
the analysis is larger than those that could be feasibly implemented in time
allowed for a single project. Because of this, the list of phenomena is split in
two – those phenomena that are used by the system introduced in chapter four,
and those that are not. It is however still important to cover the phenomena
that are not used by the system, as it is only when they are included that the
correspondence between the criteria derived and the phenomena of classical
conditioning can be demonstrated.
Analysing classical conditioning in this manner demonstrates that it can
satisfy all of the criteria without reference to any underlying learning mech-
anism. This gives a basis to both hypotheses. Firstly, a basis is given to
hypothesis A by showing that classical conditioning can be used as a machine
learning specification. Secondly, there is a basis for hypothesis B because the
analysis is based on a passive learning system.
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Due to the analytical process described above, the structure of this chapter
is as follows: The first section will give a short, abstract overview of classical
conditioning, introducing the basic concepts and terminology. Also included
in this first section are some general analytic remarks about classical condi-
tioning that need to be made, but are linked neither to the criteria nor any
specific phenomenon. After that basic overview and analysis, the second sec-
tion derives and presents the twelve criteria that the phenomena of classical
conditioning are compared against. The next two sections introduce and anal-
yse twenty-eight of the phenomena of classical conditioning. The first of these
two sections covers those phenomena that are directly used by the system pre-
sented in chapter four and the section after covers those that were not. After
the phenomena are introduced and analysed, the final section discusses two
competing interpretations of classical conditioning from within the classical
conditioning community, as the work of this thesis is based upon one of these
interpretations.
2.1 An Overview of Classical Conditioning
Classical conditioning is the name given to a collection of psychological phe-
nomena that are concerned with associative learning. These phenomena are
also known as Pavlovian conditioning, named after Ivan Pavlov, one of the
primary people who introduced the theory. Pavlov’s widely-known experi-
ments with dogs, first published in English in 1927 (Pavlov, 1927) were among
the first experiments to demonstrate the fundamental phenomena of Classi-
cal Conditioning. Pavlov’s cardinal experiment was to create an audible tone
(mostly a bell or metronome) immediately prior to the dogs having a substance
directly placed into their mouth that would cause the reflex action of saliva-
tion (usually meat powder or a weak acid). This was done multiple times.
The same audible tone was then presented to the dogs without the presen-
tation of the substance. The result was that the dogs’ salivary response was
observable with the tone even when substance was not presented. The extent
of the salivary response without the substance correlated with the number of
prior presentations where both the tone and substance were presented jointly.
Pavlov used this experiment and others like it to derive a theory of learning.
The theory of learning that Pavlov derived from this is that an arbitrary
neutral stimulus can become associated with any non-neutral stimulus, (i.e. a
stimulus that triggers a reflex response) based on their similar co-occurrence
in time. Thus when the neutral stimulus is presented alone, the subject gives
a related response to the unconditioned response. In the literature surround-
ing classical conditioning, the names of the stimulus and the responses have
particular names. The neutral stimulus is known as the conditioned stimulus
(C.S.) which in Pavlov’s experiment corresponds to the generated tone. The
non-neutral stimulus is termed the unconditioned stimulus (U.S.) which in
Pavlov’s experiment corresponds to the substance placed in the dogs’ mouths.
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The response to the non-neutral stimulus is called the unconditioned response
(U.R.) which in Pavlov’s experiment corresponds to the salivary reflex the dogs
had to the substance. The response to the neutral stimulus after the associ-
ation had been formed is the conditioned response (C.R.) which in Pavlov’s
experiment corresponds to the salivary response the dogs had to the tone when
the substance was not present.
There are five general observations that have arisen as a consequence of
the analysis of classical conditioning. The first and most important of which
is that classical conditioning can be seen as a mechanism to learn predictions.
This is not a unique insight of itself, for example the S.B. model (Sutton &
Barto, 1981), a model of classical conditioning presented in chapter three, is
based on such an observation. However, no mention has been encountered
in the classical conditioning literature discussing the issue of noise within the
learning process. Noise and the dangers of over-fitting are central concepts
within the topic of machine learning (Russell & Norvig, 2003, p. 657 & p. 662)
and a key component of the analysis presented in this chapter.
The second observation is that different approaches to understanding the
process of learning have given different names to what can be argued is the
same thing. In the section deriving the criteria of a learning agent, it is called
a sensor state. In the classical conditioning literature, it is called a stimulus.
In the artificial intelligence literature it is called an event. Each of these terms
makes sense when used within their particular approach; sensors convey their
information in series of momentary states; an animal’s neurones are stimulated
by a stimulus; an observed event can predict another event. However, when
combining the approaches, this can become confusing. Therefore from this
point on in this thesis, unless the subject of discussion is better served by
using a particular term, this thesis shall refer to all three as an event. The
reason the term “event” is chosen it that it is the most general term in a
semantic sense, but from the point of view of an agent, all three can be said
to be equivalent. Momentary input states can be said to be the smallest
perceptible component of a stimulus because their current state is caused by
some stimulus and they can be said to be events because they are caused by a
dynamic environment and each momentary state value has a definite start and
end time. Stimuli can be said to be a set of momentary input states because
their presentation causes a set of those states to change and they can be said
to be events because they are presented to the subject for a definite period of
time. Events can be said to be reducible to input states from the subjective
view of an agent because events are observed as changes in input states, and
events can be said to be stimuli because an event cannot be observed if it does
not stimulate some part of an agent.
The third general observation is that, from a logical semantics point of
view, conditioning can be seen as a process of discovering material implications
between two events spread over time. This can be seen in the requirement for
both congruity and contingency between a first event and a second. Because of
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sensory preconditioning and secondary conditioning, phenomena of classical
conditioning that shall be discussed later in this chapter, this effect can be
seen to be independent of the need for an unconditioned stimulus for these
implications to form.
The fourth general observation is that the magnitude (or salience / notice-
ability) of an event is a factor in the conditioning process. This can be seen
to be the strategy employed to deal with the issue of having more sense data
available than can be processed in the time allowed (criterion 11 of the criteria
derived in the next section). This is a rational strategy as by prioritising the
data in order of magnitude the agent can process the data in the likely order
that an event will have a large effect on the environment and/or the agent.
The fifth and final general point is that the amount of response given in
anticipation of an event can be seen to be a gradual change proportional to
the certainty of the predicted event and its expected magnitude. The antic-
ipation also gradually changes inversely proportional to the expected timing
of the predicted event. This gradual response allows for an optimal use of
the resources used in the response (criterion 12 of the criteria derived in the
next section). By responding proportionally to the certainty, the agent is
hedging its bets that the predicted event will occur. By responding propor-
tionally to the expected magnitude of the predicted event, the agent is using
as much resources as needed to deal with the predicted event and no more.
By responding in an inversely proportional manner to the expected timing of
the predicted event, the agent is avoiding committing to sustaining a large
quantity of resource over a long time without any return on that investment.
2.2 An Analysis of the Criteria for a Passive Learn-
ing System
Both hypothesis A and hypothesis B refer to the need for an agent to build a
model of its environment. This section attempts to derive a list of criteria for
a passive learning system from first principles, independent of any conception
about how a criterion might be satisfied by a learning system. As it is from
first principles, some of the arguments may seem obvious – this is due to
attempting to be comprehensive in the derivation of the criteria. This is a list
of criteria assuming that the agent is learning in a passive manner – where the
agent is not able, through its actions, to influence the state of the environment.
However, some considerations about the needs of an active agent are noted
within the argument, as they have some bearing on the analysis of the classical
conditioning phenomena presented in the next two sections.
The purpose of modelling any form of phenomenon or environment is that
it allows for the user of that model to attempt to predict the future given the
current state. By imbuing an agent with the capacity to create an internal
model of its environment, it allows the agent to predict the imminent behaviour
of that environment and so allow a rational response to that behaviour.
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The only way an agent can build a model of its environment is through
its senses. This means that for any agent, before any form of inference is
applied, all that exists is a great many typed input signals each providing
data of a particular momentary value. Through the use of memory, those
momentary signals can be combined with some timing data. Through the
signal’s data type, those momentary signals can be augmented with both its
spatial relationship to other signals and the nature of the input (e.g. the
signal of a visual sensor or a microphone input). This gives the agent a many-
channelled stream of typed input values from which a model must be built.
Therefore, as this is the only data available to the agent, by the definition
of a model, the task of creating an agent that is able to learn a model of its
environment is the same as the task of building an agent with the ability to
predict how a given signal will change based on the current and previous states
of all the signals available to that agent.
In any consistent environment, if the same type of event happens more
than once, at least some of the signals will repeat the same pattern of input
signals. These patterns of signal values could be repetitions across the spatial,
temporal or source-type dimensions, or any combination of those dimensions.
It is through these repeated patterns that a learning system must learn to
create its prediction – by coming to expect what comes next in the patterns.
Stated in logical terms, the patterns that need to be learned are chains of signal
states implying that another signal state will follow. Therefore, any learning
system will need to learn its environmental model from repeated co-occurrence
of particular signal values. It will also need to allow for the chaining of these
predictive states to allow for more complex patterns.
Some patterns of signals will be independent of the magnitude of those
signals. In other words, the same pattern holds even though the signal values
themselves have been subjected to the same function – for example a pattern
of signals has been subjected to addition or multiplication by a constant factor.
An example of this that a pattern signal increases in value three times in a row
followed by a reduction in value three times in a row, this pattern would hold
whether the interval of each increase is 1 or a 100. An example of this can be
seen in the colour constancy effect (Mollon, 1985); the same object can appear
to be different colours under different lighting yet a human can still identify
what the object’s colour would be under white light. This implies the need for
a passive learning system to recognise a pattern independently of variations
in the magnitude of the pattern. However, there needs to be a limit to the
variations allowed. Otherwise, allowing sufficient changes in the magnitude of
a pattern would allow that pattern to match in circumstances where it does
not apply, especially if the magnitude changes are non-linear. All this implies
that a criterion for a passive learning system is that the system should allow
for bounded variance within a pattern.
When attempting to predict a given signal state value, there will be several
candidate signal states that have co-occurred to greater or lesser extents. Some
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of these signal states will be due to mere happenstance, some due to a true
environmental pattern. The latter are the desired pattern states the former
are termed noise and should be ignored. Therefore another requirement for a
learning system is to separate the true predictive states from the noise states.
The need to separate noise from true predictions leads to two trade-offs.
The first of these trade-offs is between reliability of prediction and the speed
at which a prediction is learned. In an ideal world, a learning system would
instantly learn patterns of events based upon one presentation – this would
allow for rapid learning of the environmental model. However, due to the
presence of noise, more instances of a pattern are needed to ensure that an
observed pattern is not just noise. Note that it could be the case that the same
happenstance occurred a second or subsequent time. All this entails that a
learning system needs to be able to sensibly deal with the trade-off between
the reliability of a prediction and how quickly that prediction is acquired.
The second trade-off is between the reliability of a prediction and how far
in advance a prediction can be made. The further in advance a prediction
can be made, the more time the agent has to make any preparations for any
particularly desirable or undesirable signal states. However, the further in
advance an agent attempts to predict a state, the more potential predictive
states have to be evaluated, as more time has passed for there to be more
variety of signals to occur. This wider selection of signal states allows for a
greater chance for a noisy co-occurrence to recur, which could allow for the
noise signal to be seen as a predictor. Therefore a learning system needs to be
able to sensibly deal with the trade-off between the reliability of a prediction
and how far in advance that prediction can be made.
Because of the previous two trade-offs, if an agent is particularly unlucky
in its experience of noise, then it may learn an incorrect prediction due to that
noise. The agent thus needs the capacity to undo that learned prediction in
the face of new evidence that it is untrue. There is also another case where
a prediction made by the model would need to be retracted. In a dynamic
environment, patterns that were once present can disappear over time, simply
due to the environment changing around the agent. These trade-offs also
need to be dealt with in the case that the pattern is dependent on a random
occurrence. This will be discussed later in this section.
There is another consequence of a dynamic environment. Some behaviours
of an environment can be state-dependent. What is meant by state-dependent
is that a pattern of observed signal values may be dependent on hidden or non-
local aspects of the environment. A more concrete example of this would be a
sequence of lights that follows different patterns depending on the state of a
hidden switch. In other words, there is a class of patterns that can be present
some of the time but only in the correct circumstances. These circumstances
may or may not have a direct signal or set of signals that indicate whether
a particular pattern will be able to be detected or not. There may be signal
indicating a pattern is able to be found or a signal that indicates that a pattern
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may not be found. These two cases are independent of each other, leading to
four distinct cases that a learning agent needs to be able to learn within. The
first case is that two signals or sets of signals exist, one that indicate that the
state-contingent pattern may be able to be found and another that indicate
when that pattern will not be found. The second case is that there exists a
signal or set of signals that indicate that a state-contingent pattern may be
able to be found but there does not exist a signal or set of signals that indicate
that that pattern may not be able to be found. The third case is that there
does not exist a signal or set of signals that indicate a pattern may be able to
be found but there does exist a signal or set of signals that indicate a pattern
will not be found. The final case is that no signal or set of signals exists that
either indicate that a pattern is able to be found or is not able to be found. All
four of these cases need to be dealt with by the agent. Table 2.1 summaries
these states.
Case The pattern is able to
be found
The pattern is not able
to be found
1 Indicator signal exists Indicator signal exists
2 Indicator signal exists No indicator signal exists
3 No indicator signal exists Indicator signal exists
4 No indicator signal exists No indicator signal exists
Table 2.1: A summary of the four situations a state-dependent pattern can
be in.
Some signal states do predict other signal sates, but in a stochastic or
indeterminate manner rather than in a directly deterministic manner. These
patterns of prediction should still be learned by the agent as the pattern does
exist. However, this complicates the need to avoid noise, as it becomes harder
to distinguish happenstance from a genuine probabilistic relationship. Even a
single pairing of two events can be seen as evidence of a very low probability
stochastic relationship. Therefore a learning system needs to be able to learn
stochastic patterns of signal states while sensibly dealing with the trade-off of
discriminating between stochastic patterns and noise.
The learning system needs to fulfil all of the previous needs in a compu-
tationally efficient manner. Without designs and compromises in favour of
computational efficiency, the task of learning new patterns and even using
any existing learned patterns can become slow to the point where an active
agent is no longer able to react to the environment timely enough. With this
in mind, a learning system needs to have strategies in place to address this
compromise between the breadth and depth of the patterns the agent can
learn and computational efficiency. For systems that have a great number of
different channels of sense data, this compromise may lead to some sense data
not being processed in any meaningful way. Due to this a learning system
will need to have a strategy to deal with having more sense data than can be
realistically processed.
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Finally, some acknowledgement is required for how a passive learning sys-
tem behaves as part of a wider active learning system. This limited acknowl-
edgement is required to allow for a more complete interpretation of the phe-
nomena of classical conditioning as it learns passively – as it is the case that
any passive learning in classical conditioning is a part of a wider active learn-
ing system. If a passive learning system is a part of a wider agent that acts
within its environment then this may have extra consequences for the passive
learning system – as is touched upon with earlier parts of this discussion. Re-
acting to a particularly desirable or undesirable sensor state may also use up
resources available to the agent – such as energy. Therefore a passive learning
system that is a part of an active learning agent needs to learn in a way such
that the predictions it learns allow for optimal use of the agent’s resources.
The following list summarises the issues a passive learning agent will need
to deal with that have arisen from the above discussion:
1. A passive learning system needs to learn its environmental model from
repeated co-occurrence of particular signal values.
2. A passive learning system needs to allow for bounded variance within a
pattern.
3. A passive learning system needs to allow for the chaining of predictive
states to allow for more complex patterns.
4. A passive learning system needs to separate the true predictive states
from the noise states.
5. A passive learning system needs to sensibly deal with the trade-off be-
tween the reliability of a prediction and how quickly that prediction is
acquired.
6. A passive learning system needs to sensibly deal with the trade-off be-
tween the reliability of a prediction and how far in advance that predic-
tion can be made.
7. A passive learning system needs to undo a learned prediction in the face
of new evidence that indicates that the prediction is untrue.
8. A passive learning system needs to learn that a given pattern of predic-
tions may be contingent on the environment being in the correct state.
This contingency needs to be learned where:
(a) There is a signal state or set of signal states that indicate when a
pattern can be found and also a signal state or set of signal states
that indicate when that pattern cannot be found.
(b) There is a signal state or set of signal states that indicate when a
pattern can be found but not a signal state or set of signal states
that indicate when that pattern cannot be found.
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(c) There is not a signal state or set of signal states that indicate when
a pattern can be found but there is a signal state or set of signal
states that indicate when that pattern cannot be found.
(d) There is not a signal state or set of signal states that indicate when
a pattern can be found and also there is no signal state or set of
signal states that indicate when that pattern cannot be found.
9. A passive learning system needs to learn stochastic patterns of signal
states while sensibly dealing with the trade-off of discriminating between
stochastic patterns and noise.
10. A passive learning system needs to have strategies in place to address the
compromise between the breadth and depth of the patterns the agent
can learn and computational efficiency with which they are learned.
11. A passive learning system needs to have strategies to deal with the case
of having more sense data than can realistically be processed.
12. A passive learning system that is a part of an active learning agent needs
to learn in a way such that the predictions it learns allow for optimal
use of the agent’s resources.
2.3 Phenomena Used by the System
Since Pavlov’s initial discovery of the learned association between stimuli, a
wide range of connected phenomena concerning the interaction of conditioned
stimuli and unconditioned stimuli have been discovered. The main phenomena
are described and analysed in this and the next section. Schmajuk (2008)
provides a comprehensive yet concise overview of most of the phenomena in
both sections.
As previously discussed, the phenomena are primarily analysed against
the criteria derived in the previous section. The analysis parts of this and the
next section demonstrate that classical conditioning satisfies all of the criteria,
lending support to both hypotheses.
The split between the phenomena in this section and those in the next sec-
tion is to some extent quite arbitrary, being sorted by whether a phenomenon
has been explicitly used by the system described in chapter four. However, this
section does include the phenomena that are arguably the most fundamental,
such as acquisition and extinction and those that are the most discussed in
the literature, such as blocking and conditioned inhibition. This is because
it is quite natural to prioritise the implementation of these phenomena when
building the system presented in chapter four. This does not however degrade
the importance of those phenomena included in the next section.
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To summarise, the phenomena described and analysed in this section are:
1. Acquisition
2. Extinction
3. The Inter-Stimulus Interval
4. Reacquisition
5. Blocking
6. Recovery from Blocking
7. Conditioned Inhibition
8. Extinction of Conditioned
Inhibition
9. Latent Inhibition
10. U.S.-Pre-Exposure Effect
11. Sensory Preconditioning
12. Secondary Conditioning
2.3.1 Acquisition
Acquisition is the process whereby the conditioned stimulus becomes asso-
ciated with the unconditioned stimulus and thus the conditioned response.
This is the phenomenon that was discovered first, as discussed in section 2.1.
The strength of the association (e.g. measured by the amount of saliva pro-
duced) is a sigmoid-like function of the number of reinforcements of the condi-
tioned stimulus (i.e. the number of presentations of the conditioned stimulus
where the unconditioned stimulus follows). Acquisition was first described by
Pavlov (1927).
2.3.1.1 Analysis
Almost by definition, acquisition demonstrates learning from repeated co-
occurrence of particular events (criterion 1). However, the phenomenon also
helps fulfil other criteria in the way those co-occurrences are used. The pro-
cess indicates that the agent only needs an iteratively updated current measure
of association between any two events that have previously been associated,
as opposed to the storage of the complete association history of each pair of
events. By only using a current measure, the computational costs of storing
that data are minimal for each pair of events (criterion 10).
The use of a sigmoid-like curve offers further contributions towards satis-
fying the identified criteria. This can be seen by comparing the sigmoid curve
against a linear curve. The sigmoid initially accumulates lower association
strength than the linear curve, followed by a sudden fast increase in accu-
mulation giving greater association strength than linear, and followed by a
tail-off as the association strength asymptotically approaches one. This pat-
tern of accumulation can be seen to be acting as a “soft” threshold, where
there is always an increase, but has almost all of its gains around the thresh-
old value. This allows for the suppression of noise (criterion 4), as noise is
likely to occur at a lower frequency than true event patterns.
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2.3.2 Extinction
Extinction is the process whereby a conditioned stimulus that is already associ-
ated with the unconditioned stimulus is repeatedly and consistently presented
to the subject without the unconditioned stimulus. The strength of the asso-
ciation is weakened and eventually returns to the same level of association as
observed prior to acquisition. Extinction was first described by Pavlov (1927).
2.3.2.1 Analysis
Like acquisition, extinction is almost by definition a mechanism that can undo
a learned prediction in the face of new evidence that indicates that the predic-
tion is untrue (criterion 7). Again, there is some contribution to other criteria
too. Extinction works at all association strength levels, not just at high levels.
This means, that when combined with the initial slow accumulation of associ-
ation strength, extinction can help keep noise below the soft threshold of the
sigmoid curve (criterion 4).
2.3.3 The Inter-Stimulus Interval
The inter-stimulus interval (I.S.I.) is the time between the start of the con-
ditioned stimulus and the start of the unconditioned stimulus. This interval
induces two modes of acquisition: delay and trace conditioning. Delay con-
ditioning is where the conditioned stimulus overlaps or finishes immediately
before the unconditioned stimulus appears. Trace conditioning is where the
conditioned stimulus finishes with a period of inactivity before the uncondi-
tioned stimulus appears. The inter-stimulus interval affects the rate of acquisi-
tion of a C.S.-U.S. association. The rate follows a curve where small intervals
are negligible, it then rapidly moves up to a peak and then gently decays,
similar to the curve of a log-normal distribution. An idealised version of this
is shown in Figure 2.1. The difference between delay and trace conditioning
is that the latter has a much faster decay after the peak. The effect of the
inter-stimulus interval was first described by Pavlov (1927). The shape of
the curve was built up over a number of studies, notably by Schneiderman &
Gormezano (1964) and by Smith (1968).
2.3.3.1 Analysis
When attempting to learn with long intervals between the predictor event and
the predicted event, there needs to be a cut-off point after which a prediction
is not processed. The reason this is needed is that otherwise, every event the
learning system has ever experienced would need to be associated to some
extent with every other event type that has ever been experienced. Not only
is this computationally inefficient, violating criterion 10, it makes the learned
associations become useless, as every event would to some extent predict every
other event that came after it in the entire lifetime of the agent.
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Figure 2.1: An idealised diagram showing the effects of the I.S.I. for a fixed
number of reinforcements.
By reducing the association strength as the inter-stimulus interval in-
creases, it implies that at some point the gain in association strength from a
pairing of two events will drop to nothing (assuming that association strength
is quantised at some level). This gives a natural cut-off for computational
efficiency (criteria 10 and 11).
The gradual reduction of the association strength gains as the inter-stimulus
interval increases also allows for a sensible trade-off between the reliability of a
prediction and how far in advance a prediction can be made (criterion 7). The
gradual reduction means that noise events with a high inter-stimulus interval
have less influence. This takes into account the fact that it will be likely that
more noise events occur for longer inter-stimulus intervals.
When a preceding event does not finish as or after the predicted event
starts, as is the case with trace conditioning, there is a higher likelihood that
the event is noise rather than being a proper predictive relationship. This can
be seen to be because of a poorer temporal relationship with the predicted
event. Therefore trace conditioning implies a higher likelihood that a given
event is noise, for a fixed inter-stimulus interval. Therefore, the faster drop-
off of gains in association strength in the case of trace conditioning allows
the learning system to retain a sensible trade-off between the reliability of a
prediction and how far in advance a prediction can be made (criterion 6).
The reduction in association strength gains for longer inter-stimulus inter-
vals also allows for a better allocation of resources, as low association strengths
found with long inter-stimulus intervals elicit only a weak response. This al-
lows the total resources used by maintaining a ready state over a long time to
be minimised (criterion 12).
Predictive value also serves a possible explanation for the reduction in
association strength gains for very short inter-stimulus intervals, as for very
short intervals, the prediction is too immediate to be useful. In addition, as
the difference between the start points of each event decreases, it becomes
preferable to see the two events as being part of a parallel compound event
rather than having a predictive relationship.
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2.3.4 Reacquisition
Reacquisition is the name given to the phenomenon where a previously ex-
tinguished C.S.-U.S. association is acquired again. During reacquisition, it
takes fewer reinforcements to re-acquire the same strength of association than
it did the previous time that the association was acquired. Reacquisition was
first described by Pavlov (1927). Figure 2.2 exhibits an idealised version of
how reacquisition (and by extension, acquisition and extinction) modifies the
strength of the conditioned response based on the number of presentations of
the relevant stimuli. The curve shows four cycles with each cycle split into
two phases. The first phase reinforces the conditioned stimulus (labelled by
“R”) and the second phase non-reinforces the conditioned stimulus (labelled
by “NR”). Each “R” phase shows the sigmoid-shaped curve of the acquisition
phenomenon. Each “NR” phase shows the sharp linear decay of the extinc-
tion phenomenon. Each phase presents the same number of relevant stimuli.
For each new cycle, the number of presentations required to reach the peak
conditioned response strength of the previous cycle is lower. This shows the
phenomenon of reacquisition. The figure is based on the results presented in
Balkenius and More´n (1998).
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Figure 2.2: An idealised diagram showing the effect of Reacquisition.
2.3.4.1 Analysis
Consider an environment where a part of that environment is state-dependent,
but there may or may not be any cues to give any indication which state that
part of the environment is currently in (criterion 8 a–d). To be able to adapt
to the case where an association between events gets observed in intermittent
bursts, the agent would need to learn to quickly switch between a state where
the association exists and a state where it does not exist.
The process of reacquisition can show how this can be done within the
paradigm of conditioning. By allowing gradual speed-up of the rate of acqui-
sition, the switching between states of the association existing will eventually
allow for full or near-full acquisition of association strength within a single ob-
servation, and the same for extinction. This allows for rapid switching between
states of an association existing and not existing.
This ability to switch should only be gained gradually, with each switch
between states of strong association requiring fewer observations. If this were
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not the case, then after acquiring a strong association for the first time, any
extinctions and further acquisitions would cause the agent to switch between
high association strength and low association strength. This is undesirable
because such a system would violate criterion 3: If there was an initial glut of
the same form of noise, such that a high association strength value is attained,
but later became extinguished due to the nature of it being noise, then every
instance of that type of noise would later cause the full reinstatement of that
association. By gradually reducing the number of instances required for the
reinstatement of a strong association it means that single occasional instances
of a past noise-based strong association does not fully reinstate that strong
association. While a single noisy stimulus paring will still be associated, this
noise will more likely be extinguished quickly, and so the acquisition rate will
only increase by an insignificant amount.
2.3.5 Blocking
Firstly the subject is conditioned to a C.S.-U.S. pairing. Secondly, another
conditioned stimulus is introduced alongside the original pairing (such that
all three stimuli are present) and provided with further reinforcements. The
second conditioned stimulus will only ever display a weaker response on its
own than would normally be the case for the number of reinforcements. This
is known as the blocking effect and was discovered by Kamin (1969).
2.3.5.1 Analysis
The blocking effect only occurs when both potential predictor events are
present. If both potential predictor events are presented as separate trials,
then both associations can become strong associations. From this, it can be
seen that the reason for the blocking effect is that it allows for noise events to
occur at the same time as a predictor event and its corresponding predicted
event. In the case where there is an event with a strong association to the
predicted event and another event which has little or no association strength,
the strong association is able to adequately predict the predicted event on its
own, and so little credit can be given to the event with little or no association
strength. This allows the learning agent an additional robustness to noise
(criterion 4).
2.3.6 Recovery from Blocking
Blocking only holds while a strong C.S.-U.S. association holds. If the strong
association is extinguished, then it will no longer prevent any other conditioned
stimulus from having a conditioned response due to an association with the
unconditioned stimulus. This effect was found by Matzel et al. (1985).
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2.3.6.1 Analysis
As described above, blocking can be seen as a mechanism where the presence
of an event that is adequately predictive, can stop another (as yet unseen)
event from becoming a predictor of the same event. If that predictor event
ceases to be a good predictor through extinction, then there is no reason to
stop another event from becoming a predictor. Because of this argument, this
phenomenon can be seen as another strategy to separate out predictive events
from noise events (criterion 4), albeit from a reverse approach to the blocking
effect.
2.3.7 Conditioned Inhibition
Conditioned inhibition refers to an effect where the presence of a specially con-
ditioned stimulus can reduce the response of a different conditioned stimulus
when it is present (with little or no effect when the stimulus is not present).
This can be demonstrated in the following experiment: First, two conditioned
stimuli are conditioned separately to associate with the unconditioned stim-
ulus. A third stimulus is then presented simultaneously with one of the two
previously reinforced conditioned stimuli without the unconditioned stimulus.
After repeated trials of this presentation, presenting this third stimulus along
with the other of the two conditioned stimuli will not elicit a conditioned re-
sponse. When either of the conditioned stimuli is presented without the third
stimulus, the conditioned response is elicited. This effect was first described
by Pavlov (1927) and later expanded on by Rescorla (1969).
2.3.7.1 Analysis
Conditioned inhibition can be seen as a mechanism to allow an agent to learn
that the presence of an event indicates that a particular event pattern will not
be able to be found. In this way, conditioned inhibition can contribute to the
learning of state-dependent patterns of events. More specifically, conditioned
inhibition can assist learning a pattern of events that is contingent on an
environmental state in the cases where there exists an event that indicates
that a particular pattern cannot be found (criterion 8a and criterion 8c).
2.3.8 Extinction of Conditioned Inhibition
Analogous to the extinction effect, any learned inhibitory effect of a stimulus
can be reversed. This is done by presenting the inhibitory stimulus together
with the unconditioned stimulus that the inhibitory stimulus inhibits. This
effect was first described by Pavlov (1927).
2.3.8.1 Analysis
As the conditioned inhibition mechanism is iterative, a conditioned inhibitor
could be created through happenstance and therefore needs to be removed.
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Another situation where a conditioned inhibitor needs to be retracted is where
a conditioned inhibitor that was true in the past has ceased to be true due to a
change in the environment. Extinction of conditioned inhibition demonstrates
that such a mechanism exists. This helps a learner retract predictions (in
this case a prediction of the non-occurrence of an event) that are shown to be
untrue in the face of new evidence (criterion 7). As inhibition associations are
gained as a gradual process like acquisition, this extinction process can help
stop incorrect inhibitory associations from forming (criterion 4), by reducing
the strength of any weak inhibitory association.
2.3.9 Latent Inhibition
When a stimulus is exposed to the subject prior to it being reinforced with the
unconditioned stimulus to form an association, the conditioned response of the
stimulus is weaker than would be the case if the subject was not pre-exposed.
This phenomenon is called latent inhibition and was discovered by Lubow and
Moore (1959).
2.3.9.1 Analysis
In the discussion of the contingency phenomenon in section 2.4.1, latent in-
hibition is involved. In that discussion it is likened in its effect to that of
extinction. Latent inhibition could be seen as a form of pre-emptive extinc-
tion, reducing the predictive value of the event to future new associations, as
it can be assumed that it is a noisy association because the effect was not
observed initially. From this interpretation, latent inhibition can be seen to
be a strategy that allows a learning system to be more resilient to noise (cri-
terion 4). By still allowing association strength to build, but at a slower pace,
new associations can still be made but at a pace that would cause noise to not
build association strength.
2.3.10 U.S.-Pre-Exposure Effect
The U.S.-pre-exposure effect is a duel phenomenon with latent inhibition.
When the unconditioned stimulus is exposed to the subject without a con-
ditioned stimulus and then later is exposed with a conditioned stimulus, the
conditioned response is weaker than would be the case if the subject was not
pre-exposed to the unconditioned stimulus. This phenomenon was also dis-
covered by Lubow and Moore (1959).
2.3.10.1 Analysis
The U.S.-pre-exposure effect can be seen to be the same effect as latent inhi-
bition but for the predicted event of an associative event pair, as was briefly
mentioned in the discussion of the contingency phenomenon. By observing
the event to be predicted prior to any associations, the predictive value of fu-
ture potential predictor events is damaged, as those future potential predictor
- 28 -
events did not predict the initial observations of the event to be predicted. As
with latent inhibition, the purpose of this can be seen to be another strategy
to allow the learning system deal with noise (criterion 4). Again, this is done
in a way that new predictors are allowed, but they have to be proved to be
a predictor to a greater extent before they can be bestowed with a strong
association.
2.3.11 Sensory Preconditioning
Sensory preconditioning involves two stages. In the first stage, two neutral
stimuli are presented together. In the second stage, one of those stimuli is
paired with an unconditioned stimulus. Presentation of the stimulus that was
not paired with the unconditioned stimulus still produces a conditioned re-
sponse, despite not ever being presented alongside the unconditioned stimulus.
Brogden (1939) first demonstrated this effect.
2.3.11.1 Analysis
Both sensory preconditioning and secondary conditioning (discussed below)
are experimental results that indicate the same root phenomenon, namely that
classical conditioning allows for chaining of predictive events (criterion 3). By
chaining predictive events, a learning system is able to build up a model that
allows for prediction of future events further in advance than would be the
case if chaining did not happen. This allows for a learning system to increase
how far in advance predictions can be made in a way that maintains some
level of reliability (criterion 6) because it gives intermediate predictions.
2.3.12 Secondary Conditioning
Also known as second-order conditioning and can be seen as a phenomenon
related to sensory preconditioning. Secondary conditioning is where a sec-
ondary conditioned stimulus can be conditioned to elicit a conditioned re-
sponse through reinforcement only with a primary conditioned stimulus (where
a primary conditioned stimulus is one that has been reinforced with the un-
conditioned stimulus). This effect is typically weak as the extinction of the
primary conditioned stimulus will happen while the secondary conditioned
stimulus is being conditioned. This effect is highly dependent on the saliency
of the unconditioned stimulus. Tertiary conditioning, where there is a chain of
three unconditioned stimuli, can occur but is usually too weak to observe, un-
less the unconditioned stimulus is particularly salient – for example extreme
pain. Along with sensory preconditioning, Brogden (1939) also found this
effect.
2.3.12.1 Analysis
As described in the discussion of sensory preconditioning, both phenomena
can be seen to be results indicating that predictive events can be chained
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(criterion 3) and allow for a way to increase how far in advance predictions
can be made (criterion 6). With secondary conditioning there is a need to also
look at the related results of tertiary conditioning – as its results could indicate
that chaining is a limited effect. Arguably, instead of tertiary conditioning
occurring rarely, tertiary chaining (and higher-order chaining) happens very
regularly. In this alternative view, there is a two-fold cause of the low measured
conditioned response. Firstly, the extinction effect is also occurring while doing
the trials for both secondary and tertiary conditioning.
Another potential reason for a reduction in measurable response is that
when there is an increase in the expected timing of an event that requires a
response. The need to use resources to pre-emptively respond to that expected
event becomes less pressing, and so in order to optimise use of finite resources,
a response is less forthcoming for higher-order chains of conditioning – this can
be seen as a strategy to allow for the optimal use of resources (criterion 12).
2.4 Phenomena Not Used by the System
While reviewing the literature of classical conditioning, a total of twenty-
eight different phenomena were found. Of those phenomena, there was only
enough time to directly implement twelve. However, the remaining sixteen
are still worth discussing. This is because when the respective analyses of
all the phenomena presented in both sections is taken into account, it can
be seen that classical conditioning as a whole satisfies the criteria derived in
section 2.2.
The phenomena covered in this section are:
1. Contingency
2. Generalisation
3. Discrimination
4. Configural Cues
5. Patterning
6. The Inter-Trial Interval
7. Facilitation of Remote
Associations
8. Primacy
9. Temporal Primacy
10. Learning-to-Learn
11. Overshadowing
12. Super-Conditioning
13. Backward Blocking
14. Partial Reinforcement
15. Partial Reinforcement
Extinction Effect
16. Spontaneous Recovery
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2.4.1 Contingency
While the majority of the phenomena discovered deal with the congruity of
stimulus events (i.e. the events occur in the same time and space), congruity
is necessary but not sufficient. For conditioning to occur, the conditioned
stimulus also needs to probabilistically predict when the unconditioned stim-
ulus occurs. This means that the probability of the occurrence of the un-
conditioned stimulus given that the conditioned stimulus did occur must be
greater than the probability of the occurrence of the unconditioned stimu-
lus given that the conditioned stimulus did not occur. Stated symbolically:
P (US.|C.S.) > P (US.|C.S.). The requirement for contingency was experi-
mentally confirmed by Rescorla (1968).
2.4.1.1 Analysis
By requiring there to be a dependency in the Bayesian sense between two
events for a strong association to occur, it allows for a greater resistance to
noisy predictions (criterion 4). This is because it allows for a measure of
the absolute probabilities of each event occurring to influence the estimate
of the events co-occurring. This use of an absolute probability of each event
occurring also contributes to the ability for the learning system to be able
to retract predictions in the face of new evidence – as it implies that each
presentation of either the predictor event or the predicted event without the
other will reduce the association strength (criterion 7).
This thesis holds that this phenomenon of contingency is mostly an epiphe-
nomenon that arises from some of the other phenomena discussed by this the-
sis. To see this, consider that this phenomenon is stating that the association
strength between the predictor event A (the conditioned stimulus) and the
event to be predicted B (the unconditioned stimulus) is proportional to the
difference between the probability that B will happen given that A has hap-
pened and the probability that B will happen given that A has not happened.
This can be expressed in the derivation expressed in equations 2.1 to 2.3, as-
suming that the association strength between A and B is V (AB), and then
applying the definition of conditional probability.
V (A,B) ∝ P (B|A)− P
(
B|A
)
(2.1)
∝
P (A ∩B)
P (A)
−
P
(
A ∩B
)
P
(
A
) (2.2)
∝
P (A ∩B)
P (A)
−
P (B)− P (A ∩B)
1− P (A)
(2.3)
The final expression implies that any value that is proportional (or in-
versely proportional) to at least one of the three values of P (A), P (B) and
P (A ∩ B) can be used as part of a calculation that produces a value that is
proportional to the association strength V (AB). This thesis argues that the
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other phenomena do produce such values. When acquisition occurs, all three
values increase, as positive instances of all three are observed. When extinc-
tion occurs, P (A) increases but the other two values do not change, as only
instances of A are observed; the same is the case for latent inhibition. When
the U.S. pre-exposure effect occurs, P (B) increases but the other two values
do not change, as only instances of B are observed.
Therefore this phenomenon arguably mostly happens as a consequence
of the other observed phenomena. The reason the qualification “mostly” is
applied is that the results of this phenomenon does imply that observation of
event B (the unconditioned stimulus) will decrease the association strength
after the first co-occurrence of the two events together too, as an analogue
to the extinction phenomenon. If such a phenomenon is observed, then this
phenomenon can be said to be just a consequence of other phenomena (or,
conversely, the other phenomena are a consequence of this one phenomenon).
Note that this analysis is expanded in the future work section of chapter
seven, in section 7.3.14 and this expansion indicates that extinction due to the
presentation of B-only instances may only occur in young subjects.
It should also be noted that the classical conditioning literature considers
contingency to be a prerequisite of conditioning rather than a phenomenon of
conditioning. This thesis finds this distinction to be arbitrary and therefore
redundant. This is for two reasons: Firstly, from a semantic perspective, the
term “phenomenon” is a general enough that it should include “prerequisite”.
On a more fundamental level, if the previous analysis is correct, then con-
tingency is not a prerequisite that learning arises from at all, but is instead
an epiphenomenon that arises from learning. If it is indeed a prerequisite,
then there needs to be an explanation for how the subject detects that that
the prerequisite is in place in the first instance, so that learning is allowed to
occur.
2.4.2 Generalisation
A first conditioned stimulus is reinforced with the unconditioned stimulus. If a
new stimulus is then presented that shares enough characteristics with the first
conditioned stimulus, then a conditioned response is elicited. This is despite
the fact that the subject has never been exposed to that stimulus. This effect
was first described by Pavlov (1927).
2.4.2.1 Analysis
Generalisation is based on the assumption that if something has a similar
appearance, it may have similar behaviour. This can be a reasonable assump-
tion, for instance when encountering different members of the same species.
The use of the assumption helps learning in three ways. Firstly, it allows the
learner to have some tolerance to the variance in the events that are recognised
(criterion 2).
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Secondly, it offers a reasonably reliable short-cut to allow a learned predic-
tion to be used when faced with a novel, but similar event. This can be seen
as a strategy to help with the trade-off between the reliability of a prediction
and how quickly a prediction is acquired (criterion 5).
The third way generalisation helps learning is that should a prediction
based on a generalisation be correct, then there is little need to store that
additional association. This means that the data can be stored in a more
compact manner, and so this helps the agent be more computationally efficient
(criterion 10) by preserving memory resources.
2.4.3 Discrimination
As described above, if a stimulus is similar enough to an existing conditioned
stimulus, it will also elicit the same conditioned response. This effect can
be removed for particular stimuli through non-reinforcements of that similar
stimulus, interspersed with reinforcements of the conditioned stimulus so that
extinction does not take place for the original conditioned stimulus. Stimuli
that are similar to the original stimulus in a different manner are unaffected by
the discrimination training. This effect was first described by Pavlov (1927).
2.4.3.1 Analysis
The downside of generalisation is that, ultimately it is making assumptions
that can easily be false. Therefore, discrimination can be seen as a process to
extinguish any false assumptions. Discrimination can therefore help provide a
bound to the variance allowed by generalisation (criterion 2). Discrimination
also helps the agent deal with the trade-off between the reliability of a pre-
diction and how quickly that prediction is acquired (criterion 5) in the same
manner as generalisation. This phenomenon can also be seen as being a mech-
anism for undoing the false predictions of generalisation in the face of new
evidence (criterion 4).
2.4.4 Configural Cues
When conditioning compound stimuli, the compound itself can behave as a
stimulus in its own right. This can be demonstrated in a two main ways:
Firstly, subjects can be conditioned such that a compound stimulus elicits the
conditioned response but its component parts do not. Secondly, subjects can
be conditioned such that no response is given to the compound stimulus, but
any of the component parts do elicit the conditioned response. This effect was
first described by Razran (1939).
2.4.4.1 Analysis
A central concept to understanding configural cues is that an agent does not
know what counts as an individual event and what counts as a parallel com-
pound event of its components. Therefore, it can be viewed that the solution
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demonstrated by the configural cue experiments is to create an association
with both the individual events and their corresponding compound event, in-
ferring that compound events are events in their own right. This allows for
the construction of an environmental model where the association takes place
at the correct level of granularity. By compounding events in this way, the
results of configural cues can be seen to be building up patterns via spatial
and cross-input-type (i.e. associating a visual event with an audial event)
co-occurrence (criterion 1).
The first of the two configural cue results is that component events that
are learned to be not predictor events can be learned to be a predictor as a
compound event. This can be seen as learning that some events are necessary
but not sufficient for a prediction. From a logical viewpoint, the result can be
seen as learning a conjunctive (“and”) relation between the two component
predictor events.
The second of the two configural cue results is that component events
that are learned to be predictor events separately can be learned to not be
a predictor as a compound event. From a logical viewpoint, the result can
be seen as learning an exclusive disjunction (“xor”) relation between the two
component predictor events.
Both types of result contribute to learning a richer environmental model.
However, in addition to this, the first result can also be interpreted as learning
an indication that a state-dependent pattern can be predicted (criterion 8a and
criterion 8b).
2.4.5 Patterning
Patterning involves intermixing presentations of a compound stimulus (i.e.
one that is made up of more than one stimulus) with individual presentations
of the compound stimulus’ component parts. There are two forms of pattern-
ing – positive and negative. In positive patterning, a compound stimulus is
presented with the unconditioned stimulus intermixed with individual presen-
tations of the component parts that are also paired with the unconditioned
stimulus. In negative patterning, a compound stimulus is presented with the
unconditioned stimulus intermixed with individual presentations of the com-
ponent parts that are not paired with the unconditioned stimulus. The result
of positive patterning is that the compound stimulus has a stronger associa-
tion strength value than the sum of its component stimuli association strength
values. The result of negative patterning is that the compound stimulus has
a weaker association strength value than the sum of its component stimuli as-
sociation strength values. Patterning was first demonstrated by Bellingham,
Gillette-Bellingham & Kehoe (1985).
2.4.5.1 Analysis
Patterning can be viewed as an extension to the results of configural cues,
as they involve further interaction between compound events and their cor-
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responding component events. As with the results of the configural cue ex-
periments, the results of the patterning experiments can be interpreted as a
compound event being conditioned as an independent event in its own right.
With positive patterning, where the compound event is reinforced in ad-
dition to separate reinforcements of the constituent events, leading to the
compound providing a greater prediction than the sum of its parts. By as-
suming that a compound event is reinforced separately to its parts, this extra
conditioning can be seen to be due to the separate prediction of the compound
event.
With negative patterning, where the compound event is not reinforced
while the constituent events are separately reinforced, leading to the compound
providing a lesser prediction than the sum of its parts. By assuming that a
compound event is reinforced separately to its parts, this lower conditioning
can be seen to be due to the separate inhibitory prediction of the compound
event.
As with the results of configural cues, a learning system that demonstrates
this phenomenon would be able to learn an environmental model with a suf-
ficient richness to be usable, and can be seen to be building up patterns via
spatial and cross-input-type co-occurrence (criterion 1).
2.4.6 The Inter-Trial Interval
This phenomenon is another effect based on how the trials are timed. The
inter-trial interval (I.T.I) is the time that has elapsed between reinforcements.
It has been shown that increasing the length of the inter-trial interval increases
conditioning. This effect was first described by Pavlov (1927).
2.4.6.1 Analysis
Longer inter-trial intervals imply that the particular event to be predicted is
rarer than shorter inter-trial intervals. This in turn implies that there are
fewer opportunities to learn any predictors of an event. In this case, the need
to learn quickly becomes slightly more pressing than usual, due to the fewer
chances to learn an association. This can be recognised by a change in the
trade-off between the reliability of a prediction and the need to learn quickly
(criterion 5) to be less discriminating between a true prediction and noise.
2.4.7 Facilitation of Remote Associations
Due to the drop-off of association strength as the inter-stimulus interval in-
creases, remote associations are rarely learned. However, if another condi-
tioned stimulus is placed in between the first conditioned stimulus and the
unconditioned stimulus, to form what has been called a “serial compound”,
then the first (remote) conditioned stimulus can gain an association with the
unconditioned stimulus. This effect was first rigorously studied by Kehoe et al.
(1979).
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2.4.7.1 Analysis
This phenomenon can be seen to be the result of an interaction between the
phenomena of the inter-stimulus interval and secondary conditioning / sensory
preconditioning. In this case, the result of the inter-stimulus interval effects
would mean the remote predictor event would normally have a low association
strength value and the closer predictor (the intermediate event) would have
a larger association. Due to secondary conditioning, the intermediate event
becomes associated with the remote event, meaning that the remote event
becomes a predictor for the intermediate event. As the remote event is closer
to the intermediate event, it is a better predictor of the intermediate event
than the final predicted event. This better prediction in turn allows for a
more accurate prediction of the final event because the strong association
with the intermediate event demonstrates that the remote event is less likely
to be a noisy relationship with the final predicted event. Therefore, through
this chain of events, the predictive value of the remote event in predicting the
final predicted event is larger, which is reflected in the association strength.
By allowing an increase in association strength for chains of events, a
learning system can reflect the more reliable prediction of that event chain.
This allows for a strategy to improve the trade-off between the reliability of a
prediction and how far in advance that prediction can be made (criterion 6).
2.4.8 Primacy
In the experiment that demonstrates primacy, two conditioned stimuli are si-
multaneously reinforced such that both conditioned stimuli terminate at the
same time, but the first stimulus is longer than the second. In this sched-
ule, the longer first stimulus gains substantially more association strength
than the shorter second stimulus. This effect was first described by Egger &
Miller (1962).
2.4.8.1 Analysis
When two events predict the same event to the same reliability, but one event is
longer than the other (but not so much that the penalty for long inter-stimulus
intervals would cause a large difference between the two association strengths),
then the longer event should be preferred as this allows for a prediction to be
made further in advance without any loss in reliability (criterion 6). The
primacy effect provides such a mechanism.
Within the S.B. model (Sutton & Barto, 1981), described in the next
chapter, this effect has been observed to be due to a the longer event effectively
receiving two reinforcements of the unconditioned stimulus for each trial: one
reinforcement from the unconditioned stimulus and one reinforcement from
the shorter conditioned stimulus through the effect of secondary conditioning /
sensory preconditioning. This implies that the primacy effect is due to a similar
mechanism as facilitation of remote associations. The S.B. model is able to
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predict the primacy effect. By implementing the S.B. model as described by
Sutton & Barto (1990) in a spread-sheet, where each row displays the model
variables per time step, it was found that even if the predictive value of the
longer event drops even slightly (for example, through introducing a short gap
between the longer conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus), then
the primacy effect can be observed to rapidly diminish.
2.4.9 Temporal Primacy
This is a variant of the primacy effect, and has two phases. In the first phase,
a first conditioned stimulus is associated with the unconditioned stimulus. In
the second phase, a second, longer conditioned stimulus is presented such that
it terminates at the same time as the first stimulus. The observed result is
that not only does the blocking effect fail; the introduction of the longer stim-
ulus causes the association strength of the pre-trained stimulus to be sharply
reduced. This phenomenon was first predicted by Sutton & Barto (1981) in
the S.B. model, which is discussed in the next chapter, and was experimentally
confirmed by Kehoe, Schreurs & Graham (1987).
2.4.9.1 Analysis
As described in the discussion of the primacy effect, primacy can be seen to be
a mechanism to credit the majority of the association strength to the event that
provides the longest prediction without sacrificing reliability (criterion 6). The
temporal primacy effect can therefore be described as a method to transfer the
majority of the association strength (and so corresponding predictive value)
between an existing predictor and a new predictor that is reliably providing a
longer prediction time.
Sutton & Barto (1990) noted that the prediction by the S.B. model at
the time was novel and surprising, asking: “Why should a well-trained C.S.
that continues to be paired with the U.S. in a good temporal relationship
lose associative strength just because a new C.S. is introduced with no initial
association and in a poorer temporal relationship to the U.S.?” (Sutton &
Barto, 1990, pp. 508–509). Sutton & Barto did not suggest any answer to this
question.
This question was briefly investigated as part of this thesis, by implement-
ing the S.B. model within a spread-sheet where each row displays all model
variables per time step. By reviewing the progress of the association strengths,
it was seen that the mechanism in the S.B. model for this behaviour starts as
being the same as for the primacy effect – namely that the longer stimulus
increases its association strength due to a double reinforcement effect from
both the unconditioned stimulus and the shorter conditioned stimulus. This
accounts for the increase in the association strength of the longer stimulus.
To understand the reduction in the association strength to the shorter stim-
ulus, note that the increase in association strength provided to the longer con-
ditioned stimulus from the shorter conditioned stimulus is applied before the
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unconditioned stimulus is presented. In the time-steps immediately prior to
the presentation of the unconditioned stimulus, the sum of the two association
strengths add together to form a prediction that is larger than the magnitude
of the unconditioned stimulus. This leads to a negative difference between the
prediction and reality that gets shared equally between the two conditioned
stimuli, reducing their association strength by the same amount. The gain
in association strength received by the longer stimulus is always larger than
the corresponding reduction for over-prediction by the unconditioned stimu-
lus. Therefore the net result of each trial is that the longer stimulus has an
increase in association strength and the shorter stimulus has a decrease in
association strength. This mechanism therefore supports the view that the
purpose of the primacy and temporal primacy effects is to credit predictive
capacity to the event that provides an accurate prediction for longer.
2.4.10 Learning-to-Learn
To demonstrate learning-to-learn (also known as positive transfer of learning),
a two-phase experiment is used: In the first phase, a first conditioned stimulus
is associated with an unconditioned stimulus. In the second phase, a second
conditioned stimulus is reinforced with the same unconditioned stimulus. The
rate of acquisition in the second phase will be more rapid than in the first
phase. This second conditioned stimulus can be one that has been shown
to not elicit any association due to the generalisation phenomenon. This
phenomenon was first found in a more general sense by Harlow (1949) and
then later found to apply to classical conditioning by Kehoe & Holt (1984).
2.4.10.1 Analysis
The essence of learning-to-learn in the sense used outside of conditioning is
that it allows the use of previous contextual situations to speed up learning
in a new context (Harlow, 1949). Using this to interpret the phenomenon
within the paradigm of classical conditioning, the unconditioned stimulus can
be thought of as a cue for the similarity of situation, therefore demonstrating
that a novel stimulus can be a predictor of the unconditioned stimulus.
Demonstrating that an event is able to be predicted due to one predictor
event increases the possibility that another predictor event exists. With each
extra predictor that is observed, it increases the likelihood that a further
predictor exists. Consider that if an event can be predicted by 100 predictive
events, then if another candidate predictor is observed the possibility that it
is a genuine predictor and not noise is subjectively more plausible than if the
predicted event had only one or two known predictor events. This can be seen
in the ratio between the known predictors and potential total predictors. The
existence of the possible world where there are two total predictors appears
more plausible than the existence of the possible world where there are 100
total predictors if one predictor has been observed (1/2 versus 1/100). If 98
more predictors are then observed then it becomes increasingly more plausible
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that there are 100 total predictors (99/100). Therefore, to accommodate this,
a faster rate of the accumulation of association strength can be justified for
increasing number of predictors. In this way, learning-to-learn can be seen
to be another strategy to deal with the trade-off between the reliability of a
prediction and how quickly that prediction is acquired (criterion 5).
2.4.11 Overshadowing
The salience (or intensity) of the conditioned response is also a factor in
conditioning. When two conditioned stimuli are reinforced simultaneously,
if one stimulus is much more salient than the other, then the conditioning
only occurs with the more salient stimulus. This effect was first described by
Pavlov (1927).
2.4.11.1 Analysis
Overshadowing can be seen to be a part of a strategy to deal with having more
sense data that can be realistically processed (criterion 11). As described in
the fourth general observation made in section 2.1, allocating the processing
time for each event by the salience of each event can be a reasonable strategy
to deal with having more sense data than can be processed in the time allowed.
A consequence of this is that a large relative difference in the magnitude of
two potential predictive events may cause the event of lower magnitude to not
be processed, and so acquire less association strength than the high magnitude
event.
2.4.12 Super-Conditioning
In super-conditioning, a first conditioned stimulus is reinforced in compound
with a second conditioned stimulus that already has an inhibitory association
with the unconditioned stimulus. The result is that the first conditioned stim-
ulus will acquire a greater association strength value than if it were reinforced
alone. This effect was first demonstrated by Rescorla (1971).
2.4.12.1 Analysis
This phenomenon can be seen as a mechanism whereby the learning system
learns an exception to the prediction of a non-occurrence of an event by the
presence of an inhibitory event. This contributes to the learning system by
allowing a learned prediction to be undone for a specific exception (criterion 7).
By creating these exception events so that a super-conditioned event is pre-
sented alone, it produces a response greater than would be otherwise the case.
This can be seen as encoding an assumption that the inhibitory event was still
able to reduce the magnitude of the predicted event, even if it didn’t eliminate
it in the face of the strong predictor and therefore if the super-conditioned
event presented alone would predict an event of greater magnitude. By en-
coding this assumption in the mechanism, the system is able to avoid needing
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to learn to predict a greater magnitude event through experience, sacrific-
ing some reliability for the speed that a prediction is acquired (criterion 5),
whereas if the greater magnitude prediction is not the case, then presumably
the over-prediction would get extinguished.
2.4.13 Backward Blocking
In backward blocking, the two phases of the blocking phenomenon are re-
versed. Namely, in the first phase, a two-part compound conditioned stimulus
is presented with the unconditioned stimulus. In the second phase, only one
part of the compound conditioned stimulus is paired with the unconditioned
stimulus. The prediction is that the association strength of the part of the
compound stimulus that went unpaired would diminish, due to the greater
predictive capacity of the part that was subsequently reinforced. This phe-
nomenon, contrary to some sources, was found to not occur in classical condi-
tioning in animals (Schweitzer & Green, 1982). It was however found to occur
in human causal reasoning (Chapman, 1991).
2.4.13.1 Analysis
Backward blocking can be seen as retrospectively re-evaluating the initial
learned associations of the events to attribute the predictive value to the event
that is observed to be a predictor outside of the pairing. This phenomenon,
like blocking, would allow for the separation of noise events from predictive
events (criterion 4).
2.4.14 Partial Reinforcement
Partial reinforcement experiments are where the unconditioned stimulus is
paired with presentations of the conditioned stimulus on an intermittent basis.
This intermittence can be either due to presenting the unconditioned stimulus
randomly after the conditioned stimulus or, due to a regular pattern of non-
pairing and pairing. For all ratios of reinforcements to non-reinforcements, the
intensity of the conditioned response trends asymptotically with the number of
trials to match the same response intensity as that of the case where all trials
are reinforced. While Pavlov (1927, p. 384) did briefly mention some work
hinting at the effect, it was Skinner who explored the concept in depth, looking
at the effect of regular patterns of reinforcement in instrumental conditioning
(Skinner, 1938).
2.4.14.1 Analysis
The results of the partial reinforcement experiment imply that associations in
relation to a stochastic co-occurrence do get learned, but that this process is
slower than for a deterministic association. By making the process slower and
therefore requiring far more positive predictions to counter the greater number
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of negative predictions, the process of acquiring a stochastic association is
made robust to noise (criterion 9).
2.4.15 Partial Reinforcement Extinction Effect
When an association has been formed using a partial reinforcement schedule,
it is far more resistant to extinction than one that has been formed using a
full reinforcement schedule. The rate at which an association is extinguished
is proportional to the probability of reinforcement – in other words, the higher
the probability of reinforcement, the faster the association extinguishes. This
effect was first found by Humphreys (1939) with the proportionality of the
effect found by Grant & Schipper (1952).
2.4.15.1 Analysis
By allowing for the learning of stochastic relationships, it implies that those
predictions that are stochastic can be allowed to have some failures without
loss of association strength. By the nature of stochastic patterns, this resilience
to loss of association strength needs to include some relatively long runs of
failed predictions. Allowing for there to be failures without loss of association
strength necessitates that extinction is harder to achieve. This allows the
learning system to maintain those stochastic relationships that it has learned
(criterion 9).
2.4.16 Spontaneous Recovery
When a conditioned response is extinguished and there is a long time without
the presentation of the conditioned stimulus, then presentation of the condi-
tioned stimulus occasionally elicits the conditioned response. The response is
still weaker than prior to extinction, however. This effect was first described
by Pavlov (1927).
2.4.16.1 Analysis
Spontaneous recovery can be seen to be a phenomenon to deal with an ad-
ditional problem that arises from having to predict an association in a state-
dependent manner where there may or may not be any indicators for the state
of the association (criterion 8 a–d). The issue is that even if the reacquisition
effect is able to adapt to a state-dependent association, if a long period of
time has passed after the last extinction, it would be unknown which state is
currently in play. As such, if there is a cost for not being ready for a predictive
event, then in these circumstances it is prudent to partially respond to that
predictive event.
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2.5 Classical Conditioning Interpretations
There are two interpretations of the underlying process of classical condi-
tioning. The two interpretations differ on what association is formed during
conditioning. These interpretations are known as the stimulus-stimulus (S-S)
interpretation and the stimulus-response (S-R) interpretation. The stimulus-
stimulus interpretation of conditioning states that during conditioning, the
concept of the conditioned stimulus becomes associated with the concept of
the unconditioned stimulus, the conditioned response is then due to antici-
pation of the unconditioned stimulus. The stimulus-response interpretation
states that the conditioned stimulus becomes directly associated with the un-
conditioned response. The current most widely accepted interpretation is that
the vast majority of associations are stimulus-stimulus, but that in the correct
conditions, stimulus-response associations can be found.
One piece of evidence in favour of stimulus-stimulus associations is that of
the existence of the sensory preconditioning phenomenon. As the two neutral
stimuli are associated prior to the introduction of any non-neutral stimulus,
there is never any possibility for the neutral stimulus that was not paired with
the non-neutral stimulus to ever gain any association with the unconditioned
response, so no stimulus-response association could ever form.
Another piece of evidence against the stimulus-response interpretation is
advanced by an experiment Holland & Rescorla (1975). In the experiment,
first the conditioned stimulus is associated with an unconditioned stimulus
of food. Once conditioning is complete, the food stimulus is devalued to the
subject, either by inducing nausea from spinning the subject around, or by
allowing the subject to feed until it did not want any more food. The result
was that the conditioned response was no longer elicited by the conditioned
stimulus. If the stimulus-response interpretation was correct, then the lack of
value of food would not stop the response from occurring.
A third piece of evidence is provided by Siegel (1975), whose study lends
support to a proposition that the unconditioned response is determined to be
the response that compensates for the effects of the unconditioned stimulus.
The association of the conditioned stimulus then allows for that compensatory
response to be initiated prior to the arrival of the unconditioned stimulus.
Siegel gave rats repeated injections of insulin, each reducing the blood-glucose
level. In this experiment, the act of injecting was the conditioned stimulus and
the reduction of blood-glucose was the unconditioned stimulus. To test the as-
sociation, the rats were given a saline injection and the blood-glucose level was
monitored and found to increase. This showed that the conditioned response
was compensating for the unconditioned stimulus, rather than the same as
the unconditioned stimulus. This lends further evidential weight against the
stimulus-response interpretation (and in absence of a third theory, in favour of
the stimulus-stimulus interpretation), as if the formed association was a direct
association between the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned response,
the conditioned response would need to be the same.
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The condition in which stimulus-response associations have been observed
is in second-order conditioning experiments. This is firstly shown in a study
by Rescorla (1973). Rescorla’s study used the concept of habituation to study
the interpretations. Habituation is where the response elicited by a stimulus
is weakened through repeated exposure to the stimulus. It should be noted
that this phenomenon is not in itself an effect associated with conditioning, as
it does not affect the learned association between stimuli. In Rescorla’s study,
a CS-US association was reinforced, and then using habituation, the uncon-
ditioned stimulus was weakened. The conditioned response was also found to
be weakened. This substantiated the stimulus-stimulus interpretation. How-
ever, when the experiment was repeated with a different group of subjects
using a phase of second-order conditioning with the first conditioned stim-
ulus, and then weakening the unconditioned response through habituation,
the conditioned response of the second conditioned stimulus is not weakened,
substantiating the stimulus-response interpretation.
A second experiment demonstrating a stimulus-response association in
second-order conditioning was conducted by Holland & Rescorla (1975). In
applying the same stimulus devaluation of food as they had previously done
in first-order conditioning to second-order conditioning, the conditioned re-
sponse of the second order stimulus was demonstrated to not weaken under
unconditioned stimulus devaluation.
Not all second-order associations are stimulus-response associations how-
ever. In an experiment by Rashotte, Griffin & Sisk (1977), a second order
conditioned stimulus was created, and then the original first-order associa-
tion was extinguished. This extinction led to a considerable reduction in the
conditioned response of the second-order conditioned stimulus. The stimulus-
response interpretation is disconfirmed in this experiment as extinction of
one association should not have led to the extinction of another, independent
association. This apparently contradictory evidence regarding second-order
associations was attempted to be reconciled by Holland (1985) by arguing
that the stimulus and response aspects of stimuli compete for association, the
winner determined by the nature of the experiment.
2.6 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed and analysed the background psychology that is
used within this thesis. The ideas presented in this chapter are used in both
chapter three and chapter four. Chapter three presents the work more directly
related to this thesis. As part of that presentation, existing models of classical
conditioning from the psychology community are reviewed, which require the
background knowledge of classical conditioning presented in this chapter to
understand. The ideas in this chapter inform the overall design of the system
presented in chapter four and due to the system directly implementing some
of the phenomena of classical conditioning.
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Through an analysis of the features a passive learning system needs to
function, a set of criteria have been established. These criteria have then been
used in an analysis of classical conditioning, the analysis arguing that the phe-
nomena of classical conditioning can be seen to satisfy those criteria. Table 2.2
summarises both analyses by tabulating the classical conditioning phenomena
and which criteria each phenomenon contributes to. Every criterion in the
table is contributed to by at least one phenomenon of classical conditioning.
As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this analysis is to provide both a
thorough grounding for the hypotheses and the basis for which the ideas will
be used within the system presented in chapter four.
On the not-fully-settled debate of the two interpretations of classical con-
ditioning, this thesis sides with the most widely accepted interpretation that
while both stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-response associations can exist, the
majority of associations are stimulus-stimulus in nature. However, the ideas
presented in this thesis are based upon the stimulus-stimulus interpretation
for two reasons. The first reason is due to the widely-held view that the ma-
jority of associations are of the stimulus-stimulus form. The second reason is
that this interpretation was believed to be the most compatible with devel-
oping a passive learning system. Therefore, the analysis of the phenomena
presented in this chapter comes from that viewpoint, which also means the
system presented in chapter four follows from the same viewpoint.
This chapter presented and analysed the background knowledge that is
used, but that the project that this thesis reports on did not seek to contribute
towards. The next chapter looks at the work done in the areas that the project
this thesis reports on did seek to contribute knowledge to.
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Criterion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 8b 8c 8d 9 10 11 12
P
h
e
n
o
m
e
n
o
n
Acquisition ✓ ✓ ✓
Extinction ✓ ✓
The Inter-Stimulus
Interval
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Reacquisition ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Blocking ✓
Recovery from
Blocking
✓
Conditioned
Inhibition
✓ ✓
Extinction of
Conditioned
Inhibition
✓ ✓
Latent Inhibition ✓
U.S.-Pre-Exposure
Effect
✓
Sensory
Preconditioning
✓ ✓
Secondary
Conditioning
✓ ✓ ✓
Contingency ✓ ✓
Generalisation ✓ ✓ ✓
Discrimination ✓ ✓ ✓
Configural Cues ✓ ✓ ✓
Patterning ✓
The Inter-Trial
Interval
✓
Facilitation of
Remote
Associations
✓
Primacy ✓
Temporal Primacy ✓
Learning-to-Learn ✓
Overshadowing ✓
Super-
Conditioning
✓ ✓
Backward
Blocking
✓
Partial
Reinforcement
✓
Partial
Reinforcement
Extinction Effect
✓
Spontaneous
Recovery
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 2.2: A matrix summarising which phenomena of classical conditioning
contribute to each of the criteria.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
This chapter will review the ideas related to this thesis. This chapter begins
by looking at the area of classical conditioning that is most related to this
thesis, that of the theoretical models of classical conditioning. These models
try to explain the diverse range of phenomena within classical conditioning.
The system presented in chapter four does not attempt to create any viable,
or even a unified explanation, of classical conditioning. However, it does in
some sense model classical conditioning and therefore this chapter will review
these models.
Stated in both hypotheses is that the aim is to learn commonsense knowl-
edge. Therefore this chapter will next discuss commonsense knowledge, in-
cluding the existing methods of representing it that are relevant to this thesis
and the existing attempts to acquire it.
There already exists methods within artificial intelligence that use condi-
tioning as the basis for learning. These methods are collectively known as
reinforcement learning methods. As this thesis and those existing methods
both derive from a common ancestor, the third section will review these ex-
isting methods.
In order for the system presented in chapter four to function it needs input
from the environment that it is observing. The form of input that has been
selected is that of tracked object data. There have been studies within the
field of computer vision that have also looked into learning to predict events
formed from visual data. A review of these studies is briefly discussed in
the last section of this chapter, along with a brief discussion of the types of
tracking methods that exist.
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3.1 Models of Classical Conditioning
Ever since the start of research into classical conditioning, models have been
proposed that attempt to create a unified explanation for the diverse range of
phenomena of classical conditioning.
One approach in categorising these models is to look at when the change
in association strength between the stimuli is computed. In trial-level models,
the computation is dealt with after all relevant stimuli have terminated. In
real-time models, the computation happens at every time-frame, and can cope
with those frames being arbitrarily small.
This section covers the most influential models that have been proposed.
These shall be covered in approximately chronological order. The models that
are described are: The Stimulus Substitution Model, The Rescorla-Wagner
Model, Mackintosh’s Attentional Model, The Sometimes-Opponent Process,
The Sutton-Barto Model and The Temporal Difference Model. The section
will finish with an overview of several neural network-based models.
Alonso & Schmajuk (2012) have proposed a standardised list of classical
conditioning phenomena with the aim of standardising how computational
models of classical conditioning are tested. In a special issue of Learning
and Behaviour, focusing on computational models of classical conditioning, a
number of the models mentioned below are tested against this standardised
list. This includes, most notably for this thesis, the TD model of classical
conditioning (Ludvig et al., 2012).
3.1.1 The Stimulus Substitution Model
The first explanation of classical conditioning was developed by Pavlov (1927),
and has since been known as the stimulus-substitution model, a trial-level
model. This model proposes that during conditioning, the brain areas rep-
resenting the conditioned stimulus and those representing the unconditioned
stimulus develop a connection. This connection ensures that if the area of
the brain representing the conditioned stimulus is stimulated then the area
of the brain responsible for the unconditioned stimulus will also be stimu-
lated. In turn, as the unconditioned stimulus area is stimulated then the area
that causes the unconditioned response will be stimulated. Pavlov effectively
assumed that the conditioned response is simply a manifestation of the un-
conditioned response.
This model was later discredited as unconditioned stimuli were found where
the unconditioned response is different to the conditioned response. An ex-
ample of such an unconditioned stimulus is an electric shock applied to a rat.
When a rat is presented with an electric shock its unconditioned response is
to attempt to flee. The conditioned response however, is to freeze. While this
model is discredited, its ideas have influenced later theories and models.
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3.1.2 Rescorla-Wagner Model
The most influential model is known as the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla
& Wagner, 1972). This trial-level model is both simple and yet able to account
for a very wide range of the phenomena. The basis of the model is a single
function, shown in equation 3.1.
∆V = αβ (λ− V ) (3.1)
In the equation, V is the association strength between the conditioned
stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus – i.e. the amount of conditioning the
subject displays; ∆V is the change in the association strength; α is the rate of
learning for the conditioned stimulus (with the constraint 0 < α < 1); β is the
rate of learning for the unconditioned stimulus (with the constraint 0 < β < 1)
and λ is the maximum possible association strength for the unconditioned
stimulus.
The formula is applied iteratively. A reinforcement of the conditioned
stimulus with the unconditioned stimulus is represented as an iteration of the
formula. This leads to the association strength asymptotically approaching the
maximum – similar to the sigmoidal shape of acquisition. To model extinc-
tion, when the unconditioned stimulus is not present, the maximum possible
association strength (λ) will be zero. By the equation, if the total association
strength (V ) is greater than zero due to previous trials, then the overall change
in the association strength will be negative. This negative ∆V will cause a
reduction in association strength, as shown in extinction experiments.
The model also covers the case where there is more than one neutral stim-
ulus involved. Where there is a compound stimulus, the basic equation is
adapted as shown in equations 3.2 to 3.4.
VAB = VA + VB (3.2)
∆V A = αAβ (λ− VAB) (3.3)
∆V B = αBβ (λ− VAB) (3.4)
In this set of equations, VA corresponds to the association strength of the
first conditioned stimulus; ∆V A is the change in the association strength of the
first conditioned stimulus; VB is the association strength of the second condi-
tioned stimulus; ∆V B corresponds to the change in the association strength of
the second conditioned stimulus; VAB corresponds to the association strength
of the compound stimulus; αA is the learning rate for the first stimulus; αB is
the learning rate for the second stimulus; β and λ are as before.
The different parts of the compound stimulus effectively compete to be
associated with the unconditioned stimulus. If one of the two stimuli is rein-
forced more than another, then that stimulus gains more of the total associ-
ation strength available. Similarly, if one stimulus is conditioned before it is
used within a compound stimulus, the other stimulus of the compound stim-
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ulus will gain little association strength. This is consistent with the blocking
phenomenon.
The compound stimuli version of the model can predict a number of the
other phenomena related to compound stimuli. For instance, overshadowing
can be created by varying the learning rate of each conditioned stimulus in
proportion to the salience of the stimulus. The lower learning rate of two
stimuli in the compound stimulus will gain association strength slower than the
other. Another example is conditioned inhibition. First a strong association
VA is formed with a stimulus, and then that stimulus is non-reinforced with a
second stimulus. This means that VA is high, but VAB = 0. As VAB = VA+VB,
VB must be negative. This negative association strength allows the model to
predict conditioned inhibition.
As with all models, there are some phenomena that elude the Rescorla-
Wagner model. The overview by Miller et al. (1995) gives a comprehensive
review of the successes and failures of the Rescorla-Wagner model. Most no-
tably the phenomena associated with pre-exposure. Both latent inhibition and
the U.S.-pre-exposure effect cannot be predicted. This is because the model
only deals with association strengths which are assumed to start at zero. Sec-
ondary conditioning is also not predicted. This is because the model predicts
that where a stimulus occurs, whether prior or simultaneously, with the condi-
tioned stimulus but without the unconditioned stimulus, that stimulus should
become inhibitory.
Despite its shortcomings, the Rescorla-Wagner model continues to influ-
ence both theoretical and experimental approaches within the study of classical
conditioning. Alonso et al. (2012) produced a computer simulation of a ver-
sion of the Rescorla-Wagner model that includes an extension that allows for
configural cues to be modelled.
3.1.3 Mackintosh’s Attentional Model
Mackintosh (1975), argued that instead of stimuli competing for associability
with the unconditioned stimulus, relevant stimuli instead gain attention of
the subject in accordance with their relevance. The subject would give a
response determined by only those stimuli that are attended to. It is then
the attention level for each stimulus that would change with how much that
stimulus preceded an unexpected unconditioned stimulus event.
While the idea that the attention the subject gives a stimulus is related
to its relevance was not new, Mackintosh noted a discrepancy between an
assumption made by a number of those previous models and the experimental
data that had been produced up until that point. The assumption is that there
is a competition between stimuli for attention i.e. the increase in attention
for one stimulus reduces the attention given to other stimuli. Mackintosh
also argued that this criticism applied to the Rescorla-Wagner model because,
while there is no use of attention in the Rescorla-Wagner model, stimuli still
compete for a limited resource – the pool of associative strength.
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Mackintosh then proceeded to propose a trial-level model that can explain
blocking and overshadowing without the use of a limited resource – as an
attention-based extension to the Rescorla-Wagner model. Firstly, only the
basic rule is used for all stimuli, with no special rule for compound stimuli
– though the learning rates are still stimulus-specific. Secondly, part of the
conditioned-stimulus-specific learning rate would be related to the attention
the subject gives that stimulus in the specific trial. Lastly, another part of the
conditioned-stimulus-specific learning rate would be increased if that stimulus
is the best available predictor of the unconditioned stimulus and decreased if
it is no better than any of the other stimuli. This last point is codified in
equations 3.5 and 3.6.
|λ− VA| > |λ− VX | ⇒ ∆αA > 0 (3.5)
|λ− VA| ≤ |λ− VX | ⇒ ∆αA < 0 (3.6)
In these rules, ∆αA is the change in the learning rate for stimulus A; VA
is the association strength of stimulus A; VX is the association strength of
all other stimuli other than A present in the reinforcement trial; and λ is the
maximum possible association strength. Mackintosh also suggested that the
size of the change would be proportional to the magnitude of the difference
between |λ− VA| and |λ− VX |.
In this model blocking can still be achieved as, if a strong association is
established, then any other stimuli that subsequently follow would quickly be
stopped from gaining any association strength as the learning rate would be at
or close to nothing. Overshadowing can still be achieved as salience is also a
factor included in the learning rate. If a stimulus is salient enough, its starting
learning rate will be faster than other stimuli. A faster learning rate will be
able to force the learning rates of other stimuli down to be at or close to zero.
Mackintosh argued that this model is also able to account for pre-exposure
effects such as latent inhibition, phenomena that the Rescorla-Wagner model
is not able to predict. The U.S.-pre-exposure effect is predicted through the
introduction of a “background” or “environmental” stimulus. When the un-
conditioned stimulus is reinforced alone, it is instead reinforced with the back-
ground stimulus. This allows the background stimulus, in effect, to act as a
blocking stimulus for future C.S.-U.S. pairings.
Latent Inhibition is due to the second equation that governs part of the
learning rate. This is because the learning rate declines even when a stimulus
is equal in association strength to another stimulus. If a conditioned stimulus
is presented without any sort of reinforcement prior to any pairing with an
unconditioned stimulus, then both the maximum association strength and
current association strength would be zero for all stimuli. As both sides of
the inequality would be zero for all stimuli, the corresponding learning rate
for each stimulus would reduce.
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A weakness of this model was demonstrated by an experiment by Hall &
Pearce (1979). The model predicts that the best available predictor of rein-
forcement will receive the greatest increase in attention after reinforcement,
allowing for the best predictor to be learned the fastest. Hall & Pearce (1979)
conducted an experiment of two phases. In the first phase, a first conditioned
stimulus was paired with an unconditioned stimulus of a weak electric shock.
In the second phase, the subjects were split into two groups: The first group
had the same conditioned stimulus as the first phase paired with an uncon-
ditioned stimulus of a strong electric shock. The second group had a novel
conditioned stimulus paired with an unconditioned stimulus of a strong elec-
tric shock. If the attention model was correct, the group provided with the
first conditioned stimulus would learn the association with the strong electric
shock faster than the group with the novel stimulus, as the first conditioned
stimulus is already the best available predictor of an electric shock. The results
of the experiment showed that the converse is the case: the group exposed to
the novel conditioned stimulus learned faster. The reason the two groups did
not learn at the same rate was explained to be due to the first phase effectively
acting as latent inhibition trials for the first group.
3.1.4 The Sometimes-Opponent-Process
The sometimes-opponent-process (sometimes referred to as the S.O.P. model)
was a real-time model proposed by Wagner (1981; Donegan & Wagner 1987)
as an extension of the opponent process theory. The opponent process theory
itself is not directly related to classical conditioning, but instead is a theory
of the response to unconditioned stimuli. In order to explain the sometimes-
opponent-process, the opponent process theory shall be described first.
The opponent process theory was initially introduced by Epstein (1967)
and heavily expanded upon by Solomon & Corbit (1974). The theory proposed
that, for stimuli that produce a reaction, the subject produces two separate
reactions that oppose each other. If the first reaction is pleasant, then the
second will counteract that by being unpleasant and visa-versa. The first
reaction, the A-state, is high intensity; onset is immediate and diminishes
rapidly after the stimulus event has passed. The second reaction, the B-state,
is low intensity; onset is delayed and diminishes slowly after the stimulus event
has passed. The resultant effect on the observed response is that the initial
response to stimulation is high intensity (the B-state has yet to begin), it then
comes down to a plateaux while the stimulus event is in effect (the B-state
counteracting the A-state), and then the response rapidly reverses and slowly
declines after the stimulus event has passed (the decay of the B-state being
longer than the A-state).
As the subject receives many stimulations, while the A-state does not
change, the B-state increases in intensity and onset becomes more immediate
(though it still diminishes slowly after the stimulus event has passed). The
resultant effect on the observed response after many stimulations, is that the
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overall response during stimulation is lower in intensity (the B-state begin-
ning earlier and is more intense so better at counteracting the A-state), with
an overall opposite response after stimulation that is intense and prolonged
(the B-state being more intense but with the same decay). Solomon & Cor-
bit (1974) suggested that the B-state is a process that allows the subject to
avoid extreme states of arousal, as they are resource-intensive to sustain.
Epstein (1967) used sky-diving as an example of the opponent process at
work. When a novice skydiver jumps, they feel terror. After the jump is
successful, they feel a pleasurable feeling of relief. A second example of the
opponent process at work is that of recreational drug use such as alcohol.
The initial, A-state response is pleasurable, whereas the B-state works to
counteract that and manifests itself in withdrawal symptoms after the drug’s
effects have ended.
Wagner’s sometimes-opponent process model (Wagner, 1981), while start-
ing from a different perspective, was later reinterpreted as an extension of op-
ponent process theory (Donegan &Wagner, 1987). It was this re-interpretation
that became influential. Wagner’s primary motive was to explain why the con-
ditioned response is sometimes different to the unconditioned response. Wag-
ner argued that all representations of stimuli are collections of a large number
of elements that each can be in one of three states: Inactive (I), a first active
state (A1) and a secondary active state (A2).
When a stimulus representation is activated by the direct observation of
that stimulus, the majority of the elements enter their A1 state and slowly
decay first to the A2 state and then back to the inactive state. When a
stimulus representation has the majority of its elements in either A1 or A2
state, then it induces any other stimulus representations that it is associated
with that are mainly in their inactive state to be mainly in their A2 state.
This inducement occurs in proportion to the association strength between the
two representations. When two representations are mainly in their A1 state,
then the association strength between the two representations increases.
The manifest responses when the majority of these elements are in the
A1 and A2 states are argued to correspond to the A-state and B-state of the
opponent process. As with the opponent process, both active states of the
representation of an unconditioned stimulus have their own set of responses.
Unlike the opponent process however, these responses can either be the same
or opposed, dependant on the nature of the unconditioned stimulus. As repre-
sentations of stimuli can only ever set another representation to be mostly in
its A2 state, when the representation of a conditioned stimulus induces that
of an unconditioned stimulus, then only the A2 response is elicited.
The sometimes-opponent-process allowed for the prediction of the timing
effects of classical conditioning, namely the inter-stimulus interval and the
inter-trial interval. The efficacy curve of the inter-stimulus interval is produced
by this model by the fact that association strength is only gained when the
majority of the elements of both stimulus representations are in their A1 state
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and that it takes time for the majority state to change. The upward curve at
the beginning of the inter-stimulus interval caused due to one or both elements
transitioning from inactive to their A1 state, the downward curve then caused
by the slow decay from A1 to A2.
There is a similar explanation for the inter-trial interval. When elements
of a representation have yet to fully decay back to their inactive state, then
there are fewer elements available to transition from the inactive state to the
A1 state. The result of this is that for short inter-trial intervals, the A1 state
has fewer elements than would otherwise be for a longer inter-trial interval,
and so the rate of increase of the association strength is lower. As the inter-
trial interval increases, there are more inactive elements available to transition
to the A1 state and thus a greater rate of increase of the association strength.
Once strong piece of evidence for the sometimes-opponent-process came
from Thompson (1986) who showed that with the eyeblink response in rabbits
(the stimulus being a puff of air to the eye), there are in fact two separate
components to the blink, one with latency of 20ms and one with latency
of 70ms. This agrees with Wagner’s proposal that even when there is no
opponent response, there are still two components that just happen to be the
same response.
A criticism of the sometimes-opponent-process, later reported by Wagner
& Brandon (1989), is that it predicts that all responses to a particular un-
conditioned stimulus will each peak at the same inter-stimulus interval time.
Vandercar & Schneiderman (1967) reported that when a rabbit is given a puff
of air to the eye, the conditioned response of the eyeblink peaks at a different
inter-stimulus interval time than to the conditioned response of an increased
heart rate. Wagner & Brandon (1989) proposed an extension to the model,
known as A.E.S.O.P. to account for these issues. That extension makes use of
an emotional response and so is out of scope for this section.
3.1.5 The Temporal Difference (T.D.) Model and the Sutton-
Barto (S.B.) Model
As the field of conditioning models progressed, it began to be influenced by
ideas from within the artificial intelligence community. This is apparent in the
Temporal Difference model, a real-time model, which was presented by Sutton
& Barto (1987; 1990). The model was an application of the T.D. method
of reinforcement learning, a method from artificial intelligence developed by
Sutton (1984; 1988) as a method of assigning credit for a reward or punishment
to prior actions taken by an agent. This method is extensively reviewed in
later in this chapter.
The T.D. method of machine learning was itself influenced by and devel-
oped from an earlier real-time model of classical conditioning by Sutton &
Barto that became known as the S.B. model (Sutton & Barto, 1981), a model
based on the ideas of Klopf (1972). A short overview of Klopf’s work forms
part of section 3.1.6.
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In (Sutton & Barto, 1990), the S.B. model was described in a different
manner to the original paper, which provides a clearer way of understanding
the model’s operation. The new description placed the S.B. model in the
context of an observation that was made about a large set of models of classical
conditioning. The observation is that many models of classical conditioning
have the functional form shown in equation 3.7.
∆V = Reinforcement× Eligibility (3.7)
As usual, ∆V represents the change in association strength. “Reinforce-
ment” is defined loosely as the level of unconditioned stimulus processing.
“Eligibility” on the same lines was loosely defined as the level of conditioned
stimulus processing. Sutton & Barto argued that many models focus primarily
at one or the other part, but rarely both. For example, the Rescorla-Wagner
model can be said that the “α” part of the formula corresponds to eligibility
and the β (λ− VAB) part of the formula corresponds to reinforcement. In the
Rescorla-Wagner model, the model can be argued to look primarily to the re-
inforcement side of the function. An example of a model that primarily deals
with eligibility would be Mackintosh’s attention model.
In the S.B. model, both parts of the function were used extensively. The
reinforcement part used an equation Sutton & Barto later named the Y˙ the-
ory (pronounced “Y dot”) (Sutton & Barto, 1990). In the Y˙ theory, every
stimulus S produces a reinforcement of +VS on onset, −VS on offset and zero
at all other times. The value VS represents the association strength value
of the stimulus. The unconditioned stimulus has a fixed, positive association
strength value with itself; all other stimuli have a starting association strength
value of zero. Time is assumed to pass in small increments. The function Y˙ (t)
is defined to be the sum of all reinforcement values that have occurred at time
t. The resultant value of Y˙ (t) is then used as the reinforcement part of the
∆V equation.
For the eligibility part of the S.B. model, Sutton & Barto used the concept
of an eligibility trace that was first developed by Klopf (1972). An eligibility
trace is a time-dependant function that describes the eligibility of a given
stimulus in relation to the timing of the presentation of that stimulus. The
eligibility trace used by the S.B. model builds while the stimulus is present
and then decays when it is removed. In order to do this, the S.B. model
represents the presence and non-presence of a conditioned stimulus S in terms
of a variable XS (t), which is defined at time t to be one when the stimulus
is present and zero otherwise. The eligibility trace XS (t) at time t is then
defined as a running average of the values of XS (t), as shown in equation 3.8.
XS (t− 1) = XS (t) + δ
(
XS (t)−XS (t)
)
(3.8)
Where δ is defined to be the weighting placed between the present value
of XS (t) and past values. The S.B. model then puts these two components,
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the Y˙ theory and the eligibility trace together to form a single update equation
to be applied for each stimulus S at time t, as shown in equation 3.9.
∆V S = βY˙ × αSXS (3.9)
The successes of the S.B. model was that it did predict all of the Rescorla-
Wagner model’s phenomena, plus was able to deal with inter-stimulus-interval
effects, and predicted the existence of the temporal primacy effect, which was
subsequently confirmed experimentally. However, there arose two major prob-
lems with the model. Firstly, when the I.S.I. is very short and the stimulus du-
rations were short (i.e. only a few time-steps) and overlapped, the association
gained becomes inhibitory. This prediction was disconfirmed experimentally
prior to the model being published. It was not found for some time as only
stimuli that were active for much longer time-steps were tested.
The second problem arises in trials where the conditioned stimulus contin-
ues for a variable length of time but the unconditioned stimulus always starts
as the conditioned stimulus stops. The observed experimental effect is that
the association strength between the two stimuli reduces as the duration of the
conditioned stimulus increases. The prediction by the S.B. model however, is
that the duration of the conditioned stimulus does not affect the strength of
association in this type of trial.
There were a number of attempts to rectify both of these problems with the
model. These attempts were described by Sutton & Barto (1990). However,
none of the modifications of the theory were completely satisfactory. With this
in mind, Sutton & Barto proposed a model that while sharing some similarities
with the S.B. model, has a very different basis. This model was known as the
Temporal Difference (T.D.) model of conditioning.
As described before, the T.D. model is a solution to assigning credit of
present awards to the correct past actions. The T.D. model does this by
attempting to predict an imminence-weighted sum of all future unconditioned
stimuli.
When attempting to predict future unconditioned stimuli, ideally, one
would wish to predict all future unconditioned stimuli so as to apply those to
the current actions or stimuli; however this becomes increasingly difficult as
the prediction goes further into the future. Therefore, at a given time-step, the
prediction should be weighted more towards the next time-step, then slightly
less for the time-step after that and so on. This means that as an uncondi-
tioned stimulus becomes more imminent, the prediction that it will happen at
the next time step should be greater. This also means that for unconditioned
stimuli that last more than one time-step, when the current time-step is in the
middle of an unconditioned stimulus, the strength of prediction should be in
rough accordance with how many future time-steps remain of the stimulus.
Algebraically, Sutton & Barto (1990) expressed this in formula shown in
equation 3.10.
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Vt = λt+1 + γλt+2 + γ
2λt+3 + γ
3λt+4 + · · · (3.10)
Where Vt is the prediction made at time t, λt denotes the level of intensity
of the unconditioned stimulus and γ is the imminence weighting, 0 ≤ γ < 1,
with which smaller values denoting a greater weighting to immediate values.
Through algebraic manipulation, this can be written in the form shown in
equation 3.11.
Vt = λt+1 + γVt+1 (3.11)
This formula denotes the ideal level of prediction at any given time step.
Therefore, the discrepancy between the current prediction and what it should
ideally be is the level of reinforcement that should be provided on any partic-
ular time-step, as shown in equation 3.12.
Reinforcement = λt+1 + γVt+1 − Vt (3.12)
This can then be used instead of the Y˙ theory of the S.B. model to pro-
vide the association strength update formula for the T.D. model, as shown in
equation 3.13.
∆V i = β
(
λt+1 + γVt+1 − Vt
)
× αiXi (3.13)
Sutton & Barto showed that this model is able to predict all the same
phenomena of the S.B. model without the problems that were encountered
with the S.B. model. However, the model is not able to predict several classes
of phenomena – many of which have been discussed by Sutton & Barto (1990).
The phenomena that were discussed include configural cues, overshadowing
and sensory preconditioning.
It is also believed that the T.D. model would not be able to predict the
pre-exposure effects of latent inhibition and the U.S. pre-exposure effect. The
reasoning for this claim is that there is no state in the model that can record
the non-pairings of stimuli that would allow for pre-exposure effects to be
included.
3.1.6 Artificial Neural Network Models
Of the ideas within artificial intelligence, it is that of artificial neural networks
that has had the most influence over models of classical conditioning. However,
the models that use artificial neural networks are out of the scope of this thesis.
This is because it would be circular to argue that the phenomena that make
up classical conditioning can be used for machine learning in a manner that is
independent of implementation and then test this idea by implementing those
phenomena by using a well-established method of machine learning. While
this argument could also apply to the T.D. model, the ideas presented in this
thesis are sufficiently close to warrant a discussion of the differences between
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that model and those used in this thesis – this is not the case for artificial
neural networks. As they are out of scope, but make up a large body of the
work on models of conditioning, these models shall only be covered by a short
overview.
The earliest work on modelling classical conditioning as an artificial neural
network came from Grossberg (1969; 1974). Grossberg’s early work attempted
to derive a real-time general model of learning by applying well-defined con-
straints or postulates about how the neurons and the network they compose
must act, each based either on observation or deductive argument. The predic-
tions of the model were then compared with psychological and neuroscientific
phenomena, including conditioning. Later on, Grossberg proposed the concept
of a gated dipole – a sub-structure of an artificial neural network whereby the
onset of an event and its offset compete to condition to various stimuli signals
and drive signals that are active at the same time. When this is used as part
of a larger network, the network can learn to signal the expectation of the im-
minent presentation of a given stimuli based on present stimuli. An overview
of this work can be found in (Grossberg, 1982). With Carpenter, Grossberg
developed a highly successful artificial neural network theory known as Adap-
tive Resonance Theory (ART) (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987). This theory
and accompanying neural networks are artificial neural networks that address
categorisation and prediction problems.
Starting at a similar time, but independently of Grossberg, Klopf (1972)
described a real-time neuronal model based on cybernetic principles. Klopf
proposed that a network that is composed of components that seek to max-
imise some metric1 will itself as a whole network seek to maximise a metric
(that could be the same or different to that of the component) . From such
a model, Klopf argued that the phenomena of classical and instrumental con-
ditioning arise as epiphenomena, along with the phenomenon of habituation.
Later, Klopf was influenced by the S.B. model (Sutton & Barto, 1981) (which
in turn was influenced by Klopf’s earlier work) to create another model of con-
ditioning, which Klopf named the “drive-reinforcement model” (Klopf, 1988).
In the drive-reinforcement model, Klopf mixed a variant of the S.B. model
with the ideas from the Hebbian neuronal model (Hebb, 1949). In doing so,
Klopf changed the Hebbian neuronal model, primarily by having the neuron
correlate the derivative of delayed pre- and post-synaptic activity levels, rather
than directly correlating immediate pre- and post-synaptic activity levels.
A large contribution to the field of neural-network-based models of con-
ditioning has been made by Schmajuk. Schmajuk’s first contribution to the
field was in conjunction with Grossberg (Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1987). This
1Klopf termed these metric-maximising components “heterostatic”. This
phrase appears to be used to differentiate from the theory of homeostasis –
where a component seeks to maintain a given state. However this name is
too broad for how it is used – a chaotic system that neither maintains nor
maximises its state could also be called “heterostatic”.
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model expanded Grossberg’s gated dipole model, adding an associative learn-
ing mechanism. This model was then used to predict phenomena such as
blocking and overshadowing in a real-time manner.
Of the models produced by Schmajuk, the most notable are the G.S. model,
the S.D. model, and the S.L.G. model. The G.S. model by Grossberg & Schma-
juk (1989) is again, an augmentation of Grossberg’s earlier work, though is not
an expansion of the previous collaboration between the two. The G.S. model
relies on its real-time nature by adding an array of neurons that each peak at
slightly different times, giving a spectrum of peaks that can then be associated
with stimuli and drive signals to give timing predictions between stimuli. This
model predicts both the drop in association for stimulus pairings paired with
very short inter-stimulus intervals and the drop in association for stimulus
pairings paired with long inter-stimulus intervals.
The S.D. model by Schmajuk & DiCarlo (1992) uses a real-time biologically
plausible version of the standard three-layer, artificial neural network that uses
the back-propagation algorithm. The most notable differences are firstly, the
input units connect both to the hidden layer and a single output layer unit
directly. Secondly all output layer units only receive input from a single lower-
layer unit. Thirdly, the back-propagation is implemented in real-time as an
external set of recurrent units that compare the outputs from the output layer
with the expected output and uses the error difference to update the weights
of the output and hidden layers. Each layer of the model was then mapped
to various regions of the brain and simulations of lesions to each layer were
made. The model was found to match both lesion data and able to predict a
number of the phenomena of classical conditioning, including patterning and
generalisation.
The S.L.G. model by Schmajuk, Lam & Gray (1996) was designed in order
to model in real-time the data relating to the phenomenon of latent inhibition.
The model works due to the feedback between several different networks. An
attentional system controls how fast the model of the environment adapts.
The model of the environment attempts to predict future presentations of
stimuli. The error between the expectations of the model and what actually
happens feeds into a novelty system. The total novelty at that particular time
then feeds into the attentional system. By using total novelty, the system can
predict latent inhibition because stimuli that have been encountered earlier
have less novelty than those that have not. A lower total novelty feeds into
the attentional system and so changes to the model are slower. Schmajuk’s
more recent work develops variants of this model (Schmajuk, 2005; Schmajuk
et al., 2010; Kutlu & Schmajuk, 2012).
There are a couple of other notable neural network models that are by
authors that do not have a wider corpus of work on models of conditioning.
The first of these is by Pearce & Hall (1980). Pearce & Hall contended that
unlike the Mackintosh (1975) model, the rate of association is related to the
reliability of a conditioned stimulus to predict its own consequences. Pearce &
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Hall represented this as a network of information flows that updated in a trial-
level manner. The other notable model, a trial-level model, is by Kehoe (1988).
Kehoe’s model is probably the first to test the standard three-layer artificial
neural network against classical conditioning phenomena.
3.2 Commonsense Knowledge
For an autonomous agent to interact rationally within its environment, it must
have access to usable knowledge regarding that environment. Commonsense
knowledge is that knowledge of the world that appears to be self-evident to
humans, such as “Trees are usually green” and “Things that go up, later
come down”. The concept of commonsense knowledge was first discussed by
McCarthy (1959), defining it as follows:
“A program has common sense if it automatically deduces for itself
a sufficiently wide class of immediate consequences of anything it
is told and what it already knows.”
(McCarthy, 1959, p. 78)
This definition points out two central problems in the field of commonsense
knowledge. The first problem is that commonsense knowledge needs to be
encoded such that any piece of knowledge is easily accessible to the computer.
The form in which the knowledge is encoded places a limitation on how quickly
any one piece of knowledge can be used in any automatic deduction. As an
analogy, the way that a piece of knowledge is encoded in the mind will not
bear any resemblance to that knowledge written down, and in the mind a
piece of knowledge (a knowledge rule) can usually be accessed far faster than
accessing it in the written form.
The second problem is that it is not sufficient for that knowledge to be
simply encoded in a machine readable manner; a system that has commonsense
knowledge also needs to be able to use it. A program with commonsense
knowledge needs a mechanism to make deductions and inferences that can be
made from the knowledge encoded within that program. These two problems
typically need to be tackled simultaneously as decisions made in tackling one
problem will affect the choices available in the second. The first problem is
known as representation and the second is known as reasoning.
McCarthy (1959) proposed that the general solution to the twin problems
of representation and reasoning is the use of predicate logic, though the in-
ference system he proposed was incomplete. The inference system McCarthy
proposed has been greatly improved over the years, with the resolution rule
(Robinson, 1965), Prolog (Colmerauer et al., 1973; Colmerauer & Roussel,
1996), Automated Mathematician (Lenat, 1976) and Circumscription (Mc-
Carthy, 1980) being especially notable contributions towards reasoning.
Built upon the developed systems and languages of inference were expert
systems. Expert systems use the developed methods of representation and
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reasoning to encode the knowledge of a field of endeavour that is held by a
human expert. A set of encoded knowledge is known as a knowledge base.
Arguably the most famous expert system is MYCIN (Shortliffe & Buchanan,
1975), which was able to identify bacterial infections and performed as well
as or better than human experts (Yu et al., 1979). Over the years, the knowl-
edge contained within expert systems has become ever larger, leading to direct
research into representation and inference systems that are capable of main-
taining adequate performance. These expert systems that have vast number
of rules are referred to as VLKBs – very large knowledge bases. These VLKBs
look not just implement expert knowledge, but to all commonsense knowl-
edge. By producing basic commonsense knowledge, this can augment any
expert knowledge to provide an expert system able to respond to questioning
in a much more robust manner (Lenat et al., 1985). The most famous of the
VLKBs is the CYC project (Lenat et al., 1985; Lenat & Guha, 1990). CYC is
an impressive multi-decade project that is attempting to encode all the com-
monsense knowledge held by a typical (western) person. To compare, CYC
has millions of rules whereas MYCIN had in the region of 600 rules. Chap-
ter one discussed a criticism this thesis holds on the approach taken by the
CYC project, in relation to the claim that general intelligence-level behaviour
can arise merely from encoding enough commonsense knowledge.
As the size of knowledge bases increased, arguably a third problem of
commonsense reasoning has come to light. This problem is known as the
knowledge acquisition bottleneck. The way that commonsense knowledge-
bases have been traditionally built is through humans directly writing each
individual rule in the format that the computer represents the knowledge in
(or a format that is able to be directly and unambiguously transformed into the
computer’s format). This is a very laborious and costly approach, requiring
highly skilled workers over an extended project to produce the numbers of
rules needed. This problem has spawned research in finding ways to mitigate
this problem. The work of this thesis can be argued to be a system that uses
a method of reinforcement learning to allow for the acquisition of a limited
sub-set of commonsense knowledge.
The remainder of this section will look firstly at research in knowledge
representation that is pertinent to this thesis and then look at the various
methods of knowledge acquisition that have been proposed. The problem
of knowledge reasoning is out of the scope of this thesis because this thesis
encodes any knowledge in the form of predicate logic – for which the methods of
reasoning are well-known. Due to this, the reasoning problem is not discussed
any further.
3.2.1 Knowledge Representation
The research into the representation problem has grown to be appreciably
larger than the work into the reasoning problem. This is because it is suffi-
cient to consider the reasoning problem in general terms but this is not as true
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for the representation problem. This is due to the prevailing general method of
representation – predicate logic – does not imply how specific types of knowl-
edge can be encoded, such as temporal, spatial or social knowledge. Those
first two examples, temporal knowledge and spatial knowledge are pertinent
to this thesis and so the purpose of this section is to review the literature
regarding those types of knowledge. Of the area of knowledge representation
covered, Galton (2009) provides an especially articulate survey.
3.2.1.1 Temporal Knowledge Representation
Temporal knowledge is encoded in terms of the effects of actions or events
on the current state of the world. Three predicate logic representations were
considered for this project: the situation calculus (McCarthy, 1963), the event
calculus (Kowalski & Sergot, 1986) and versatile event logic (Bennett & Gal-
ton, 2004). For reasons given later, a sub-set of the event calculus was used
within this thesis.
The situation calculus, originally proposed by McCarthy (1963) has been
extended in multiple ways by McCarthy, Reiter and others (McCarthy &
Hayes, 1969; McCarthy, 1986; Reiter, 1991; Levesque et al., 1998; Pirri &
Reiter, 1999). The core of the representation is the result (s, a) function,
that gives the resulting world situation of the action (or event) a happening
in the situation of the world s. Another main predicate is the trueIn (s, P )
predicate, that is true when P is true in situation s. This predicate gives a
way to describe the current situation and place preconditions on the ability
of the result function to change the current situation. If the preconditions are
not met, no new situation occurs.
The event calculus was first described by Kowalski & Sergot (1986). This
was later expanded on by Shanahan and others (Shanahan, 1999; Sadri &
Kowalski, 1995; Miller & Shanahan, 1999). The Event Calculus has a cou-
ple of core predicates. The first of these is the holdsAt (f, t) predicate which
states that the fluent f is true at the time-step t. A fluent is a property that
is allowed to change over time. Events are represented within the time step
with three more predicates: happens (a, t), stating that action (or event) a
occurs at time-step t; initiates (a, f, t) stating that fluent f is made true
after action (event) a at time t; and terminates (a, f, t) stating that fluent f
is made false after action (event) a at time t. There is one particular exten-
sion to these core predicates that shall be used later. This is an alternate
happens (a, [t1, t2]) predicate. This predicate is true when the action (event)
a occurs over the duration of the interval starting at time t1 and ending at
time t2. This predicate is used for actions and events that are not instanta-
neous.
Versatile event logic, the youngest of the three representations considered,
was first proposed by Bennett & Galton (2004) with the aim of creating a single
representation encompassing the advantages of the many representations of
time and events. This is done through using a modal logic that forms a tree
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of functions mapping time points to properties of the world that hold at that
time point. This is then expanded upon with extra features such as event
types.
Of these three representations, a sub-set of the event calculus was used
in the development of this thesis. This is because while versatile event logic
gives the most flexibility and power of expression, it has gained this flexibility
by increasing the complexity with which facts are expressed. This would have
increased the development time for an expressiveness that would have not been
used. As the event calculus can be represented in versatile event logic, a more
general variant of the proposed system could be implemented in the future
within versatile event logic. The event calculus was also more suitable than
the situation calculus for the proposed system due to the usage of video data.
The situation calculus does not explicitly use discrete time-steps, however
video data naturally has discrete time steps built-in in the form of frames.
A further highly influential piece of research on the representation of events
concerns the relationship between events. When two events occur over an in-
terval rather than happen at a single point in time, there can be 13 different
distinctive relationships between the two event intervals. These relationships
can be encoded as knowledge in relation predicates known as the Allen rela-
tions (Allen, 1983). Figure 3.1 shows these interval relations. While the rela-
tionship between two event intervals is a major part of this thesis, the Allen
relations are not directly used. This is because this thesis is concerned with
the existence of a temporal relationship rather than its precise nature. The
existence of a relation is based on a threshold of the allowed time-gap between
any two relations. If the gap is too large, then no relation exists. In terms of
the Allen relations, this means that the before (A,B) relation and its inverse
are effectively split into a beforeNear (A,B) relation and a beforeFar (A,B)
relation, with their corresponding inverse relations. With these effective re-
lations plus the other eleven relations, a relationship is considered to exist
between two event intervals if the relationship is not the beforeFar (A,B)
relation or its inverse.
3.2.1.2 Spatial Knowledge Representation
The naive approach to representing space within a commonsense knowledge
system would be standard Cartesian geometry. However, this is not an ideal
representation for any program with commonsense knowledge because it does
not readily allow for any spatial knowledge of the system to be used for infer-
ence along-side non-spatial data. Because Cartesian geometry does not readily
allow for inference along-side non-spatial knowledge, spatial knowledge is in-
stead represented qualitatively. The basis for qualitative spatial reasoning
is the relationship between spatial regions. There are two main schools of
thought for how the relationships between regions should be qualitatively rep-
resented. The first school is based on the concept of intersection and the
second school is based on the concept of connection.
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Figure 3.1: The thirteen Allan (1983) relations.
The first school of thought is based on the work of Egenhofer (1989; 1991).
This school has three central models of spatial representation: the 4-intersecion
model, the 9-intersection model and the dimensionally-extended 9-intersection
model. The 4-intersection model (Egenhofer, 1989) considers a region to con-
sist of its interior and its boundary. The relationship between two regions is
then characterised by how the interiors and boundaries of each intersect – i.e.
the boundary of region A with the boundary of region B, the boundary of re-
gion A with the interior of region B, the interior of region A with the boundary
of region B and the interior of region A with the interior of region B.
This relationship of intersections is then expressed in a two-by-two matrix
where each cell of the matrix contains a ∅ symbol or a ¬∅ symbol. The ∅
symbol denotes there is no intersection for the given combination – i.e. the
intersection of the set of points of the first region feature and the set of points
of the second region feature is the empty set. The ¬∅ symbol denotes there
is an intersection for the given combination – i.e. the intersection of the set of
points of the first region feature and the points of the second region feature is
not the empty set.
To clarify this description, consider the example given in figure 3.2. Ta-
ble 3.1 shows the 4-intesection matrices between region A and the other three
regions. As can be seen, regions A and B only intersect at their boundary,
regions A and C intersect at all four possible different intersections and re-
gion D intersects only with the interior of region A. Note that just because all
the points of a region intersects with another does not mean that every region
feature intersects.
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Figure 3.2: An example of regions with different relationships to one another.
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Table 3.1: Three examples of spatial knowledge represented as a
4-intersection matrix.
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The 9-intersection model (Egenhofer, 1991) adds to the 4-intersection
model by including a new feature of a region: the exterior of a region. The
exterior of a region is all the points of the environment that are not a part
of the interior or boundary of a region. The reason that there is a need for
a 9-intersection model is to allow for objects in higher-dimensional space, or
where the number of dimensions differs between two objects, such as capturing
the relationship between a region and a line (Egenhofer et al., 1993).
The dimensionally-extended 9-intersection model (Clementini et al., 1993)
adds to the 9-intersection model by replacing the ∅ and ¬∅ symbols with the
number of dimensions that each intersection has, using −1 to denote that there
is no intersection, zero for a point-intersection, one for a line-intersection and
two for a region-intersection and so on if needed for higher dimensions. This
allows for yet further detail of how a region or other object relates to one an-
other. For instance, consider two arbitrary lines on a plane. If they intersect on
their interior (i.e. not at the end-points), in the 4-intersection or 9-intersection
model this could mean either crossing at a single point or by sharing a line
segment – there would be no way to disambiguate. In the dimensionally-
extended 9-intersection model, the ambiguity would be removed, as a single
point-crossing would be a zero-dimensional intersection and the shared line
segment would be a one-dimensional intersection.
The other school of thought in qualitatively representing spatial knowledge
is based on the concept of regions being connected. From this follows a set
of predicates that form the Region Connection Calculus (RCC). The found-
ing and canonical version of this calculus has eight relations and is therefore
referred to as RCC-8 (Randell et al., 1992). The relation of two regions being
connected is taken as primitive. From this, a part relation can be defined by
stating that every region connected to a part of a region is connected to the
whole of that region. This in turn allows for an overlap relation to be defined
by stating that two regions that overlap each have a part that is a part of the
other region. These three relations, the connected relation, the part relation
and the overlap relation can then be used to derive the final eight relations
that are jointly exhaustive and pairwise disjoint (JEPD – i.e. there is no con-
figuration of two regions that isn’t described by a relation and there is no
configuration of two regions that is described by more than a single relation).
Table 3.2 lists the predicates of the relations and their description. Figure 3.3
depicts each of the relations and shows the transitions between the relations
that are possible without needing to transition to another relation first (known
as the conceptual neighbourhood).
From RCC-8, there are a number of variations that can be created. The
first of these variants is known as RCC-5 and was first described by Ben-
nett (1994). The change from RCC-8 is that there is no discrimination made
to whether the boundaries of the two regions are in contact. The consequence
of this is that there is not discrimination between tangential proper parts
and non-tangential proper parts and also no discrimination is made between
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Predicate Description
DC (A,B) A is disconnected from B.
EC (A,B) A is externally connected to B.
PO (A,B) A partially overlaps B.
EQ (A,B) A is equal to B.
TPP (A,B) A is a tangential proper part of B.
TPPi (A,B) B is a tangential proper part of A.
NTPP (A,B) A is a non-tangential proper part of B.
NTPPi (A,B) B is a non-tangential proper part of A.
Table 3.2: The RCC-8 relation predicates.
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A B
EC (A,B)
A B
PO (A,B)
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EQ (A,B)
B
A
TPPi (A,B)
B
A
NTPPi (A,B)
Figure 3.3: The RCC-8 relations in their conceptual neighbourhood.
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regions that are externally connected and regions that are disconnected. This
change makes it possible for any automated reasoning done using the repre-
sentation computationally easier than using RCC-8, i.e. the representation is
able to be used in a propositional logic rather than first-order logic. Table 3.3
lists the predicates of each relation of RCC-5 along with a description of the
relation.
Predicate Description
DR (A,B) A is discrete from B
PO (A,B) A partially overlaps B
PP (A,B) A is a proper part of B
PPi (A,B) B is a proper part of A
EQ (A,B) A is equal to B
Table 3.3: The RCC-5 relation predicates.
The next variant of the region connection calculus is known as RCC-3 and
was originally proposed by Santos & Shanahan (2002). This variant is used
where the uncertainty of the knowledge means that when regions overlap, the
two regions cannot be reliably distinguished from each other. This means
that there is no discrimination made between the part relations, the equality
relation and the partial overlap relation. Table 3.4 lists the predicates of each
relation of RCC-3 along with a description of each relation.
Predicate Description
DC (A,B) A is disconnected from B
EC (A,B) A is externally connected to B
CO (A,B) A is coalescent with B
Table 3.4: The RCC-3 relation predicates.
Variants of the region connection calculus do not just reduce the number
of relations available. There is a variant known as RCC-23 by Cohn et al.
(1997). The RCC-23 variant introduces the concept of the convex hull of a
region. This allows for the definition of relations that describe the relationship
between concave regions. Due to the complexity of the theory and that it is out
of the scope of this thesis, further details of this variant shall not be discussed.
Of the representations presented, this thesis makes use of the RCC-3 repre-
sentation. This is primarily due to practical constraints that have been caused
through other choices made in the development of the thesis. There are two
constrains that led to this choice. Firstly, and most importantly, the input of
the system described in chapter four is track-box data where it is not possible
to distinguish between regions that overlap by a significant degree. Secondly,
one of the modules of the system is based upon earlier work by dos Santos
et al. (2009) that uses RCC-3 for similar reasons.
For a more principled choice, the variants of the region connection calculus
are deemed by this thesis to be preferable to the variants of the intersection
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model. This is due to the criticism that many of the configurations of the
intersection model are impossible to create – for instance the interiors of two
objects cannot intersect without at least one of the boundaries of the two
objects intersecting with the other object in some way. In addition, some of
the intersection configurations are equivalent (Zlatanova et al., 2004, p. 425).
There are criticisms of the region connection calculus, such as it requiring that
both regions are of the same number of dimensions (Galton, 2009) and that
in a discrete space, the calculus has the problem that the atomic regions are
parts of their complements, though this issue is only a boundary case and
there exists work that tackles this issue, such as that by Roy & Stell (2002).
Both the intersection and connection representations only concern the
topological relationship between regions. There is also a number of ways in
which the directional relationship between regions can be represented, three
of which will be discussed in this section. All representations of direction are
relative to the position of a reference object, point or direction. The first
two representations were proposed by Frank (1992). The first representation,
shown in figure 3.4a, is known as the cone representation. The cone represen-
tation divides the space around the reference point diagonally into quarters,
creating four qualitative directions corresponding to the four primary com-
pass directions. The second representation, shown in figure 3.4b, is known as
the projection representation. The projection representation divides the space
around the reference point into nine squares, one for each of the eight main
compass point and a central region which Frank (1992) called the neutral zone.
The final representation covered, shown in figure 3.4c, was introduced by
Freksa (1992) and extended by Scivos & Nebel (2001). The representation,
known as the double-cross calculus, is based upon an observer’s position and
observation direction, with the observer being situated at the base of the arrow
in figure 3.4c and focusing towards the head of the arrow. This divides the
space around the observer into three horizontal parts and five depth parts.
The three horizontal parts are: left of the observer (L), straight-on with the
observer (S) and right of the observer (R). The five depth parts are: “in-front”
of the focus point (F), perpendicular to the focus point (P), in-between the
observer and the focus point (centre - C), in-line with the observer (L) and
behind the observer (B).
Of the direction representations presented, the closest this thesis uses is
that of the projection representation. This is again primarily for practical
reasons related to the use of a kernel (box) tracker representation for the input
to the system presented in chapter four and the fact that one of the modules
is based on the work of dos Santos et al. (2009). From a more principled
viewpoint, it appears that the strengths of the three representations very much
depend on the task at hand. If the observer and the viewpoint are concepts
that are a part of the task at hand then the double-cross calculus is by far the
best choice due to its expressiveness. On the other hand, if in the task at hand
there was no usable reference vector, then the representation is not usable. Of
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Figure 3.4: Three possible representations of direction.
the two frank representations, the projection representation looks to be the
more general of the two, as it takes into account the size of the reference
object, rather than assuming that it is suitable for the reference location to
be represented as a point.
3.2.1.3 Spatiotemporal Knowledge Representation
There has been a wide range of work done looking at creating a qualitative
representation of movement and spatial change over time, much more than
could be covered in this subsection. Galton (2000) has produced an authorita-
tive account of the topic. There appears to be two approaches to the problem
of combining space and time. The first approach is to use an existing theory
of space or time and either extend it into the other or combine it with another
existing theory. The second approach is to develop a new calculus specifically
for the goal of representing spatiotemporal knowledge.
The first approach of combining existing theories of time and space has
produced work such as in combining Allen’s interval calculus with region con-
nection calculus (Gerevini & Nebel, 2002; Bennett et al., 2002). This is a
natural approach to the problem, given that the region connection calculus
can be seen to be a two-dimensional extension of Allen’s interval calculus.
Another piece of work using this approach is the qualitative trajectory calcu-
lus (Van de Weghe et al., 2006) which uses the region connection calculus but
extends this using the concept of the absolute and relative velocities between
objects.
In the second approach, that of developing a new calculus, there has been
work such as that by Stell & del Mondo (del Mondo et al., 2010; Stell et al.,
2011) where change over time is represented as a graph relating entities in
one time to the entities they came from and to the entities they became.
Another work in this category is to define a four-dimensional spatial calculus
(for instance, based upon the notion of connection) and then allow for one of
the dimensions to be interpreted as time (Muller, 2002; Stell & West, 2004).
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3.2.2 Knowledge Acquisition
As previously described in this section, the commonsense knowledge present
in a knowledge base is traditionally acquired by computer systems through a
process of knowledge engineering. This process is tedious and costly. There
have been numerous approaches to attempt to deal with this problem. These
approaches fall into two general categories. The first of these categories is the
use of user interfaces that allow the general public to add to the knowledge
of the system. The second of these approaches is to use natural language
processing systems to learn facts from web pages. Both of these categories are
reviewed in turn in this subsection, and then the relationship of this thesis to
knowledge acquisition shall be discussed.
3.2.2.1 Knowledge Acquisition Interfaces
The research into knowledge acquisition interfaces focuses on attempting to
allow untrained or minimally trained users to encode and express commonsense
knowledge. By reducing the skill-level needed to encode knowledge, it allows
for the acquisition task to be distributed among a larger workforce, such as
volunteers using a collaborative system over the world-wide web. This reduces
the problem of the knowledge acquisition bottleneck in three ways: firstly by
reducing the cost of the workforce required, secondly by increasing the speed
at which a piece of knowledge can be encoded and thirdly by allowing the task
to be distributed among a larger number of people.
One of the first and by-far the largest contribution to layperson knowledge
acquisition is that of the Open Mind Common Sense project, which directly
aimed to create a knowledge base with a layperson knowledge acquisition
method. The earliest and primary foundation work to do with this project is
that by Singh et al. (Singh, 2002; Singh et al., 2002; Singh & Barry, 2003).
The key to this work is that it uses the English language itself as the internal
representation for the knowledge of the system. Instead of using a machine-
readable representation, the project has created rules of inference that work
on the English language. Therefore, in this project, people are asked to enter
simple facts in English such as “A cat is a mammal”. When inference on
the knowledge is conducted, the natural language parsing techniques match
various templates such as “X is a Y” and when a template is matched, it
allows for various rules of inference to be used, such as disambiguating a rule,
paraphrasing the rule, splitting and merging of facts and other heuristics.
The Open Mind Common Sense project was then expanded by Liu &
Singh (2004), introducing the ConceptNet. ConceptNet itself was later ex-
panded upon by Havasi, Speer and others (Havasi et al., 2007; Speer, 2007;
Speer et al., 2009) This work applies the various relationships in the Open
Mind Common Sense knowledge base into a network of concepts. In the net-
work, the nodes represent compound concepts such as “full stomach” and
“eat breakfast”. The connections in the network represent the English lan-
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guage relationship. The relations are the parsing templates, so the nodes “full
stomach” and “eat breakfast” have the connection labelled “effect of”. By
representing the relationships as a network of concepts, it allows for easier
computation of reasoning over multiple connections, such as matching pat-
terns of relationships for the creation of analogies and quick deduction based
upon the transitive nature of some relationships such as “is a”. One exten-
sion to this by Speer is to ask the user yes or no questions based on distant
relations found within the network such as “Would you find shampoo in the
living room?” based on both being found within a house. This allows for new
relationships to be found that the user may not think to write down.
A further contribution from the Open Mind Common Sense project is the
work by Gupta & Kochenderfer (2004). This work extended the base of the
project in two main ways. Firstly, the work focused on indoor commonsense
objects, by limiting the scope of the knowledge it was hoped that it would allow
for a denser level of knowledge. Secondly, this work looked at the inference of
actions using the English knowledge representation.
There has been some work that is not directly a part of the Open Mind
Common Sense project but based upon it. The first of these is the system
known as Learner (Chklovski, 2003; Chklovski & Gil, 2005). The system uses
a small set of initial seed statements and the user selects an object to discuss.
The Learner system then uses the properties of similar concepts as questions
to whether they apply to the selected concept. In this way, new commonsense
knowledge is prompted and gained. The work on Learner can be seen to be a
prototypical version of ConceptNet.
The second piece of work in the area of using an interface for layperson
knowledge acquisition is the Verbosity game by von Ahn et al. (2006). This
presented the task of creating new knowledge in the form of a computer game.
In the game, two people play cooperatively with each other. In turn, one
person selects a word to be guessed and the other has a predetermined set of
questions to ask about that word in a “fill in the blank” style. The person
who initially selected the word then fills the blank in but must not use the
selected word. Points are scored if the guesser guesses the word. Naturally,
the questions that are asked are in the knowledge format used by the Open
Mind Common Sense knowledge base and so each statement created by the
game could be added to the knowledge base, if not already present.
The third piece of work related to the Open Mind Common Sense project
is the work of Kuo & Hsu (2011). This work looked at creating a Chinese
language version of the Open Mind Common Sense project, leveraging the
English language version to aid the knowledge acquisition process. Kuo, Hsu
& Shih (2012) more recently did a piece of work in the area looking at using
content from social networks to increase the size of the knowledge base.
While the work surrounding the Open Mind Common Sense project rep-
resents the bulk of the work done in the creation of interfaces for layperson
commonsense knowledge collection, there are other pieces of work in this area.
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The earliest of which is by Witbrock et al. (2005). In their work, they review
some methods for layperson knowledge acquisition that generate knowledge
for the CYC knowledge base. The work demonstrates four graphical user in-
terface systems that allow the user to input different kinds of commonsense
knowledge. The first is an interface that takes simple natural language sen-
tences and splits the individual facts into key-value relationships based on a
chosen concept, further key-value relationships are then prompted for, based
on concepts that have a similar set of relationships. The second interface al-
lows for the user to match subjects to objects of a given type. The user is given
a set of subjects and objects that have been observed to appear together on
a web page and the found subjects and objects satisfy various filtering crite-
ria. The third interface presents hypothesised statements based on abducing2
from the existing knowledge within the knowledge base and then presents the
statement to a user. The user then rates the statement for comprehensibil-
ity, appropriateness, truth, interest value and plausibility. The final interface
uses inductive logic programming to create generalised rules that are then pre-
sented to the user with examples and the user is expected to state whether
the rule is correct.
3.2.2.2 Knowledge Acquisition through Natural Language
Processing
While at least some of the methods of layperson knowledge acquisition inter-
faces use natural language processing to process the input of the system, this
was only for simple single-line facts. This section looks at the approach of
using large natural language corpora from sources such as web pages to obtain
commonsense knowledge.
The first work of this sort is by Gao & Sterling (1997) where a limited
handcrafted knowledge base was used along with a natural language process-
ing system. The knowledge base guided the processor to allow for further
knowledge to be acquired. The study was very limited to the narrow use-case
of understanding estate agent advertisements. The next work found that looks
at mass corpora knowledge acquisition, by Wyatt et al. (2005) uses descrip-
tions of activities from the web to recognise the activity from RFID sensor
data.
Matuszek et al. (2005) produced an important study into using web corpora
for commonsense knowledge acquisition. That study looked at the methods
that are used to populate CYC with commonsense knowledge extracted from
web pages. As with the earlier work by Gao and Sterling, the CYC knowledge
base itself was used to aid the parsing process, to both generate query and
check the consistency of the results. The search was performed through the
Google search engine and the final knowledge rules from the results of the
2Abduction is a mode of inference where the agent attempts to infer the
most likely explanation for an observed consequence.
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parser were also verified by searching for an English language version of the
rule.
Another study in using web pages to acquire commonsense knowledge is by
Hadidi et al. (2010). In this study, the Simple English Wikipedia was parsed
into sentences. Of those sentences, those that followed the pattern “noun
phrase – verb phrase – noun phrase” were extracted. Those sentences were
then used to form a relational network with each verb as the relation type.
The final study looked at in this section, by Mancilla-Caceres & Amir (2010;
2011) combines both approaches, a user interface for laypeople and the use of a
large natural language corpus. The approach used was to provide a computer
game that requires the user to classify whether a commonsense knowledge
rule makes sense and is true. The candidate rules were taken from Wikipedia
in the same manner as the study by Hadidi et al. (2010). In their system,
a candidate rule was randomly selected either from the existing known rules
or from a list of previously used rules. Two human game players were each
asked whether the selected rule is true, false, nonsense, or not known. A third
computer player made the same choice, based on the previous answer if it is
a previously used question, or selects “not known” if the answer is a known
answer. After all players had selected an answer, the human players were
asked to decide which of the other two players was a human based on what
answer the other two players gave, as a form of pseudo-Turing test. Points
were awarded if the guess was correct and lost if the guess was incorrect. The
authors argue that the inclusion of a computer player stops human players
from being able to cheat by agreeing a fixed strategy and so not necessarily
provide correct answers, as only when the players adopt the strategy of giving
the correct answer can the players have a chance of knowing which player is
the computer.
3.2.2.3 Knowledge Acquisition in Relation to this Thesis
The system proposed by this thesis does not fall into either of the existing
categories. Instead it learns by observing the environment to accumulate pat-
terns of events. These event patterns are encoded in a predicate logic in such
a manner that they are usable for inference. For instance, if the system learns
that a ball moving upwards will lead in short order to that same ball mov-
ing downwards, then if the existing knowledge base contained facts such as
“people sometimes catch moving balls that move within their reach”, then
the system could possibly qualitatively infer the prediction that a ball moving
in an arc towards a person may be caught, even though the ball is currently
moving away from the person in the vertical axis. Admittedly, this is a rather
tortured example due to the current limitations of what can be learned by the
system presented. However, this does not discount the fact that the knowl-
edge being learned is able to be used within a reasoning context and so it is
argued that this system can be seen to be a prototypical knowledge acquisition
system.
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In the literature, only a single discussion was found of a system that looks
at learning commonsense knowledge from purely observing the environment.
This discussion was of the BabyExp project by Poesio et al. (2010; 2011). This
was a voluntary research project that last reported its progress in 2011 with an
unknown status after this point. The project reports stated that the project
aimed to produce work that looked to analyse an automated transcription of
an audio and video recording of the first three years of a baby’s life. From this
the group wished to develop algorithms that acquired commonsense knowledge
from the transcription by attempting to exploit the same “training data” that
a child uses to learn its linguistic knowledge. The status of the project in the
latest report had carried out an initial look into the automated transcription
of the video data. At that point, the project had not produced any methods
to learn from the transcribed data.
3.3 Reinforcement Learning
The form of machine learning known as reinforcement learning attempts to
learn a method of selecting actions such that the reward received is maximised.
The field has links across artificial intelligence and computer science in general,
from dynamic programming to neural networks to planning.
Reinforcement learning has in some form been a part of the field of artifi-
cial intelligence from early on in its history. Minsky (1952) discussed a form
of reinforcement learning, just two years after Turing (1950) asked “Can Ma-
chines Think?” Minsky later discussed secondary reinforcement in his PhD
thesis (Minsky, 1954). A notable early piece of work is Samuel’s study of
checkers-playing programs (Samuel, 1959). The discussion of these programs
make reference to a “reward-and-punishment routine” and looked at storing
the score produced by a given move for each board position encountered –
which Samuel called “rote learning” and can be seen as a very basic temporal
difference method – a form of reinforcement learning.
Later on, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Sutton & Barto produced
two models of classical conditioning based upon the concept of credit assign-
ment over time (Sutton & Barto, 1981, 1987), inspired by Klopf’s (1972) work
on conditioning and his general cybernetic theory of heterostasis. One of
these two models, the temporal-difference (T.D.) model, was later abstracted
away from its basis in classical conditioning to form the reinforcement learning
method known as T.D. learning (Sutton, 1988). This was then later expanded
upon by Watkins to produce a system known as Q learning (Watkins, 1989;
Watkins & Dayan, 1992). These two methods, T.D. learning and Q learning
form the basis of modern reinforcement learning research. Both of the two
methods will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
For an overview of the field, the survey by Kaelbing et al. (1996) and
the highly influential book by Sutton & Barto (1998) both provide a good
grounding. Due to the growth of the field, more recent surveys focus on
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different aspects of reinforcement learning, though Gosavi (2009) has presented
a tutorial survey that reviews an updated core of reinforcement learning from
a dynamic programming perspective. The more specific surveys cover topics
such as multi-agent reinforcement learning (Bus¸oniu et al., 2008), learning
from demonstration / apprenticeship learning (Argall et al., 2009) and transfer
learning (Taylor & Stone, 2009). Not being directly relevant to this thesis,
these different extensions are not covered, though two extensions shall be
briefly covered later in this section.
3.3.1 The Reinforcement Learning Problem
A concise yet highly instructive definition of the reinforcement learning prob-
lem is provided by Sutton & Barto:
“Reinforcement learning is about learning from interaction how to
behave in order to achieve a goal. The reinforcement learning agent
and its environment interact over a sequence of discrete time steps.
The specification of their interface defines this particular task: the
actions are the choices made by the agent; the states are the basis
for making the choices; and the rewards are the basis for evaluat-
ing the choices. Everything inside the agent is completely known
and controllable by the agent; everything outside is incompletely
controllable but may or may not be known. A policy is a stochastic
rule by which the agent selects actions as a function of states. The
agent’s objective is to maximise the amount of reward it receives
over time.”
(Sutton & Barto, 1998, p. 81)
This definition covers all almost all of the basic terminology of reinforce-
ment learning. As described in the definition, the task at hand is for an agent
to learn about how its actions affect the environment that the agent is in.
When the program starts, the agent is told the environmental state that it
is in, but may know nothing else about the environment. At each state, the
agent has a set of actions it can perform, from which it must select a single
action to perform on the environment. Once an action is performed on the
environment, the agent is given two pieces of feedback information: a reward
and a new description of the state of the environment. The reward can be pos-
itive (a “reward”), negative (a “punishment”) or zero valued (a neutral state).
The goal of the agent is to maximise the cumulative reward. This is achieved
by a policy, which decides which action to take given a particular state of the
environment. At its most basic, a policy is a list of instructions stating “if you
are in state A then do action B”. In a more general fashion, a policy can be
probabilistic, where for each action that can be taken in a given state, there is
a probability that that action will be taken. The function π (s, a) denotes the
probability that action a will be taken in state s for the policy π. The task
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of reinforcement learning is then one of finding the best policy, i.e. the set of
probabilities that maximises the cumulative reward.
Initially, since the agent knows very little about the environment, the ac-
tions have to be selected randomly. However, as different actions are selected
and their reward is revealed, the policy can be progressively changed so that
the actions that deliver the best reward are selected. If the world has been
completely explored, then the policy would be able to select the sequence of
actions from any starting point that gives the best possible reward. The pol-
icy that gives this best possible reward is referred to as the optimal policy.
The optimal policy is denoted as π⋆ and the function π⋆ (s, a) denotes the
probability that action a will be taken in state s for the policy π⋆.
Consider the case, that while exploring, the agent happened by accident
to come across the best sequence of actions. In this case there would be
little need to explore further as any further exploration would not improve
the policy, so therefore it is not necessary to exhaustively search the entire
environment to learn the best policy. However, this leads to a dilemma. The
agent does not know when it has arrived at the best policy, so unless there has
been an exhaustive search of the environment, the agent cannot be completely
confident that there is not a better policy, hidden in the unexplored parts of the
environment. The dilemma is that the agent can choose to exploit the current
best policy or choose to continue to explore in hope of finding a better policy.
If it already knows the best policy, then any time spent exploring is wasted
and should have been spent exploiting the current policy. This is known as the
exploration-exploitation dilemma and is central to the reinforcement learning
problem.
3.3.2 Value Functions
The way to store and compute the best policy is through a value function,
of which there are two possible types, a state value function and a state-
action value function. The state value function is usually denoted as V (s)
where s is the state and is used when the rewards of the environment need
to be predicted, but the learning system is not in control of action selection.
The state-action value function is usually denoted as Q (s, a) where a is the
action and is used when the action needs to be selected by learning system. A
state value function assigns a value to measure how beneficial it is to be in a
particular state. A state-action value function assigns a value to measure how
beneficial it is to select a particular action in a particular state.
The measure of the benefit of a state or state-action pair is based on the
need for the agent to maximise the cumulative reward over the life of the agent.
This means that the value assigned needs to include not just the immediate
reward, but the cumulative reward that would be achieved if starting with
that state or state-action pair and following the current policy. As the value
functions have to be defined in relation to a particular policy, the function can
instead be written as V π (s) and Qπ (s, a) respectively, where π refers to the
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policy that the value function relates to. Where the policy refers to the optimal
policy, the functions are usually written V ⋆ (s) and Q⋆ (s, a) respectively.
The total reward for an agent operating under a particular policy can
only be known after the life of the agent. This can be problematic if the
agent is expected to improve during its lifetime. Policy improvements that
occur within the lifetime of an agent are dealt with by discounting the sum of
rewards over time. The time-discounted future cumulative reward is known
as the expected return. The reinforcement learning methods can therefore be
described in terms of attempting to estimate this expected return for the value
function, as estimating the expected return would allow for selection of the
best policy. Now that the notion of discounting the reward has been discussed,
equation 3.14 and equation 3.15 define the expected return for the state and
state-action value functions respectively, where rt denotes the reward at the
tth time-step, st denotes the state t
th time-step, at denotes the action taken at
the tth time-step, γ is the time-discount value and Eπ {} denotes the expected
value if the agent follows the policy π.
V π (s) = Eπ
{
∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1
∣∣∣∣∣st = s
}
(3.14)
Qπ (s, a) = Eπ
{
∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1
∣∣∣∣∣st = s, at = a
}
(3.15)
3.3.3 Controlling Exploration
Now that the value functions have been described, the reason why policies
have to be probabilistic can be discussed. The reason the action selection of a
policy is defined to be probabilistic is because of the exploration-exploitation
dilemma. By having a probability that the best-known action will not be
taken, it allows for a reinforcement learning system, through the current pol-
icy, to allow for exploration of the environment. When the reinforcement
system changes the current policy, it can change the probabilities and so can
control exploration over time. There are a wide range of strategies to control
exploration, some of which were reviewed by Thrun (1992). Two widely-used
strategies for controlling exploration are known as the ǫ-greedy method and
the Softmax method. Note these methods both depend on the value function
and are not a substitute for it, nor would any method for balancing explo-
ration and exploitation make sense without it, otherwise the method would
not know what the exploitation choice was.
In the ǫ-greedy method, the best known action is selected most of the time
but occasionally, with probability ǫ, a different action is selected from the
remaining actions (with uniform probability between the remaining actions).
Equation 3.16 describes the probability that action a would be chosen under
the ǫ-greedy method, where n is the number of actions available to the agent
at state s and ǫ is the probability that the best known action will not be taken.
Sutton & Barto (1998, p. 48) attribute the method to Watkins (1989).
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π (a, s) =

1− ǫ if a = Q
π (s, a′)
ǫ
n−1 otherwise
(3.16)
In the Softmax method, the actions are selected with a probability that
is dependent on their current expected reward, with the largest probability
being assigned to the best known action and the lowest probability to the worst
action. The probability distribution for the Softmax method is the Boltzmann
distribution. Equation 3.17 describes the probability that action a is selected,
where n is the number of actions available to the agent at state s and τ is
the temperature. Temperature values tending towards positive infinity tend
towards all the action probabilities being equal, temperature values tending
towards zero tend towards always choosing the action with the largest expected
return. The Softmax rule was first proposed by Luce (1959).
π (a, s) =
eQ
pi(s,a)/τ
n∑
a′=1
eQpi(s,a′)/τ
(3.17)
3.3.4 Stochastic Results and Markov Decision Processes
There is a final complicating factor that is part of the reinforcement learning
problem but was not discussed before this point to avoid making the discussion
harder to follow. This is the fact that when an action is selected, either by
the learning system or otherwise, the following state is not always the same.
Instead, the state following from the selected action is randomly decided from
a probability distribution over a set of states. The set of states is usually a
small sub-set of the total states so the randomness is still constrained. The
stochastic nature of the resultant states consequently affects the reward for
a particular action, as the reward is given upon entry into a state from the
chosen action. Because the reward is based both upon the action and the
resultant state, it is possible for two separate actions to lead to the same state
but have different rewards. An example where this may apply is if the agent is
rewarded by trying to go up a hill, but sometimes slips so fails to go up but is
still rewarded for trying, whereas choosing to go down could lead to the same
state but wouldn’t be rewarded.
By making the system stochastic, it changes the requirements for the ap-
proach that must be taken for by a reinforcement system, but does not change
the nature of the value functions, and equation 3.14 and equation 3.15 still
apply. The nature of the exploration-exploitation dilemma and the methods
mentioned also still apply. The reason that the value functions are not af-
fected by the inclusion of this stochastic behaviour is because the stochastic
behaviour can be fully contained within the expected value (denoted by Eπ {}
in equation 3.14 and equation 3.15). The actual sum for the time-discounted
awards is not changed, as there is still only one reward and one successor state
given after an action selection.
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This system where the environment’s successor state and reward response
to an agent’s actions is stochastic can be represented by a mathematical frame-
work known as a Markov decision process (MDP) (Bellman, 1957).
A Markov decision process can be represented as a 4-tuple:
(
S,A, P
(
s, a, s′
)
, R
(
s, a, s′
))
Where:
• The symbol S denotes the set of states.
• The symbol A denotes set of actions.
• The function P : S × A × S → [0, 1] denotes the probability p ∈ [0, 1]
that taking action a ∈ A from state s ∈ S will lead to state s′ ∈ S.
• The function R : S × A × S → R denotes the immediate reward r ∈ R
for taking action a ∈ A from state s ∈ S that led to state s′ ∈ S.
A MDP can be represented diagrammatically as a directed graph with two
kinds of node: a state node and an action node. Edges from state nodes lead to
action nodes and edges from action nodes lead to state nodes. The edge from
action nodes to state nodes is labelled with the probability of that transition
occurring along with the reward given when that transition is used. Figure 3.5
shows an example graph for a MDP with two states and two actions. In
figure 3.5 the optimal policy is to always select action X. Note that even when
the transitions are defined stochastically, a MDP can still contain deterministic
elements, such as the (A, Y ) state-action pair of figure 3.5.
p = 0.6, r = 0 p = 0.4, r = 3 p = 0.8, r = 1 p = 0.2, r = 3
X X
A B
Y Y
p = 1, r = −6 p = 0.1, r = 8 p = 0.9, r = −3
Figure 3.5: A generic example of a Markov Decision Process. The empty
nodes (A and B) are state nodes. The filled-in nodes are action nodes.
X and Y are the possible actions. The value p is the transition probabil-
ity. The value r is the reward given for that transition.
By expressing the reinforcement learning problem in terms of finding an
optimal policy over an MDP, the value functions can be expressed even more
precisely. This is done through defining the value function in terms of the
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policy action selection function, the transition function of the MDP and the
reward function of the MDP. The equations that do this are known as the
Bellman equations (Bellman, 1957). The Bellman equations are out of scope
for this thesis as they are needed to understand neither the remaining discus-
sion of reinforcement learning, nor the relationship between this thesis and the
reinforcement learning literature, nor the system presented by this thesis.
3.3.5 Approaches to the Reinforcement Learning Problem
There are three main approaches to the reinforcement learning problem: The
dynamic programming approach, the Monte Carlo approach and the temporal
difference approach. One of the central differences is that in the dynamic pro-
gramming approach, the MDP of the environment is assumed to be known,
and so examples from actual experience are not needed. The other two ap-
proaches do not assume that the MDP is known, and instead rather try to
learn the optimal value functions from actual experienced cases.
The dynamic programming approach treats the reinforcement learning
problem as an optimisation problem. As the approach already has complete
knowledge of the environment, there is no need for the policy to be stochastic.
Instead the policy is deterministic, i.e. each environmental state has exactly
one action choice. The goal in this optimisation problem is to produce an
optimal policy. This is done by evaluating each policy and then evaluating
variants of that policy by selecting a different action at a given point and but
keeping the remainder of the policy the same. If the end value is increased by
adopting the new action then the policy is changed to include this action. This
feedback process of evaluating the policy and then selecting a local action that
improves the evaluation is known as policy improvement. The key then to the
dynamic programming approach is the evaluation of a policy. One approach
is to treat the MDP as a system of simultaneous equations. The other method
is to change the relevant Bellman equation to be an iterative update rule and
iteratively change the value function until it converges (Bellman, 1957).
The Monte Carlo approach is that an agent is given a stochastic policy
which it must follow for its entire life. At the end of the life of each agent,
the cumulative reward is added to each and every state or state-action pair
that the agent encountered during its lifetime. The value for each state or
state-action pair is then the mean of the cumulative reward over the lifetime
of many agents. By the law of large numbers, the value for each state or
state-action pair will converge to its true value (Michie & Chambers, 1968).
The temporal difference approach (Sutton, 1988; Sutton & Barto, 1998)
is similar to the Monte Carlo approach in that it uses actual experience to
estimate the value function. However, unlike the Monte Carlo approach, the
temporal difference approach updates the value function within the lifetime of
each agent. One approach to this is done by only calculating the value of the a
given state or state-action pair that was visited based on the value of the next
state or state-action pair that was visited, plus the immediate reward that was
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received for transitioning between the two cases. Initially, the value function
will only take into account immediate rewards, but as the agent re-visits states
or state-action pairs, and over the lifetimes of many agents, the value function
will converge to be globally optimal rather than locally optimal.
Being born out of conditioning, the temporal difference approach is the
closest of the three approaches to this thesis. Because of this, the remainder
of this section on reinforcement learning will focus on this approach.
3.3.6 Temporal-Difference (TD) Learning
The TD learning method was developed out of the TD model of classical condi-
tioning, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The method abstracts away from
the concept of stimuli and instead looks purely at predicting future rewards
given the current state. The temporal difference learning method presented
here is the same as that presented by Sutton & Barto (1998), which can be
considered to be the canonical version of the method.
In the terms of the notation introduced in this section on reinforcement
learning, equation 3.18 gives the amount a state value will be updated by.
In equation 3.18, α is a learning rate constant, e (st) is the eligibility trace
(explained below) and the remaining symbols are as were previously defined.
For comparison, a slightly-rearranged version of the main equation of
the TD model of classical conditioning (equation 3.13) is presented in equa-
tion 3.19. In that equation, ∆V i is the change in association strength for the
ith conditioned stimulus; Xi denotes the eligibility trace for the i
th conditioned
stimulus; λt+1 is the magnitude of the conditioning strength at time t+1; αi de-
notes the conditioned stimulus-specific learning rate; β is the unconditioned
stimulus-specific learning rate; γ denotes the imminence weighting and Vt is
the prediction made of the magnitude of the unconditioned stimulus at time t.
∆V (st) = αe (st) (R (st, a, st+1) + γV (st+1)− V (st)) (3.18)
∆V i = αiXiβ
(
λt+1 + γVt+1 − Vt
)
(3.19)
In looking at the similarities and differences between the two equations, it
is noticeable that there are many analogies between the two equations. The
prediction of the value remains the same, with a discount factor; the immediate
magnitude of the unconditioned stimulus is now the immediate reward; there
is a value for the eligibility of the association and there is a fixed learning
rate constant. The one place where there is not an analogy between the two
equations is that the reinforcement learning method does not have a specific
learning rate for each state – this is probably because such a learning rate
would make little sense in the context of the reinforcement learning problem.
Algorithm 3.1 lists the full TD (λ) algorithm, applying equation 3.18. The
listed algorithm is the same as that described by Sutton & Barto (1998,
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p. 174)3. The way the algorithm works is by back-propagating rewards through
the chain of states that were experienced within the lifetime of the agent as
the rewards are experienced, discounting by γ at each step. The eligibility
trace for each state (e (s)) controls this discounting by being multiplied by the
discount factor each time the state is updated. This reflects that the state is
one step further in the past each time the agent goes to a new state. Note
that in line nine, the eligibility trace is incremented by one, this is so that if
a state is visited more than once in the lifetime of the agent, that state could
have a total trace that is greater than one. Note that equation 3.18 is split up
to allow for the algorithm to be more efficient.
Algorithm 3.1 TD(λ)
Input:
S: The set of states in the world.
V : The tabular state value function.
π: The tabular state value function.
λ: The tabular state value function.
γ: The tabular state value function.
1: Initialise V (s) arbitrarily for all s ∈ S
2: Repeat (for each agent):
3: e (s)← 0 for all s ∈ S
4: Initialise s
5: Repeat (for each step of the agent’s lifetime):
6: a← action given by π for s
7: Take action a, observe reward r and next state s′
8: δ ← r + γV (s′)− V (s)
9: e (s)← e (s) + 1
10: Repeat (for each s′′ ∈ S):
11: V (s′′)← V (s′′)− αδe (s′′)
12: e (s′′)← γλe (s′′)
13: s← s′
The new symbol (λ ≥ 0) is a parameter of the algorithm that controls the
weighting of how far the back-propagation of rewards goes. If λ is set to zero,
then the reward is only ever propagated backwards by one step each time a
state is visited. If λ is set to one, then the reward is propagated backwards
through the entire chain of states visited with no weighting other than the
time discounting. Values of λ in between zero and one progressively weight
more towards the recent past as the value approaches zero. Note that λ is
set to one, the algorithm produces the same output as a variant of the Monte
Carlo approach.
Temporal-difference methods originally only focused on the state value
function, and the introduction of the TD(λ) algorithm by Sutton (1988) made
no mention of the state-action value function. The work that applied temporal
3Some minor changes were made for notational clarity, to comply with the
vernacular used in this thesis and to take into account the errata by Sut-
ton (2010).
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difference methods to the state-action value function was done by
Watkins (1989; Watkins & Dayan 1992). Watkins introduced the Q-learning
algorithm, which is not quite the state-action version of the TD(λ) algorithm
due to the use of off-policy learning. Off-policy learning is where the algo-
rithm learns the optimal policy, but does not follow it. Instead an off-policy
algorithm follows a separate, related policy that still allows for exploration.
By taking into account the differences between the policy being followed and
the optimal policy, the optimal policy can be updated such that it includes
no exploration and so can truly be the optimal policy. There does exist an
on-policy temporal difference method, which is a direct state-action version of
the TD(λ) algorithm. It is known as Sarsa and was proposed by Rummery &
Niranjan (1994).
3.3.7 Extensions to Temporal Difference Learning
Up to this point, this section has been discussing the core work of reinforcement
learning. There are a great many extensions to the core, too many to cover in
any detail. This subsection will look at two extensions to give an impression
of how the reinforcement learning problem can be extended.
The aim of generalisation is to apply the knowledge that has been learned
from the environmental states that have been observed to those states that
have not been visited. This is done by adding to each state some supplemen-
tary information which the agent can use to compare the similarities between
states. It is the job of the agent to learn which pieces of the supplementary
information are useful when and by how much. The agent would then use the
information to predict the value function of a state based on supplementary
information alone.
How generalisation is done is the subject of a great deal of research. The
general idea though is to create a state-value function that is parameterised
by the values of the supplementary information rather than the individual
state. However, in allowing for generalisation, there has to be the trade-off
that no state or state-action value will ever be able to be perfectly predicted.
This is because by using a general measure of similarity between states, means
that the transition between states has to be smooth. Therefore, if two close
states are near enough but give very different values for their value function,
the smoothness of the general value function will mean both values are pulled
away from their true value.
Because of this, the goal of a general value function is not to match each
state exactly, but to minimise the mean of the squared error between the val-
ues of the true (optimal) value function and the general value function. This
is done by a method known as gradient descent. The intuition here is that as a
given value is changed, this will change the mean of the squared error in some
manner, either up or down, meaning that there is a local gradient for each
parameter value. By calculating this gradient for each parameter, the direc-
tion that most quickly reduces the mean of the squared error can be followed,
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allowing for a minimum value to be found. Alonso et al. (2006) suggested
an approach to generalisation for Q-learning based on a number of observa-
tions made regarding the differences between the TD learning method and the
Rescorla-Wagner model of classical conditioning. Sutton et al. (2009) have
produced a variant of TD learning that calculates gradient descent efficiently
and in a convergent manner.
A related, but different extension to reinforcement learning is that of in-
troducing the notion of continuous states and actions. In the conventional
version of reinforcement learning, each state and action is a discrete set of
choices. However this need not be the case, for instance if a robot is to choose
an angle with which to turn through then this is an action where there is a
continuum of possible actions rather than a discrete set of choices. Similarly
the state that the robot is in after making its choices is also a continuum.
The state space becomes an even larger continuum if the robot then moves
forwards after the turn, with another continuum of choices. Some of the meth-
ods of generalisation can be applicable, as one form of representing this is to
have the supplementary state information become the state itself. Work by
van Hasselt (2012) has looked at this version of the reinforcement learning
problem in detail. Some recent research by Fairbank & Alonso (2011; 2012)
has looked at this variant in terms of dynamic programming.
3.3.8 Reinforcement Learning in Relation to this Thesis
This thesis has many commonalities with reinforcement learning in general
and temporal difference learning specifically. It also has a number of very
significant differences. This subsection will review these similarities and dif-
ferences.
The similarities between reinforcement learning and temporal difference
learning and this thesis are due to their common origins: conditioning. This
means that both systems learn to associate temporally congruous events, as
that is the basis for conditioning. Both temporal difference learning and the
system presented in this thesis use a value of association to represent the
learning – in temporal difference, this is the association to the reward (i.e. the
value function) and in this thesis it is the significance value (see chapter four
for details). There are other similarities that are not necessarily conditioning
based, but are logical developments of it. These similarities are that both
systems learn continuously, are able to adapt the circumstances over time and
the converged learning need not be biased by the earliest values learned.
However, there are numerous differences, which again originate in decisions
made regarding the interpretation of the phenomena of classical conditioning.
The largest difference is that the system developed in this thesis does not make
use of any concept of rewards, nor of action. This was due to subscribing to the
stimulus-stimulus interpretation of conditioning. In the temporal difference
system, the only thing learned is the propagation of reward. This means that
if the environment provides no reward, no learning occurs. This is in-line with
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the stimulus-response interpretation of classical conditioning, which in the
current psychological consensus is that it is the minor form of association. It is
accepted that in the reinforcement learning variant of temporal difference, that
conformance to any psychological interpretation was never the goal, however
given the models heritage, such analysis is to be expected.
Another point regarding the difference between the system presented by
this thesis and reinforcement learning in general is that during the transition
between the model of classical conditioning and the machine learning method,
the basis of what is being learned subtly changed. No longer was the learning
method one of classical conditioning but one of instrumental conditioning4.
The nature of classical conditioning is that the subject learns passively, with no
choice of actions - the unconditioned and conditioned responses are reflexive,
not deliberate actions, and if the stimulus-stimulus interpretation is correct,
the response is not needed for learning to occur5.
In instrumental conditioning, the choices are deliberate actions on the part
of the subject seeking the expectation of reward or avoidance of punishment.
The nature of what becomes associated in instrumental conditioning is differ-
ent from classical conditioning. In instrumental conditioning all three items
of the cue stimulus, the action and the reinforcement stimulus are associated,
whereas in classical conditioning there is no action, just a cue and a rein-
forcement stimulus being associated. Note that in reinforcement learning, it
is indeed a triple of the current state, the action and the reward. A possible
argument against this assertion that reinforcement learning is more analogous
to instrumental conditioning is that one can argue that classical conditioning
is to instrumental conditioning what the state value function is to the state-
action value function. The counterargument is that just because the state
value function does not select actions, the policy which it evaluates does select
actions, meaning that action selection is still very much an essential part of
reinforcement learning, even in the case of the state value function.
The consequence of this subtle difference between the classical conditioning
origins of reinforcement learning and its instrumental conditioning abstrac-
tion means that the basis for temporal difference learning has unanswered
questions. This raises the question that, if a temporal difference model of
instrumental conditioning were formulated, would it be different to the clas-
sical conditioning model? If so, would that model be able to be applied to
the reinforcement learning problem, potentially giving a better solution to it?
4Instrumental conditioning is a form of associative learning where the sub-
ject is given a cue stimulus, and the reward is based on the active actions that
the subject makes in response to the cue. Instrumental conditioning was first
found by Thorndike (1898) and was greatly advanced by Skinner (1938; 1962).
Unlike classical conditioning, the subject makes non-reflex actions.
5For the potential argument that in fear conditioning, actions can be taken
that appear to be deliberate, a counterargument would be that the reflex
response – the response that becomes conditioned – is the fear response itself,
not any actions which follow the fear response.
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As with the discussion over interpretation, it is accepted that it was not the
intention of the machine reinforcement learning version of temporal difference
to be compared, however again it does at least warrant discussion due to the
heritage of the method.
It should be pointed out that the two previous arguments, “temporal dif-
ference follows a stimulus-response interpretation” and “temporal difference is
instrumental conditioning”, are not necessarily contradictory positions. What-
ever the mechanism or interpretation of classical conditioning and instrumental
conditioning, the similarities are greater than the differences between the two.
This means that there is a likely shared mechanism between instrumental and
classical conditioning and therefore, it is probable that the interpretation of
classical conditioning also applies to instrumental conditioning.
There are other lesser differences between temporal difference learning and
the system presented by this thesis. The first of these is that the choice of
knowledge representation is different. Temporal difference typically encodes
its knowledge in its value function and the system presented by this thesis
uses predicate logic. The second difference is that temporal difference learn-
ing typically associates linearly, whereas the system presented by this thesis
associates hierarchically, though it is acknowledged that there are extensions
to temporal difference learning that do deal with hierarchical association.
3.4 Visual Event Sequence Learning
The research into visual event sequences is a part of the distinctive sub-field
of artificial intelligence known as computer vision. As the system discussed
within this thesis uses visual events as its data source, this section provides
a brief review of the techniques used in computer vision to identify event se-
quences. This is followed by a brief review of visual object tracking techniques.
3.4.1 Event Recognition
Computer vision research into event detection and classification appears to be
application-driven. These applications broadly fit into two groups of applica-
tions. These are the analysis of broadcast television and automated surveil-
lance. There appears to be a single main difference in approach independent
of application. There are those systems that manually and explicitly model
the classes of event being searched for (Foresti et al., 2004; Cui et al., 2007;
D’Orazio et al., 2009; Cristani et al., 2007) and those systems that do not, dy-
namically creating a model instead (Dee & Hogg, 2009; Piciarelli et al., 2008).
It also should be noted that the method used to detect events is very depen-
dent on the type of application. This suggests that the approach of research
being application-led has in this instance failed to produce any methods that
are general enough to be used across applications.
Systems analysing broadcast television are mainly focused on news broad-
casts, where the events being the story segments in the recording (Hoogs et al.,
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2003; Xu & Chang, 2007) and sport broadcasts, where the events generally
being dependant on the sport – for example goal events in soccer (D’Orazio
et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2009). In the analysis of television broadcasts, the most
common method of detecting events is through temporally dividing the video
into individual shots, classifying each shot based on a cluster analysis and us-
ing typical sequences of shots to detect events. These methods are typically
augmented with concurrent analysis of the audio and closed caption streams
present in the broadcast.
Automated surveillance can be split into those systems attempting to char-
acterise the behaviour of all detected subjects (Dee & Hogg, 2009; Cristani
et al., 2007) and those that attempt to search for anomalous events (Cui et al.,
2007; Foresti et al., 2004; Piciarelli et al., 2008). In the surveillance domain,
the most common method to detect events is through analysis of the trajec-
tories of the detected objects. These trajectories are calculated through the
use of an object tracking system. To find anomalous trajectories, the system
is trained on sets of trajectories that are considered normal (either through
manual labelling or through clustering trajectories and using those clusters
with the highest frequency of use). Anomalous or interesting trajectories are
then classified as such if they are an outlier to the trained sets.
3.4.2 Object Tracking
While the development of this thesis did not directly implement a full track-
ing system, using simulated data instead, the system is designed such that the
input data is supposed to be the output of a tracker or simulation thereof.
In addition, the input data simulator modelled some of the kind of noise that
a tracker produces in its output. As these two parts of this thesis assume
knowledge of a tracking system, and for the sake of completeness, this very
large area shall be briefly discussed. Yilmaz et al. (2006) provide a comprehen-
sive review of tracking techniques, in which they split the tracking techniques
into three different categories: point tracking, kernel tracking and silhouette
tracking.
Point tracking is based on finding a correspondence between salient points
in one frame and the same points in the next frame. Salient points are points
in the scene that are either easy-to-find points on the objects present in the
scene (for example, corners) and/or points that are invariant to particular
transforms that may be applied to the image.
Kernel tracking is the category of methods where the objects to be tracked
are represented in a simple manner, such as a bounding box or an ellipse. A
correspondence between frames is then obtained for each simple shape. The
search for the area of each frame that defines the shape can then be constrained
by searching the neighbourhood of the shape in the previous frame. Kernel
tracking is typically used with techniques that attempt to create foreground-
background segmentation, such as between changing and static regions of pix-
els in the image.
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Silhouette tracking is the name given to the set of methods that attempt
to model the outline of each class of objects to be tracked. These models
are typically a complex polygon or spline and have control points to allow
the model to deform within set bounds. Tracking is then the creation of
correspondences between models in consecutive frames. The position and
shape of the previous frame is used to guide the search for the position and
shape in the next.
In dos Santos et al. (2009), it is noted that an object forming part of
a dynamic scene can display two types of motion: intrinsic and extrinsic.
Intrinsic motion is that motion that changes the appearance of the object
by the movement of constituent parts of the object (e.g. limbs on a body).
Extrinsic motion is motion where the position of the object changes relative
to other objects. From the point of view of tracking systems, extrinsic motion
can be detected by either a kernel tracker or a silhouette tracker, whereas
intrinsic motion can only be detected by a silhouette tracker.
The system discussed in chapter four of this thesis assumes the use of a
kernel tracking system. While a silhouette tracker would provide the most in-
formation and allow for a more general way to describe events, it has a number
of practical concerns. Firstly, a silhouette tracker would require models of the
outlines of the objects expected to be tracked. This assumption of what ob-
jects would be present in a scene would mean that the system would be less
adaptable to novel objects.
3.5 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the ideas that are related to this thesis, either
through this thesis making use of those ideas or through the ideas having a
common conceptual heritage. Firstly the work done within the psychology
community towards modelling classical conditioning was reviewed. It was
noted that there are two classes of model, trial-level models, and real-time
models. A trial-level model is one that computes the association strength
after each presentation of a stimulus completes. A real-time model computes
the association strength at regular intervals.
Next, the ideas of commonsense knowledge were reviewed, with the three
problems of knowledge representation, knowledge reasoning and knowledge
acquisition. The two most pertinent problems, those of representation and
acquisition were then discussed. The problem of knowledge representation
focused on space and time. The problem of acquisition was reviewed more
generally, looking at two dominant approaches of acquisition, namely using
an interface that abstracts away the technical details of representing knowl-
edge and that of using natural language processing to parse the commonsense
knowledge that is expressed within large corpora such as web pages.
The chapter then went on to review reinforcement learning, looking at the
reinforcement learning problem in detail, including its formulation as max-
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imising a value function and as a Markov decision process. The three methods
of solving the reinforcement learning problem were then briefly reviewed: dy-
namic programming, Monte Carlo and temporal difference techniques. The
temporal difference techniques were then looked at in further detail due to
their common conceptual heritage to this thesis. The similarities and differ-
ences between reinforcement learning and this thesis were then discussed, with
the most notable difference being that this thesis does not assume external ac-
tions and rewards are available.
Finally, the chapter reviewed some of the literature surrounding visual
event detection and a quick overview of tracking methods was included for
completeness. The remainder of this thesis will be dedicated to describing and
evaluating a system that makes use of the analysis presented in chapter two in
a system that passively learns from classical conditioning. In particular, the
next chapter presents a description of the system built to learn in the manner
similar to classical conditioning.
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Chapter 4
The System
In order to test the ideas expressed by the hypotheses presented in chapter one
and expanded upon in chapter two, a system was developed that makes use of
the ideas of classical conditioning to passively learn a model of the observed
environment. This chapter describes that system.
Chapter two presented and analysed a wide range of phenomena of classical
conditioning. It was not feasible within one project to implement all the
features that were presented and analysed. Because of this constraint, the
system implements a sub-set of the phenomena. The phenomena that were
chosen to be implemented were those that were observed to be the most widely
discussed within the classical conditioning literature. To recap, the phenomena
that the system implements are:
1. Acquisition
2. Extinction
3. The Inter-Stimulus Interval
4. Reacquisition
5. Blocking
6. Recovery from Blocking
7. Conditioned Inhibition
8. Extinction of Conditioned Inhi-
bition
9. Latent Inhibition
10. U.S.-Pre-Exposure Effect
11. Sensory Preconditioning
12. Secondary Conditioning
The system takes frame-based data and learns a model in an unsuper-
vised manner with no external feedback. This is one of the main departures
from previous reinforcement learning systems in that previous reinforcement
learning systems require external evaluative feedback in the form of an ex-
ternal reward signal. The other main departure is that the system does not
interact with the environment in the form of action selection. The basis for
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these departures is that the stimulus-stimulus interpretation of classical con-
ditioning implies there is no inherent need for reward and action to be present
for learning to occur. Actions and rewards exist within classical conditioning
experiments only to allow the learning process to be observed.
Some general terminology needs to be introduced that is used throughout
this chapter. The term “event instance” refers to a specific observed occur-
rence, with a particular form, start time and end time. The term “event type”
can then be defined to be the classification of the form of an event. The form
of an event instance is that event instance’s event type.
The chapter starts with a brief outline of how the system works overall,
discussing only the key general ideas that are a part of its operation. The
next four sections each provide an intuitive description of the function of the
four modules that comprise the system. The final section of this chapter then
provides a more formal description of the system and its implementation.
4.1 System Outline
In order to test the hypotheses, a system that creates a human-examinable
environmental model using the principles of classical conditioning is required.
This section gives an outline description of how the system works to produce
this environmental model.
The model of the environment that is learned by the system consists of
patterns of events that the system believes correspond to real-world phenom-
ena. Due to the system learning patterns of events, the system requires a
stream of events as input. In practical terms, this can limit the type of data
that it will process. This is due to the practical need that those events from
which the patterns are learned have to be defined. It is these event definitions
that define the domain over which the pattern learning occurs.
The system presented in this chapter is provided with a sequence of frames,
each of which is associated with a collection of object location and size data.
These frames are then processed into a stream of pre-defined basic events
based on the spatial and temporal relationships found for each object in each
frame. The system then learns patterns of these events. This domain of the
pre-defined events was chosen due to its flexibility in what could be learned
and the ability for the learned patterns to be intuitively interpreted.
The system is implemented as four modules, representing the main process-
ing steps of the system. These modules are: pre-processing, recognition, as-
sociation and significance. The pre-processing module turns the object move-
ment data into the pre-defined events from which the patterns are learned.
The recognition module recognises existing event patterns and generates to-
kens representing those patterns. The association module associates the pat-
tern tokens based on their timing to produce new candidate patterns. Finally,
the significance module collects the evidence of new patterns and determines
whether a given pattern is believed to exist based classical conditioning.
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The system is based on a feedback loop between the pattern recognition
module, the association module and the significance module. Figure 4.1 de-
picts the modules and the data that is passed between each module.
Object bounding boxes Module 1:
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Figure 4.1: The four modules.
As input to the system, the system incrementally takes time-frames that
comprise of bounding boxes for each object of interest in the observed scene.
The first module takes these boxes and notes the spatial relationships between
the objects. The module then recognises specific changes between each frame’s
spatial relationships and uses these changes as the basic event instances which
the recognition system uses to recognise patterns of those events.
The second module recognises patterns of events. Each pattern is consid-
ered an event in its own right. An event pattern is a set of two time-ordered
events, which can be either a basic event or another event pattern. The mod-
ule takes each frame of basic events and compares those events with a list of
known event patterns. When an event pattern is recognised, an event instance
of that event pattern is generated for the current frame. When only the first
event of an event pattern is recognised, but the second is not found, a different
kind of event instance of that event type is generated for the current frame.
The former kind of event instance is called a positive event instance; the latter
kind of event instance is called a negative event instance. The second module
then, in a recursive manner, uses the positive event instances as if they were
also input events for the current frame to recognise higher-order patterns of
patterns, again generating both positive and negative instances. The set of
all positive event instances are passed to the third module and the set of all
negative event instances are passed to the fourth module.
The third module, the association module, identifies pairs of those event
instances whose temporal relationship satisfies a set of criteria such that they
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can be said to happen together. The set of all event pairings is then passed
to the fourth module.
The fourth module takes input from modules two and three. From the
second module, it takes the negative event instances. From the third module,
it takes the identified event pairings. To these inputs, the module applies
various metrics that are grounded in the ideas of classical conditioning. The
two inputs are treated as evidence for the existence or non-existence of the
event-type pattern they represent. The identified event pairs are treated as
positive evidence for the pattern they make together and the negative event
instances are treated as negative evidence for their corresponding pattern.
This application of metrics in the fourth module results in a list of patterns
together with a measure of how well the two parts of the pattern are associated,
calculated by a measure based on some of the ideas of classical conditioning.
The list is then made available to the second module where those patterns that
have a measure value above a given threshold are used as the patterns that the
second module recognises. Should the measure of an event pattern that was
high enough to be recognised by the first module subsequently weaken such
that it is no longer considered high enough, that event pattern is no longer
recognised.
The definition of a recursive event type leads to further terminology that
this thesis uses to describe the system. Firstly the terms “atomic event type”
and “atomic event instance” respectively refer to the event types and instances
that are the indivisible basic events that form the input to the system. Sec-
ondly the terms “composite event type” and “composite event instance” re-
spectively refer to those event types and instances that are composed of other
event types and instances. Finally the terms “component event type” and
“component event instance” respectively refer to the event types and instances
that make up a composite event type or instance.
4.2 Module 1 – Pre-Processor
The recognition module attempts to recognise patterns of event types. This
requires some pre-processing of the system’s input data to produce the atomic
event instances from which the recognition module can use to recognise pat-
terns, which is the job of the pre-processor module. This processing is largely
the same as the atomic event type recognition presented by dos Santos et al.
(2009), though with some differences.
There are two stages to the pre-processing, firstly the module computes
a sequence of frame states from the system input and secondly the module
recognises and generates instances of the atomic event types from each se-
quential pair of frame states. After describing the nature and format of the
system input, this section will in turn look at the frame state computation
stage followed by the atomic event type recognition stage.
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4.2.1 System Input
The input to the system is a list of predicates, each predicate corresponding
to a single frame of a video. Each predicate contains the coordinates and
sizes of a set of boxes that describe the boundary of an object or objects of
interest that appear within that frame. This format is the same as the format
described by Bennett et al. (2008, p. 72). Figure 4.2 is an annotated example
of the data format used.
Not all the data available is made use of. This format was chosen to be
backwards-compatible with the system described by Bennett et al. (2008).
This system only makes use of the frame number, object labels, box position
and minimum box size data. Effectively, the measures of uncertainty within
the tracking data is currently ignored by this system, for two reasons, firstly
it allows for a simpler design and secondly it is believed that the mechanisms
the system has to deal with noise should compensate for uncertainty in the
input data.
4.2.2 Frame State Calculation
The first stage of pre-processing is to extract the relevant qualitative states of
each frame of the input. Each individual frame of the system input is itera-
tively processed to find a set of variables that describe the state of the objects
of that frame and the state of the relationships between each pair of objects.
These variables are similar to the variables that are calculated by dos Santos
et al. (2009); differences will be noted as each variable is discussed. There are
three per-object variables and four variables that describe the relationships
between each pair of objects. The first per-object variable, a variable not used
by dos Santos et al. (2009), marks whether an object is currently visible1.
The other two per-object variables are the x and y positions of each object (if
more than one object is a part of the same box, then both objects share the
same position). The four variables that describe the relationship between each
pair of objects are the straight-line distance between the two centres of both
objects, the connectivity between the two objects, the horizontal relationship
between the two objects and the vertical relationship between the two objects.
The connectivity of the two objects represents whether the objects appear
to be touching one another and if so, how. This is encoded by means of three
fluents which are mutually exclusive. Table 4.1 describes the meaning of each
predicate. The fluents are the the RCC-3 variant of the Region Connection
Calculus (Randell et al., 1992) by Santos & Shanahan (2002). The original
Region Connection Calculus has eight different states, but these assume that
the relative positions of each region can be perfectly distinguished, even when
one object is completely enclosed within the other. The variant by Santos &
Shanahan (2002) assumes that regions cannot be perfectly distinguished.
1For the purposes of scalability, the system assumes that by default a pred-
icate is false if it has not been asserted.
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frame( 9, 2, Frame number, box count
[ List of boxes
box( 9, 18, 16, Frame number, box ID, parent box ID
[person], List of detected object labels
[0.89], List of object existence probabilities
[ List of box geometry
[291.5, 352], Coordinates of the box centre
[93, 308], Minimum box size (x, y)
[100, 314] Maximum box size (x, y)
]),
box( 9, 19, 17,
[ball],
[0.99],
[
[285, 197],
[46, 46],
[52, 53]
])
]).
frame( 10, 1,
[
box( 10, 20, 18,
[person, ball],
[0.81, 0.85],
[
[293, 340.5],
[96, 331],
[105, 340]
])
]).
Figure 4.2: An annotated example of the system’s input data.
Fluent Meaning
co (o1, o2) o1 is coalescent with o2: The boxes of the two objects o1
and o2 are either the same or overlap to the extent that
the two objects cannot be reliably distinguished.
extC (o1, o2) o1 is externally connected with o2: The boxes of the two
objects o1 and o2 are touching but do not overlap greater
than a given error margin.
disC (o1, o2) o1 is disconnected with o2: The boxes of the two objects
o1 and o2 are distinctly separate.
Table 4.1: A list of the meanings of the connectedness predicates available.
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Because the Santos & Shanahan (2002) Region Connection Calculus vari-
ant assumes that regions cannot be perfectly distinguished, it implies that the
boundary of a region is also uncertain. This assumption also implies that as
two objects transition between one of the states and another, there is some un-
certainty as to when the transition happens. The way the states are calculated
takes both of these factors into account.
The coalescence fluent holds either when the two objects are contained in
the same box or when there is an area of overlap between the two boxes that
as a percentage of the smallest box area is above a given threshold (τarea).
This criterion is expressed in equation 4.1. The external connection fluent
holds when there is an overlap below the threshold τarea and when there is no
overlap and the distance between the nearest two points on the box boundaries
(calculated by the function dist(o1, o2)) is below a given threshold (τdist). This
criterion is expressed in equation 4.2. The disconnection fluent holds when the
distance between the nearest two points on the box boundaries is above τdist
This criterion is expressed in equation 4.3.
co (o1, o2)↔ τarea ≤
area(o1 ∩ o2)
min (area (o1) , area (o2))
(4.1)
extC (o1, o2)↔ τarea >
area(o1 ∩ o2)
min (area (o1) , area (o2))
∧ τdist > dist (o1, o2) (4.2)
disC (o1, o2)↔ τdist ≤ dist (o1, o2) (4.3)
These criteria differ in some aspects from Santos & Shanahan (2002) and
therefore also differ from dos Santos et al. (2009), as that paper uses the same
criteria. The way they differ is that Santos & Shanahan define the criterion
for coalescence to be when the distance between nearest two points on the
box boundaries is zero – the distance threshold (τdist) separating the states
external connection and disconnection remains the same. By using the overlap
area percentage, it takes into account the sizes of the objects involved; an
overlap area of 10 pixels may be considered small for an object with a total
area of 1000 pixels but be considered large for an object with a total area of
20 pixels. This is not taken into account with the criterion used by Santos
& Shanahan (2002), which assumes any overlap should be considered to be a
sign of coalescence, which does not respect the original implication that there
needs to be a margin of tolerance in the region boundaries.
The horizontal and vertical relationships between each pair of objects re-
fer to the positioning in relation to each other. Each relationship is sep-
arately encoded by means of three mutually exclusive fluents: left (o1, o2),
inlineX (o1, o2) or left (o2, o1) for the horizontal relationship and
above (o1, o2), inlineY (o1, o2) or above (o2, o1) for the vertical relationship.
Table 4.2 describes the meaning of each predicate. The first three fluents
refer to the horizontal relationship and the last three refer to the vertical
relationship. These fluents can be seen to be similar to those proposed by
Frank (1992), but instead of defining 9 states of the compass, the relations are
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separated into their horizontal and vertical components and then only one of
the two non-inline relations is defined, relying on the other being defined by
transposing the object symbols. This extends the expressiveness of the posi-
tioning fluents used by dos Santos et al. (2009), which only defined the left
fluent. These predicates are all calculated using the position of the centre of
one box in relation to the border of the other box. For example, left (o1, o2)
holds when the centre of the box of object o1 is to the left of the left box edge
of object o2; inlineX (o1, o2) holds when the centre of the box of object o2 is
between the left and right edges of the box of object o1 and left (o2, o1) holds
when the centre of the box of object o2 is to the right of the left box edge of
object o1.
Fluent Meaning
left (o1, o2) o1 is to the left of o2
left (o2, o1) o2 is to the left of o1
inlineX (o1, o2) Both o1 and o2 are in-line in the x axis
Note that inlineX (o1, o2) = inlineX (o2, o1)
above (o1, o2) o1 is above o2
above (o2, o1) o2 is above o1
inlineY (o1, o2) Both o1 and o2 are in-line in the y axis
Note that inlineY (o1, o2) = inlineY (o2, o1)
Table 4.2: A list of the meanings of the horizontal and vertical object inter-
relation predicates available.
Equations 4.4 to 4.9 provide definition for all of the horizontal and vertical
object relationship fluents. The function posx () returns the horizontal posi-
tion of the centre of the object and similarly, the function posy () returns the
vertical position of the centre of the object.
left (o1, o2)↔ posx (o2) > posx (o1) +
width (o1)
2
(4.4)
left (o2, o1)↔ posx (o2) < posx (o1)−
width (o1)
2
(4.5)
inlineX (o1, o2)↔ ¬left (o1, o2) ∧ ¬left (o2, o1) (4.6)
above (o1, o2)↔ posy (o2) > posy (o1) +
height (o1)
2
(4.7)
above (o2, o1)↔ posy (o2) < posy (o1)−
height (o1)
2
(4.8)
inlineY (o1, o2)↔ ¬above (o1, o2) ∧ ¬above (o2, o1) (4.9)
To summarise this subsection, table 4.3 lists each of the variables that are
calculated to embody the state of the input frame. For each variable, it lists the
variable, the possible fluents that can represent the state, and any constraints
for the fluent. Note that in the list of constraints the set Objects refers to
the set of all objects recognised by the system (independent of whether an
object is visible at any particular time), the set N0 refers to the set of natural
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numbers (including zero) that can be represented by the computer and the set
R
+
0 refers to the set of non-negative real numbers that can be represented by
the computer.
Variable Fluent Constraints
Object o is visible in
the scene.
visible (o) o ∈ Objects
Object’s x position posx (o, x) o ∈ Objects,
x ∈ N0
Object’s y position posy (o, y) o ∈ Objects,
y ∈ N0
Distance between
objects o1 and o2
dist (o1, o2, d) o ∈ Objects,
d ∈ R+0
Connectedness
relationship between
objects o1 and o2
co (o1, o2)
extC (o1, o2)
disC (o1, o2)
o1, o2 ∈ Objects,
co (o1, o2) = co (o2, o1)
extC (o1, o2) = extC (o2, o1)
disC (o1, o2) = disC (o2, o1)
Horizontal
relationship between
objects o1 and o2
left (o1, o2)
left (o2, o1)
inlineX (o1, o2)
o1, o2 ∈ Objects
inlineX (o1, o2) = inlineX (o2, o1)
Vertical relationship
between objects o1
and o2
above (o1, o2)
above (o2, o1)
inlineY (o1, o2)
o1, o2 ∈ Objects
inlineY (o1, o2) = inlineY (o2, o1)
Table 4.3: A list of the variables used to represent the state of a frame of
system input.
4.2.3 Atomic Event Calculation
The atomic event types denote the change of a state between two consecutive
frames. Table 4.4 lists the event type fluents and their meaning. The definition
of each event type is based upon the frame-state variables and is listed in
Appendix A. There are no constraints as to the mutual exclusivity or otherwise
of these event types past the event type definitions themselves. This implies
that it is possible for an object to move left and up at the same time, but can’t
move left and right at the same time due to the atomic event type definitions
making this a mathematical impossibility.
The processing takes place using sequential pairs of frame-states. One
frame-state is designated as the current frame-state and the other as the pre-
vious frame-state. In this way, the current frame-state becomes the previous
frame-state when the next frame-state is processed. The pairs of frame-states
are compared against the atomic event type definitions and the atomic event
types that match the frame-states are generated as instances and are passed
to the recognition module.
The event types that are detected are based on those described by dos
Santos et al. (2009) but have a number of significant extensions. The remain-
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Fluent Meaning
lost (o) Object o is no longer visible.
found (o) Object o has become visible.
moveLeft (o) Object o has moved left.
moveRight (o) Object o has moved right.
moveUp (o) Object o has moved up.
moveDown (o) Object o has moved down.
approaching (o1, o2) Object o1 and Object o2 approached each other.
receding (o1, o2) Object o1 and Object o2 receded from each
other.
mergeRight (o1, o2) Object o1’s track box has merged with Ob-
ject o2’s track box on the right of Object o2
mergeLeft (o1, o2) Object o1’s track box has merged with Ob-
ject o2’s track box on the left of Object o2
mergeTop (o1, o2) Object o1’s track box has merged with Ob-
ject o2’s track box on the top of Object o2
mergeBottom (o1, o2) Object o1’s track box has merged with Ob-
ject o2’s track box on the bottom of Object o2
emergeRight (o1, o2) Object o1’s track box has emerged from Ob-
ject o2’s track box on the right of Object o2
emergeLeft (o1, o2) Object o1’s track box has emerged from Ob-
ject o2’s track box on the left of Object o2
emergeTop (o1, o2) Object o1’s track box has emerged from Ob-
ject o2’s track box on the top of Object o2
emergeBottom (o1, o2) Object o1’s track box has emerged from Ob-
ject o2’s track box on the bottom of Object o2
makeContactRight (o1, o2) Object o1 has made contact with Object o2 on
the right of Object o2
makeContactLeft (o1, o2) Object o1 has made contact with Object o2 on
the left of Object o2
makeContactTop (o1, o2) Object o1 has made contact with Object o2 on
the top of Object o2
makeContactBottom (o1, o2) Object o1 has made contact with Object o2 on
the bottom of Object o2
breakContactRight (o1, o2) Object o1 has broken contact with Object o2 on
the right of Object o2
breakContactLeft (o1, o2) Object o1 has broken contact with Object o2 on
the left of Object o2
breakContactTop (o1, o2) Object o1 has broken contact with Object o2 on
the top of Object o2
breakContactBottom (o1, o2) Object o1 has broken contact with Object o2 on
the bottom of Object o2
Table 4.4: A list of the fluents used to represent atomic event types along
with their meaning.
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der of this section will look at these differences. The first difference is that
dos Santos et al. (2009) did not directly record the time of an event instance
or frame-state; instead a new connective was defined, called serial conjunc-
tion. The serial conjunction connective, ⊗ connects two predicate logic state-
ments ρ1 and ρ2 such that the resultant statement ρ2⊗ ρ2 means “ρ1 happens
immediately before ρ2”.
In contrast the system described in this chapter uses a more general re-
lationship than serial conjunction, in that it allows for serial, parallel and
overlapping conjunction. This is achieved by pairing events hierarchically,
and will be described in section 4.3.
The remaining changes between the two systems are additions or subtrac-
tions of atomic event types. These are listed below:
• dos Santos et al. (2009) only defined event types along the horizontal
axis. The system described by this thesis defines the relevant event
types in terms of both the horizontal and vertical axes.
• Event types were added that represent objects entering and leaving
the observed scene. These additions were influenced by Ivanov & Bo-
bick (2000).
• The system also has an addition of event types to represent the absolute
movement of objects. These were included as it was deemed that only
using relative movement (as was done by dos Santos et al. (2009)) is
insufficient – for instance, the event type approaching can be satisfied
both by a mobile object moving towards a static object and a chase
scenario where the chasing object is gaining on the chased object. It
may be desirable to allow for these situations to be differentiable and
this can be done through representing absolute movement. These issues
are discussed further by Van de Weghe et al. (2005).
• Event types that represent objects making and breaking contact were
added. The merge and emerge event types are transitions to and from
a coalescent state. The addition of event types representing objects
making and breaking contact allow for the transitions to and from an
externally connected state. The definitions of these event types recognise
that for two objects to transition between being disconnected to being
coalescent, the objects need to pass through an externally connected
state and so, the make or break contact event types are generated even
if the transition between the disconnected and coalescent states occurs
over less than one frame.
• dos Santos et al. (2009) provided an event type to represent a static
relationship between two objects. This has been removed as it represents
no change of state.
• dos Santos et al. (2009) also provided a set of three event types to repre-
sent an object’s relationship to the camera (approaching, receding and
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stasis). These were removed as they were calculated based upon the
change in the size of an object. This makes the assumption that an
object’s absolute size is constant, which is not necessarily true. These
event types could only be correctly defined in a system that employs
stereo cameras (even in this case, the event types may be better imple-
mented by introducing an observer object into the scene and using the
existing approaching and receding event types).
4.3 Module 2 – Recognition
The recognition module turns an input stream of atomic event instances that
are all one frame long into two streams of instances of recognised patterns
of event types. These instances can be of different frame lengths. The first
stream consists of event type patterns where all constituent events happened.
The second stream consists of event type patterns where only some of the
constituent event types happened within the time allowed.
This section is divided up as follows. First the core concept of the recogni-
tion system is discussed, namely hierarchical events. Following-on from this,
the complicating factors are discussed, such as event instances that happen
over more than one frame. The next three subsections extend the core concept
in different ways to make allowances for the complicating factors. Those three
subsections are followed by an explanation of how the extending concepts work
together to allow for the complicating factors. The final subsection discusses
how the system as a whole creates the two output streams.
4.3.1 Hierarchical Events
The system considers that patterns of event types are event types in their
own right. This means that the system has a recursive hierarchy of event
types where patterns of patterns and patterns of patterns of patterns and so
on occur. These patterns of event types are called compound event types,
in contrast to the atomic event types. Figure 4.3 demonstrates a three-level
hierarchy of event types. By creating a hierarchy of patterns, sub-patterns can
be re-used within other patterns. This re-use is found in figure 4.3 in event
types A, B and C on the first level and event type 2 on the second level.
Taking this patterns-are-event-types concept to its limit, any pattern of
event types can be represented as a hierarchy of compound event types where
each compound event type is composed of only pairs of event types. For ex-
ample, take event type 1 of figure 4.3, with its pattern ABAC. By taking
each event type in turn and pairing it with its next event type, the pat-
tern can be decomposed into the event type pairs (A,B), (B,A) and (A,C).
These event type pairs can then again be sequentially composed into the pairs
((A,B),(B,A)) and ((B,A),(A,C)) which in turn can be finally composed into
the pair ( ((A,B),(B,A)), ((B,A),(A,C)) ). This decomposition is represented
graphically in figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: A 3-level hierarchy of event types. Letters correspond to atomic
event types (the first level) and numbers correspond to composite event types
(the second and third levels).
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Figure 4.4: A hierarchy of event types involving only two-component com-
pound event types.
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To match patterns, each composite event type can be said to be attempting
to search for its pattern within the stream of atomic event instances and when
it is successful, inserts an instance of its event type into the event instance
stream. When an event type does insert an event instance into the event
instance stream it allows for event types higher up in the hierarchy to match
their pattern.
For an example of this matching behaviour the pattern of figure 4.4
(‘ABAC’) shall be used. Consider the situation where the event types A
and B have been observed over the last two frames. Due to this observed
pattern, event type 1 has been matched and an instance generated. Therefore
the most recent frame has the event instance set {B, 1} which causes event
types 2 and 4 to both be expecting that their next event type will occur soon.
If the next frame event instance set contains an instance of event type A, then
the resultant event instance set for the frame will be {A, 2, 4} leading to event
types 3, 5 and 6 to all expect that their next event type will occur soon.
The reason it is useful to create such a hierarchy of event type pairs is
that it allows for the question of learning arbitrary event type patterns to be
phrased as a matter of learning what event type is to be expected given an
event instance. The task of the system is to learn which pairs of event types
the system encounters are significant enough to deem that they are a pair of
event types that forms a pattern and not noise. This is where the concepts of
classical conditioning are primarily used, as will be discussed in section 4.5.
The significance module is responsible for determining the significance of pairs
of event types.
The cost of using hierarchical patterns of event types is that it increases
the space required to store a particular pattern. For a pattern of length n, the
worst case number of event types required to represent the pattern is n(n+1)2
(i.e. the space requirements are O
(
n2
)
). The worst case occurs when there
is no repetition of any event type. If there is any repetition, then significant
space savings are made. For instance, each re-use of an atomic event type
effectively reduces the pattern length by 1, giving a space saving for the ith re-
use of n− (i− 1) and a total space saving of
m∑
i=1
(n− (i− 1)) = m
(
n− m−12
)
where m is the total number of re-uses.
As mentioned briefly, the responsibility for asserting the existence of event
type pairings is undertaken by the significance module. This is done by pro-
cessing the evidence for the existence of a pairing and assigning a significance
measure or measures. The significance module then makes available the as-
serted event type pairings to the recognition module to be used as the event
type patterns to search for.
- 103 -
4.3.2 Multi-Frame Events
The previous subsection described basics of how the system recognises event
type patterns. However, that discussion only looked at event instances that
happen over a single frame, to allow the core principles to be discussed free
from complicating factors. This and the next four subsections look at extend-
ing that description to account for event instances that happen over more than
one frame. This includes three cases – on-going event instances, delayed event
instances and overlapping event instances.
On-going event instances are atomic event instances that are detected over
multiple consecutive frames but each frame instance is in reality just multiple
detections of a single long event instance. The approaching event type is an
example of such an event type capable of the behaviour – it can be detected
over a single frame but when detected in two consecutive frames, those two
detections are in reality part of a single long event instance.
Delayed event instances refer to composite event instances where there are
one or more frames between the first component event instance and the second
component event instance. In the intervening time, other event instances that
are not a part of that pattern could take place.
Due to allowing for multiple atomic event instances to happen in any one
frame, multiple patterns may be detected simultaneously. Combined with
the existence of on-going event instances and delayed event instances, it is
possible for two event instances to overlap. Some higher-order event type
patterns may involve pairs of composite event types that can either always
overlap or occasionally overlap. In order to detect these types of overlapping
patterns, the system needs to allow for the hierarchy to detect overlapping
patterns; this is referred to as overlapping event types.
The way that these cases can be dealt with is the topic of the next four
subsections, the first three each introducing an extending concept to the recog-
nition system presented so far. The first of these is growing event instances,
the second is the generation of a type of event instance known as a potential
event instance and the third concept is the use of a moving window. The final
subsection shows how these new extensions handle these three cases of event
instances that exist over multiple frames.
4.3.3 Event Growing
Event growing refers to the reconstruction of on-going event instances. This
is achieved by examining the event instances generated in the current frame
and event instances generated in the previous frame. Where an instance of the
same event type exists in each frame, the event instance of the previous frame is
removed and the start time of the current event instance is changed to the start
time of the previous event instance. This way, event instances (particularly
atomic event instances) that occur over multiple frames are extended as they
are observed to occur and cease to be extended when they don’t. This allows
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for the construction of on-going event instances, and as will be shown later,
the interaction of event growing with the other two extensions allows for the
three cases of event type patterns to be incorporated within the hierarchical
recognition system.
For atomic events, event growing only happens over consecutive frames,
and not over any further gap. If an event instance was grown where there
is a delay, then it could allow for mutually exclusive event types to happen
simultaneously – a contradiction. For example, consider the case where two
objects first approach, then recede and then approach again. If the event type
approaching was merged into one long event instance, then for the middle
frame, the system would record the two objects as having approached each
other and receded from each other at the same time.
4.3.4 Potential Event Instances
When an atomic event instance occurs that is a part of a single composite event
type, it creates multiple expectations at once. It both creates an expectation
that the second component atomic event type will occur and therefore also an
expectation that the composite event type itself will occur. If that composite
event type is in turn a part of a higher-level composite event type, then there is
also some expectation that the higher-level composite event type will too come
to pass. This chaining of expectations can carry-on up the entire structure of
the event type hierarchy to the highest level relevant composite event type.
In relation to the example of figure 4.4, if event type A was encountered with
no prior expectations, hierarchically there would be an expectation of event
types 1, and 3, and an expectation of event type 1 would create an expectation
for event type 4 which in turn would create an expectation for event type 6.
Event type 3 does not create any further expectations because it is not used
as the first event type of any higher-level event types.
What the system does is, when any atomic event type is observed, an event
instance is generated for every composite event type where that atomic event
type occurs as the first component. Each of those instances is marked as be-
ing a potential event instance. This generation of potential event instances is
repeated for every applicable layer of the hierarchy. When the second com-
ponent event type of a composite event type is observed, the potential event
instance is replaced with a non-potential event instance of the same type that
starts at the same time as the potential event instance and ends at the same
time as the second component event instance (which will always be the same as
the current time as the second event instance will have just been discovered).
These potential event instances are how the state of expectant composite event
types are stored.
The replacement of event instances due to event growing and the replace-
ment of event instances due to potential event instances have a different basis.
The event instance replacement of event growing occurs due to the detection
of event instances of the same type whereas the event instance replacement
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of potential event type confirmation occurs due to the detection of event in-
stances of differing types. The practical consequence of this difference is that
while the former needs to be restricted to only replacing subsequent event
instances, the latter can be allowed to replace event instances where there is
a gap between the two detected parts. This fact is utilised by the concept of
a moving event window, which is discussed next.
4.3.5 The Moving Window
In chapter two, it was argued that the loss of association strength as the
inter-stimulus interval increases implies that there is a cut-off point for two
event instances to be associated at all and that this is a reasonable strategy
in learning to predict one event type given an instance of another. This need
for a finite cut-off point can be used by this system. Because computers are
by their nature discrete, all asymptotic functions reach their asymptote in
a finite number of steps, due to the difference between the asymptote and
the function reducing below the smallest number representable by a finite
memory computer. Therefore, if the function that determines the change in
association strength asymptotically reduces to zero as the time between the
two event instances increases, there exists a point where the time between
the two event instances is so large that it causes no change to the association
strength. This means that there naturally exists a moving window where it is
impossible to learn any association between two delayed event instances. This
moving window is of a fixed length and always finishes at the current frame.
In similar vein, there also exists a smaller moving window where there is a
change in the association strength but that that change is so small to not be
worth the cost of keeping track of the event instances involved to apply changes
over longer periods of time. Depending on what threshold is set for what is
considered too small a change, the corresponding window size may be many
orders of magnitude smaller than the natural window described previously.
The existence of the moving window means there is a cut-off point after
which there is no need to recognise a delayed event instance, because the
composite event type will never be learned by the system in the first place.
Therefore, the recognition system only needs to keep track of the set of event
instances where the end frame number of each event instance is a fixed number
of frames in the past.
The system keeps track of event instances within the window through the
use of a first-in-first-out queue of a fixed length. As the current frame of event
instances is added to the queue, the oldest frame is deleted. Frames store
their event instances as a two-dimensional array of event instances where each
array of event instances represents one level of recursion in the event type
hierarchy. Event instances and potential event instances are held in the frame
where they were last observed. This means that if an event instance continues
to be observed, it will continue to be within the current frame. The way
that an instance continues to remain in the current frame is through the event
- 106 -
instance replacement system of event growing and the replacement of potential
event instances. Through these two systems, previous instances are deleted
and replaced with a new instance that is held within the current frame of the
window. It is only when an event instance does not get updated that it begins
to move down the moving window towards deletion. Along with the rest of
the details of the moving window, this mechanism is more precisely specified
in section 4.6.3.
The window data structure is implemented in shared memory to allow
access by both the recognition module and the association module. This is
because both modules need to be able to track all event instances within the
window and be able to note when an event instance ceases to be grown into
the current frame (which means they also cease to be grown so the final length
of the event instance is known).
4.3.6 Dealing with Multi-Frame Events
The three extending concepts presented in the previous three subsections allow
the system to deal with the three issues of the multi-frame event instances.
On-going event instances are straightforwardly dealt with through the use of
event growing. Delayed event instances are handled through a combination of
potential event instances and the moving window.
The final case, the case of overlapping event instances, is dealt with by
a combination of event growing and potential event instances. Consider a
composite event instance where the two component event instances overlap.
When the first component event instance is detected a potential event instance
for the composite event type is generated. For every subsequent frame where
there exists the first component event instance but not the second, another
potential event instance is generated, which through event growing becomes a
single longer potential event instance. When the overlapping second compo-
nent event is observed, the potential event instance is replaced with a normal
event instance with the same start time as the potential event instance. For
each subsequent frame where either both event instances or the second event
instance is present, the event grower continues to grow the composite event in-
stance. If the first component event instance stops and then starts again later
with no break in the second component event instance, then a new instance
of the composite event type is created and the previous instance ends. This
new composite event instance is not allowed to be merged with the previous
composite event instance through event growing.
4.3.7 Output Streams
As the stream of input event instances continues frame after frame, observed
on-going and delayed event instances finish and so move backwards in the
window. Once an event instance has left the window, there is no more pos-
sibility for it to be a component part of any further recognised event types.
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This means that at that point it is no longer possible to finish recognising po-
tential event instances that were generated on the basis of observing an event
instance that was recently deleted. Therefore the predictions manifested in
those potential event instances have failed. This failure should be taken into
account as part of evaluating the significance of an observation. Therefore
failed potential event instances where one of their constituent event instances
was observed to happen are passed to the significance module to be used as
evidence against the existence of that particular event type existing. These
negative instances form the negative stream mentioned at the start of this
section. Only potential event instances where one of the constituent event
instances was observed to happen are used in this manner; event instances
which were generated on the basis of another potential instance are not, as
the evidence for their prediction in the first place was less sound.
All composite event instances that are observed in their entirety are pos-
itive evidence for the existence of their corresponding event type. Unlike
negative evidence that can only be confirmed to be negative once their cor-
responding potential event instances are deleted from the window, positive
evidence is confirmed the moment it is fully observed. However, every pair of
event instances that are observed is evidence for the existence of that pair as
an event type – including previously unobserved pairs for which no compos-
ite event type currently exists. As the pair of event instances that makes up
a fully observed composite event instance has also been fully observed, it is
simpler to use every pairing of observed event instances as the positive evi-
dence as opposed to the event instances themselves being positive evidence in
favour of their own existence as an event type. Therefore, the positive event
instances need to be used to create every pair of event instances not just over
the current frame but over the entire window. This needs to be done in order
to collect evidence for the existence of delayed event instances. This pairing-
up is the job of the association module. The positive event instances that are
sent to the association module at each frame are those that have newly been
observed in the current frame and form the positive stream which is passed to
the association module for pairing.
As there are approximately n2 possible pairs of observed event instances
(for n observed event instances) there are some restrictions on the sort of pos-
itive event instance that is passed to the association module, to reduce the
number of pairs. The only event instances that are passed to the association
module are those where the corresponding event type has a significance mea-
sure (calculated by the significance module) above a defined threshold. This
is one of the purposes of the significance measure and its threshold within
the system as a whole. The primary purpose of the significance measure is
examined as part of the discussion of the significance module; in short it lim-
its the growth of new event types to only those comprising of well-founded
event types and adds robustness to noise. The significance measure does not
determine what is sent by the negative stream.
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4.4 Module 3 – Association
The purpose of the association module is to systematically record each pairing
of event instances that are temporally close enough together that, based on
defined constraints, the pair of event instances can be said to be valid positive
evidence in favour of the existence of the composite event type that represents
that pair of event instances. This is the simplest of the modules, as its only
role is to create pairs of event instances from a combination of the positive
event instance stream of the recognition module that are within the specified
constraints.
This section will first review those constraints, stating the reason for their
existence and how the module enforces the constraints. This section will then
go on to describe the details of how the pairs are generated that exploits the
iterative nature of the input.
4.4.1 Constraints on association
There are four constraints that need to be satisfied for two event instances to
be paired. They are as follows:
1. Both event instances must have corresponding event types that have a
significance measure above the defined threshold value.
2. Both event instances must either overlap or the end of the first event
instance and the start of the second event instance must both lie within
a common window.
3. Both event instances must have event types that are of the same hierar-
chical level.
4. Both event instances must not share the same event type.
The first constraint is stated for completeness and is not enforced by the
association module. It is instead enforced by the recognition module as it
can be enforced more efficiently by that module. This efficiency exits because
it is more efficient in this case to not transmit an event instance than to
transmit it only for it to be immediately filtered out. The constraint exists to
allow for the benefits that were mentioned in the discussion of the recognition
module and will be explored in more detail in the discussion of the significance
module – the primary benefits being that it constrains the growth of candidate
composite event types to only those that comprise of event types that are
strongly believed to exist and it reduces the system’s sensitivity to noise, with
a secondary benefit of reducing the number of instances that need to be paired.
The second constraint is based on the idea presented in the description
of the recognition module (extending one of the arguments of chapter two
concerning the inter-stimulus interval) that there exists a cut-off point where
the delay between two event instances is so large that the effort needed to track
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such a large delay is more than the value of the evidence for the existence
of the compound event type is worth. This constraint is enforced by the
independent operation of the moving window in shared memory – particularly
the automatic deletion of event instances that fall outside the moving window.
This means the association process does not need to check pairs of event
instances that would not satisfy the constraint.
The third constraint makes sure that the layered nature of the hierarchical
event type system remains intact. This constraint is enforced by each frame of
the moving window storing its event instances in a separate array for each level.
This allows for the association module to only associate the event instances
that are of the same hierarchical level. This separation of levels also allows for
the system to be more time-efficient.
The fourth and final constraint is checked and enforced as each pair is
generated. The purpose of this constraint is to avoid the same reason the
event grower is stopped from extending event instances over a delay. The
constraint is in place to avoid the situation where an event that is grown over
a delay may be in danger of asserting that two mutually exclusive events are
happening simultaneously.
4.4.2 Event Instance Pair Generation
The recognition module passes instances of all new event instances of signifi-
cant event types to the association module, including potential event instances.
These new event instances are immediately paired off with every other event
currently present in the window at the hierarchical level of the event under
the constraints listed above. The new event instance is the second event of
the pair. These pairs are stored in a list of on-going associations, a list that
is divided up by hierarchical level for easier access.
At each frame the association module looks at the event instances located
in previous frame in the moving window. Due to the way the window operates,
all of the events in that frame are events that have just finished. Taking each
finished event instance in turn, the system looks at every pair in the list of
on-going associations that the finished event instance is a part of – as either
component. If both event instances of that pair are not potential events,
then that pair is sent to the significance module as positive evidence for the
existence of the compound event made up by that pair. The pair is deleted
from the list of on-going associations.
The remaining pairs involving potential event instances are allowed to re-
main in the list of on-going associations until both of the event instances have
left the current frame of the moving window. When the pair of event instances
leaves the moving window the pair is deleted, this happens whenever the sec-
tion of the list they are on is next searched, or during a per-frame clean-up at
the end of the frame processing, whichever happens first. As described before,
when a part of a potential event instance is observed the instance moved to the
current frame of the moving window, thereby only pairs that involve potential
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event instances that failed to occur within the moving window end up being
deleted without being passed along to the significance module.
To give a better understanding of the pairs that are generated by the
association module, figure 4.5 depicts the moving window and 13 intervals
representing event instances arranged to form each of the possible Allen (1983)
relations with the moving window. Each interval is inclusive at both ends, so
for instance, event instance intervals 1 to 8 are all three frames long. The
current frame is marked as t – meaning that in the diagram event instance
8 has not yet begun and event instance 7 has only been observed once. The
symbol W denotes the size of the moving window. As with the event instance
intervals, the moving window is inclusive at both ends. With this input of
event intervals, the association module would generate every possible pair of
two event instances with the exception of three pairs. The event instance
pairings that would not be generated are the pairs (1, 7), (1, 8) and (2, 8). It
should be noted that the association module would generate the event instance
pair (2, 7) and that pair represents the largest delay the moving window allows.
W
1
2
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4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
t−W t
Figure 4.5: The moving window in relation to a set of event instances. Light
grey lines depict a frame. Bold black lines depict the moving window – solid
for the current frame and dashed for the last frame. Dark grey numbered
intervals depict the event instances.
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4.5 Module 4 – Significance
The purpose of the significance module is to collate all the evidence in favour
and against the existence of a particular composite event type. Those compos-
ite event types where the module deems there is significant evidence for the
existence of an event type are then allowed to be components of a higher-level
composite event type. This module takes the most amount of inspiration from
classical conditioning of all the modules, to the extent of modelling some of
the phenomena of classical conditioning over several different models. These
models are what determine the significance value of a particular event type.
The module is designed to allow different measures of significance to be
used. These measures are referred to as models and the choice of model is
a changeable setting. This means that different models of conditioning were
able to be developed, each to different levels of fidelity. This allows for testing
of the hypotheses of the project stated in chapter one. Both hypotheses are
tested by observing the different results of each model of classical conditioning.
Chapter five explores how the different results are to be compared.
This section is divided up as follows. First, the nature and effect of the
significance measure is discussed. This is followed by a review of the process-
ing carried out before and after the application of the selected model. The
remainder of the section then describes each of the ten models in turn.
4.5.1 The Significance Measure
The significance measure is analogous to the concept of the association strength
from classical conditioning. In classical conditioning, the role of the association
strength is an indirect measure of the likelihood that a biologically relevant
stimulus is about to take place. It is a measure of how much preparation an
organism is investing given its subjective prediction of the event type that
represents the stimulus. While the system has no ability to act on its observa-
tions, it is able to give a prediction of the occurrence of an event type, namely
in the form of generating potential event instances. The significance measure
associated with a potential event instance reflects how the level of belief that
the potential event instance shall be observed in full.
All of the models ultimately set a single significance measure for each of
the event types. The value of this measure is limited to the range2 0 < V ≤
1, where V is the significance measure. The measure is updated each time
new evidence is presented to the model regarding that event type. How the
significance measure is calculated is down to the particular model.
There are two thresholds involved with the association strength. The upper
threshold, which is set near the maximum value of one, which has previously
been mentioned, decides when an event type has enough evidence that it can
be used within another event instance. The lower threshold, set near the
2The range excludes an exact zero to avoid potential division by zero errors.
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minimum value of zero, decides when an event type should be deleted from
the hierarchy of event types.
While the recognition module generates potential event instances for all
pairs regardless of the measure, only those with a strong significance measure
are allowed to pair-up. As mentioned earlier in the chapter there are several
reasons for doing this, which shall now be discussed. The reasons for the
significance measure and its corresponding threshold are firstly to ensure that
new pairings are based on solid evidence and secondly to add resilience to
noise and limit the number of pairs of event instances that are generated at
each frame. The last of these reasons is a secondary benefit and is examined
properly at the end of the discussion of the recognition module.
The significance measure’s most important role is to make sure only those
event types that have a strong enough evidence base are allowed to contribute
to the formation of new event types. The way this is achieved is through
the constraint on the association module that only pairs of instances of event
types that are above the significance measure are generated. The reason for
this requirement is twofold. Firstly, if a composite event type has a low basis
of evidence in favour of its existence, then if the two-part pattern that the
event type represents is itself used in a larger pattern of event types, there
would be even less basis for the existence of the larger pattern. Secondly, if
it were not the case that event types needed to reach a particular standard
of evidence, then this would mean that every time that a pair of event types
is observed after the first observation, it would create a new event type as it
would be paired with every other current event instance. Those higher-level
pairs would then also be paired-up which would cause even higher-level pairs
to be created. There would be no cap to the growth of the event type hierarchy
and it would grow without bound.
Another role for the significance measure is in noise-reduction. The nature
of the noise that is reduced is through the arguments forwarded in chapter
two, namely that happenstance will naturally create random pairings of event
instances. Assuming the model of conditioning employed is rational, then
positive evidence of the existence of a compound event type would increase
the significance measure and negative evidence would reduce it. Through
the increase based on positive evidence, criterion 1 (A passive learning sys-
tem needs to learn its environmental model from repeated co-occurrence of
particular signal values) of the criteria presented in chapter two is satisfied.
Through the reduction based on negative evidence, the significance measure
satisfies criterion 7 (A passive learning system needs to undo a learned predic-
tion in the face of new evidence that indicates that the prediction is untrue).
The increase in the significance measure is analogous to part of the function
of the acquisition phenomenon and the reduction in the significance measure
is analogous to the function of the extinction phenomenon. These analogies
further demonstrate the overall analogy between the significance measure and
the association strength.
- 113 -
4.5.2 Non-Model Processing
To make the task of the models simpler, before and after the selected model is
executed, the module processes the model’s inputs and outputs in ways that
are common to all models. There are two main categories of tasks. The first
category of tasks is to retrieve and store the significance measure plus any
other model-specific data for each input event instance pairing or negative
instance. The second category of tasks is the deletion of event types that have
fallen below the lower significance measure threshold.
There are two inputs to the module. The first input is a set of pairs of
instances of significant event types that have been observed to have happened
together and both event instances have finished (this is furthermore referred
to as the positive evidence). The second input is a set of event types that
were predicted to happen but the prediction has been confirmed to be a failed
prediction (this is furthermore referred to as the negative evidence).
Each piece of evidence, both positive and negative, is provided to the
model individually. Before each piece of evidence is provided to the model,
the module retrieves the significance measure and any further measures the
selected model has defined. If the measures for the positive evidence could
not be found, it is because the corresponding composite event type does not
exist yet. In this case of the composite event type not existing, the module
creates it, setting the significance measure to be equal to the lower significance
threshold. If a model requires further custom measures, it can define a function
that creates and initialises those measures. It is not possible for the composite
event type to not exist for negative evidence because the negative evidence was
formed due to a failed expectation of the composite event type happening.
4.5.3 The Models
The purpose of a model is to calculate the significance measure, V for each
event type, based on each piece of evidence presented to that model. The
models described below vary in complexity and fidelity with which they imi-
tate the phenomena of classical conditioning. The chapter introduction noted
that the system presented in this chapter only focuses on a sub-set of the phe-
nomena that were described and analysed in chapter two. While some of those
phenomena can be seen in all aspects of the system, it is the models and how
they control a composite event type’s significance measure that draws most
from the concepts of classical conditioning.
In the discussion of existing models of classical conditioning in chapter
three, one categorisation applied to the models was whether a model was trial-
level or real-time. In trial-level models, the computation is dealt with after an
event instance has terminated. In real-time models, the computation happens
at every time-frame, and can cope with those frames being arbitrarily small.
The system presented in this chapter is arguably both: The system as a whole
deals with real-time data, segmented into arbitrarily small frames. However,
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at the level of the models used in the significance module, the system operates
as a trial-level model.
There are ten models in total. The names for these models are:
1. Fixed Increment
2. Symmetrical Fixed Increment
3. Count Only
4. Absolute Acquire-Extinguish
5. Iterative Acquire-Extinguish
6. Temporal
7. Reacquiring
8. Blocking
9. Inhibition
10. Pre-Exposure
The first three models presented are in some sense, the “control” models,
approaching the problem of calculating a significance measure without drawing
from the concepts of classical conditioning, of which two were developed in a
na¨ıve manner. The latter seven models do draw from the concepts of classical
conditioning to varying degrees. Each of the last six models of conditioning is
built based on the previous model, amending it to add further phenomena.
None of the models provide any form of theoretical explanation as to how
any phenomenon of classical conditioning arises within biological systems.
This is deliberate and this ethos of only replicating phenomena as a black
box is one of the founding hypotheses of this project, expressed in chapter one
as hypothesis A. The consequence is that some of the phenomena have been
developed in a highly biologically implausible manner; for example, by testing
for the conditions in which the phenomenon has been observed to occur and
then applying the effect of the phenomenon, rather than building a model
where all phenomena are just cases of a single unified mechanism.
4.5.3.1 The Fixed Increment Model
The Fixed Increment model is the most na¨ıve of all the models used by this
thesis. As its name suggests, each time it receives a piece of positive evidence,
the model returns a significance measure that has changed by a constant f+.
This is expressed in equation 4.10.
Vn+1 = Vn + f
+ (4.10)
The constant f+ is a parameter defined prior to the system beginning to
process any frames of input data and is set to be in the range 0 ≤ f+ ≤ 1. As
described earlier, the significance measure is limited to the range 0 < V ≤ 1.
This means that ultimately, the Fixed Increment model considers an event
instance pairing to be strongly associated after a fixed number of presenta-
tions, with the number of presentations being
τupper
f+
, where τupper is the upper
significance threshold.
The model does not take into account any negative evidence. When the
model is provided with some negative evidence via its respective input func-
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tion, it always returns a significance measure value change of zero. By having
a model that does not use the negative evidence that is provided, it allows for
the utility of the negative evidence to be seen.
4.5.3.2 The Symmetrical Fixed Increment Model
The Symmetrical Fixed Increment model is the enhancement of the Fixed
Increment model that does take into account any negative evidence that it
is provided with. As with the non-symmetrical model, this model returns a
significance measure value that has changed by a constant value f+, which
is set to be in the range 0 ≤ f+ ≤ 1. When the model is provided with
negative evidence, the model again returns a significance measure value that
has changed by a constant value, this time by a second constant f−, which
is set to be in the range −1 ≤ f− ≤ 0. While the model is built with two
separate constants, in practice, f is set to be equal to −f+. By setting the
two constants to be the same magnitude with opposite signs, it allows for the
Symmetrical Fixed Increment model to be more directly compared with the
asymmetric version, as it gives equal weighting to both positive and negative
evidence. As with the Fixed Increment model, the significance measure is
limited to the range 0 ≤ V ≤ 1.
4.5.3.3 The Count Only Model
The third model is based on frequentist probabilities and is the final model of
the ten models in this section that is not based on classical conditioning. For
each event type, including atomic event types, a count of the number of times
that a particular event type has been observed is stored as supplemental data.
These counts are then used to calculate a new significance measure.
When positive evidence of a composite event type is presented, the corre-
sponding composite event type counter is incremented. If the component event
types of that composite event instance are atomic event types, those event in-
stances are counted too, but only if those particular atomic event types have
not yet been observed within that frame.
When negative evidence of a composite event type is provided, only the
observed atomic event types that had not yet been observed as part of any
other evidence are used, and those atomic event type counts are incremented
along with the other atomic event types.
Atomic event instances are counted by the model maintaining its own count
for each observed atomic event type. Before the model increments an atomic
event type count, the model searches for the event type in a list of atomic
event types that have been incremented during that frame. Only if an atomic
event type is not on the list is the count incremented. The list of seen atomic
event instances is reset after all evidence produced in that frame has been
processed, using the frameTick function discussed in section 4.6.5.
Every time a composite event type count is updated, the significance mea-
sure is recalculated for that composite event type and any composite event
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types that it is a component part of. When an atomic event type is updated,
only the composite event types that the event type is a part of are updated.
The significance measure for the composite event type T1,2 composed of
event types T1 and T2 is calculated according to equation 4.11. The derivation
of the function is provided in appendix B.
V =
2 |T1,2|
|T1|+ |T2|
(4.11)
Where V is the significance value, |T1,2| is the count for the composite
event type and |T1| and |T2| are the independent counts for the corresponding
component event types. As |T1| and |T2| are independent from |T1,2|, they also
include in their count those occurrences that appeared outside any pairing with
each other.
4.5.3.4 The Absolute Acquire-Extinguish Model
The Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model maintains as supplemental data for
each composite event type a count of how many instances of positive evidence
have been presented and how many instances of negative evidence have been
presented. These two counts are both used to calculate the significance mea-
sure, which is recalculated with the presentation of each piece of evidence.
There are two components to the significance measure formula, one for posi-
tive evidence and one for negative evidence.
The positive component of the significance measure formula (V +) is known
as the logistic function and is the most common sigmoid function, as shown
in equation 4.12.
V + =
1
1 + e−k1ǫ+
(4.12)
Where ǫ+ is the count of all the observed positive evidence and k1 is
a learning rate constant that determines how fast a composite event type
moves along the curve. The logistic function was chosen to replicate the s-
shape of the classical conditioning acquisition curve. This is not the typical
function in which models of classical conditioning display the s-shaped curve
of acquisition. Typically models of classical conditioning such as the Rescorla-
Wagner (1972) model add a percentage of the difference between a maximum
significance value and the current significance value, leading to diminishing
gains in the significance measure, forming an s-line asymptote at the maximum
significance value. The common method does not have a slow initial start
like the logistic curve, which, as discussed in chapter two, can have uses in
minimising the effect of coincidental event instance pairings. The logistic
curve is however used widely within artificial neural networks.
The negative component of the significance measure formula (V −), as ex-
pressed in equation 4.13, is a simple linear decay.
V − = −k2ǫ
− (4.13)
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Where ǫ− is the count of all the observed negative evidence and k2 is a
learning rate constant that determines how fast a composite event type moves
along the curve. Again, this differs from the typical equation used in models
of classical conditioning in that most apply an inverted version of the acquisi-
tion function, decaying a large amount for high significance values and a small
amount for small significance values. During the review of literature regarding
classical conditioning, no experimental evidence could be found that suggests
that extinction follows a sigmoidal decay, as is usually assumed by most mod-
els such as the Rescorla-Wagner model. The data provided by Pavlov (1927,
pp. 52–53) suggests that extinction follows a roughly linear decay. This obser-
vation is reflected in the choice for the negative component of the significance
measure formula.
These two component parts of the formula are combined together through
addition, as shown in equation 4.14.
V = V + + V − =
1
1 + e−k1ǫ+
− k2ǫ
− (4.14)
The range of values the significance measure can take is actively enforced
through checking the value and if it is out of range, replacing it with the appro-
priate limit of the range. The reason the range needs to be actively enforced is
due to the linear subtraction of negative evidence. If there is enough negative
evidence, then the significance measure would become negative, forcing it out
of the range the system expects the significance measure to be in.
4.5.3.5 The Iterative Acquire-Extinguish Model
The Iterative Acquire-Extinguish model covers the same phenomena as the
Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model. The difference is that the significance
measure formula has been changed in order to make it iterative, in the sense
that the significance measure modification can be calculated at each frame
based only on its value at the previous frame and the input of the current
frame. By making the formula iterative, the model does not need to maintain
absolute counts of the observed positive and negative evidence, meaning the
model does not need to store any supplemental data about a given event type.
Unlike the Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model, where both counts of evi-
dence are included in the one equation, the iterative model has two separate
equations, one that is applied when a piece of positive evidence is encountered
and one that is applied when a piece of negative evidence is encountered. Both
equations calculate the change required for the significance measure value
(∆V ) given the increase in the number of pieces of evidence observed. For
completeness, the relationship between the significance measure before the
supply of a piece of evidence (Vn) and after its supply (Vn+1) is stated in
equation 4.15.
Vn+1 = Vn +∆V (4.15)
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The change in significance value given a piece of positive evidence is given
by equation 4.16. In that equation k1 is the same learning rate constant for
positive evidence as the Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model; ∆x is the amount
one reinforcement instance is to be counted (this is normally equal to one and
is only included for completeness) and all other symbols are the same as they
were previously defined.
∆V =
(1− Vn) e
k1∆x + Vn − 1
ek1∆x + 1Vn − 1
(4.16)
The change in significance value given a piece of negative evidence is given
by equation 4.17. In that equation k2 is the same learning rate constant for
negative evidence as the Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model and all other
symbols are the same as they were previously defined.
∆V = −k2∆x (4.17)
The derivation of both significance measure change formulae are provided
in appendix B.
The Iterative Acquire-Extinguish model was originally believed to produce
the same results as the Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model. In testing how-
ever, the results were found to be significantly different. This was found to be
due to the fact that in the Absolute model, once an association has been extin-
guished, it cannot be reacquired. In the iterative model, however, associations
can be reacquired. This result is further discussed in chapter six.
4.5.3.6 The Temporal Model
The first expansion to the number of phenomena modelled is to include the
effect of the inter-stimulus interval. This brings in the event instance tim-
ing information that is provided when positive evidence is provided to the
model. This model is built upon the Iterative Acquire-Extinguish model. As
there is no timing data for negative evidence, the equation for the change in
significance value following negative evidence is unchanged. Due to the com-
plexity this model adds, the discussion of how the model works is found in
appendix B. What is presented here is a description of the changes that the
model introduces to the Iterative Acquire-Extinguish model.
The way that the event instance timing data influences the change in sig-
nificance measure for positive evidence is that through equations 4.19, 4.20
and 4.21, a single value is produced, ψ, which lies in the range 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.
This value is multiplied with the output of the previous version of the posi-
tive evidence formula. This gives the revised version of the positive evidence
formula, which is shown in equation 4.18.
∆V = ψ
(1− Vn) e
k1∆x + Vn − 1
ek1∆x + 1Vn − 1
(4.18)
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The calculation of ψ itself is based upon two intermediate values, φ and χ
that take the timing data of the event instances that influence the size and
shape of the inter-stimulus interval curve. These intermediate values are shown
in equations 4.19 and 4.20. In those equations, tS,1 is the start time of the
first event instance; tE,1 denotes the end time of the first event instance; tS,2
is the start time of the second event instance; tE,2 denotes the end time of the
second event instance; and W represents the size of the moving window.
φ =
1
2
−
1
2
max
(
0,
tE,1 − tS,2
tE,2 − tS,2
)
+
1
2
max
(
0,
tS,2 − tE,1
W
)
(4.19)
χ = max(0, (tS,2 − tS,1 − 2φ)) (4.20)
The intermediate values are then fed into the function calculating the tim-
ing coefficientψ, as shown in equation 4.21. The way that all three equa-
tions 4.19, 4.20 and 4.21 are arrived at is explained in appendix B.
ψ =
2 (2− φ) e
−2(ln(χ)−1)2
(2+φ)2
χ (2 + φ)
√
π
2
(4.21)
4.5.3.7 The Reacquiring Model
The Reacquiring model adds to the temporal model the effects of the reacqui-
sition phenomenon. There are two effects of the reacquisition phenomenon in
the way that it changes the acquisition curve each time a reacquisition phase
occurs. The first effect is that the rate at which the subject regains any lost
association strength is faster. The second effect is that the point at which
the acquisition curve begins to level-off is higher. Both of these effects can be
achieved if the asymptote of the acquisition changes proportionally to a count
of the observed positive evidence.
The reason that varying the asymptote of the positive evidence curve pro-
portionally to the positive evidence count will achieve the desired effects is
because it changes the maximum height that can be achieved for a set num-
ber of positive pieces of evidence. This causes the first effect because it takes
fewer positive pieces of evidence to achieve the same effect. The second effect
is caused because the asymptote the function is approaching is higher.
This asymptote needs to change in proportion to the count of the observed
positive evidence. The reason for this is that there needs to be a state that,
when an event type has been extinguished, the state retains the fact that
there have been previous times where the significance value has been at a
higher point than at present. There is little point creating an iterative function
based on this count, as the value stored for the iterative version would only be
influenced by that absolute count, and so would purely be an indirect measure
of the absolute count itself.
Because of this need for the count of positive evidence for each composite
event type, the Reacquiring model and models based upon it maintain as
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supplemental data a count of all the positive evidence a particular composite
event type has received. The Reacquiring model does not maintain a count
of the negative evidence nor does it maintain a count of any observed atomic
event types.
The way that the asymptote is varied is by multiplying the absolute version
of the positive evidence equation with current desired asymptote value. The
absolute function with the asymptote multiplier is then treated to the same
derivation of the iterative function that was used in the Iterative Acquire-
Extinguish model. The resultant function is shown in equation 4.22, where
the variable a is the reacquisition asymptote value and all other variables are
the same as they have been previously defined.
∆V = ψ
(a− Vn) e
k1∆x + Vn − a
ek1∆x + aVn − 1
(4.22)
In order to maintain a significance value that lies between zero and one, the
asymptote value itself must always lie between zero and one. This constraint
can be achieved if the function to calculate the current asymptote value is
itself asymptotic to one. The equation that is used is shown in equation 4.23.
In equation 4.23, ε+ denotes the count of the positive evidence; k3 is a pos-
itive constant k3 ∈ R
+ where the smaller the constant, the faster the value
approaches one and k4 is a positive constant 0 ≤ k4 ≤ 1 which is the initial
value of asymptote, which is the minimum value that the asymptote is allowed
to take.
a = k4 + (1− k4)
(
ǫ+
ǫ+ + k3
)2
(4.23)
The negative evidence equation is unchanged from the Iterative Acquire-
Extinguish model and the derivation of both equations 4.22 and 4.23 is de-
scribed in appendix B.
4.5.3.8 The Blocking Model
The Blocking model is an extension of the Reacquiring model to add the
effect of the blocking phenomenon. In this model, the blocking concept is
extended from there being two predictor event types and one predicted event
type to there being arbitrarily many of both. The basic inspiration for the
implementation of this model is taken from the idea of subtracting from a
maximum association strength, as done in the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model.
For each piece of positive evidence, the model searches through the list of
all positive evidence that has been or will be passed to the model during the
current frame. The model searches to find the corresponding event type that
has the largest significance value Vmax that shares the same second component
event type. The difference between the largest active significance value and
the significance value of the evidence being processed is then used to define
a maximum limit on the amount of change that the significance value of the
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evidence being processed can undergo. This is done by subtracting that differ-
ence from the largest possible significance value allowed (i.e. a value of one).
This is expressed in equation 4.24 where Vn is the current significance value
of the evidence being processed and ∆V max is the largest amount of change
to that significance value that is allowed.
∆V max = 1− (Vmax − Vn) (4.24)
The ∆V max value is then compared with the usual ∆V value as calculated
by equation 4.22 to give a new value ∆V ′, which is the value that is now
returned by the positive evidence function. This is expressed in equation 4.25.
∆V ′ = min (∆V,∆V max) (4.25)
It should be noted that it is sufficient to only search through the list of the
entire current frame’s positive evidence because all the relevant event instance
pairs necessarily share the same second event instance. As that second event
instance finishes second of any associated pair, all event instances associated
with that event instance will be passed to the model during the same frame.
Again, the negative evidence function remains unchanged from the function
in Iterative Acquire-Extinguish model.
4.5.3.9 The Inhibition Model
The Inhibition model is based on the Blocking model, extending it to add
the effects of the conditioned inhibition phenomenon. Conditioned inhibition
involves the creation of a different type of association. When translating the
phenomenon into associations between event types, it means that for each
composite event type a list needs to be maintained comprising of other event
types which, if present, can contribute to an explanation for a piece of negative
evidence other than the default explanation. The negative evidence exists
because the association that the composite event type represents does not.
This list is stored with each composite event type using the supplemental
data system. With each inhibitory event type in the list, there is an associated
inhibitory significance value 0 ≤ U ≤ 1.
The Inhibition model modifies the negative evidence function so that every
time a piece of negative evidence is received, four things happen:
1. The set of all currently potentially inhibitory event types Θ is created
by looking at all the event instance pairs that the association module
created that involves the component of the event type that did have an
event instance.
2. From the set Θ, all the event instances that have an event type with an
existing inhibitory association with the event type have their inhibitory
significance values summed. The sum is subtracted from the old change
in association strength formula as shown in equation 4.26 where Γ is the
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set of all inhibitory associations of the composite event type, Ui is the i
th
inhibitory significance value and all other symbols are defined as before.
∆V = −max
(
0, k2∆x−
∑
i∈Θ∩Γ
Ui
)
(4.26)
3. Each event instance on the list Θ that is not on the list Γ are added
to that list with an initial U value of τI, which is a constant threshold
which determines when an event type is to be removed from the list of
inhibitors.
4. Each event type on the list Θ is given an increase in its corresponding U
value, including the newly added event types. The amount each U value
is increased by is done according to the iterative sigmoid curve developed
in the Iterative Acquire-Extinguish model. For completeness, the func-
tion used is shown in equation 4.27. Equation 4.27 uses a different rate
constant k5 to the constant used in the standard acquisition function.
Un+1 = Un +
(1− Un) e
k5∆x + Un − 1
ek5∆x + 1Un − 1
(4.27)
The Inhibition model modifies the positive evidence function to extinguish
any inhibitors that are present at the time. When the model is provided with
an example of positive evidence, four things happen:
1. The set of all currently potentially inhibitory event types Θ is created
by looking at all the event instance pairs that the association module
created that involves the component of the event type that did have an
event instance.
2. Each inhibitory event type that appears in both the set Θ and the set
of all inhibitory associations of the composite event type Γ has its in-
hibitory significance value subjected to an extinction function shown
in equation 4.28. This equation is the same as the negative evidence
function for the Iterative Acquire-Extinguish model but with a separate
decrease rate k6.
Un+1 = Un − k6∆x (4.28)
3. For each of the inhibitory event types that have a new inhibitory signifi-
cance value below the threshold τI that inhibitory event type is removed
from the set of all inhibitory event types Γ.
4. From the set Θ, all the remaining event types that are also present in
the list of inhibitory existing event types have their inhibitory signifi-
cance values summed. The sum is subtracted from the old change in
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association strength formula as shown in equation 4.29 where Γ is the
set of all inhibitory associations of the composite event type, Ui is the i
th
inhibitory significance value and all other symbols are defined as before.
The limit due to the blocking effects is applied after the subtraction of
the inhibitor sum.
∆V = max

0, ψ (a− Vn) ek1∆x + Vn − a
ek1∆x + aVn − 1
−
∑
i∈(Θ∩Γ)
Ui

 (4.29)
4.5.3.10 The Pre-Exposure model
The final model presented extends the Inhibition model to add the effects of
pre-exposure of component event types prior to the first time they are associ-
ated. This adds the effects of the classical conditioning phenomena known as
the U.S.-pre-exposure effect and latent inhibition. As there is little difference
between the two phenomena other than the stimulus the effect works on, both
effects were added simultaneously.
Both effects require knowing (or having the ability to derive) the absolute
count of how many times a particular event type has been observed for all
event types, including atomic and composite event types. If there was not
such a record, there would be no way of knowing whether the component
event types of a new event instance pair have been previously observed.
Due to the Reacquiring model needing the same value, the count of the
observed positive evidence can be extended to include atomic event types using
the method used in the Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model – i.e. through
keeping a record of the atomic event types that had been observed during
each frame so that each atomic event instance is only counted once per frame.
The way that the event type counts are used to add the effects of pre-
exposure is to multiply the main part of the positive evidence function (i.e.
the part from which the sum of the inhibitory significance values subtracted)
by two ratios. Both ratios are the ratio between the count of the positive
evidence for the composite event type and the counts of the positive evidence
for one of the component event types. This change is shown in equation 4.30.
In equation 4.30, ǫ+1,2 is the positive evidence count for the current composite
event type, ǫ+1 and ǫ
+
2 are the positive evidence counts for the correspond-
ing component event types and all other symbols are the same as they were
previously defined.
∆V = max

0, ψ
(
(a− Vn) e
k1∆x + Vn − a
ek1∆x + aVn − 1
)(
ǫ+1,2
ǫ+1
)(
ǫ+1,2
ǫ+2
)
−
∑
i∈(Θ∩Γ)
Ui


(4.30)
In the Pre-Exposure model, the negative evidence function is unchanged
from the function used in the Inhibition model.
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4.6 Formal Description and Implementation
The majority of this chapter has been dedicated to developing an intuitive
understanding of how the system operates. This final section shall present the
system in a more formal manner, discussing the structure of the kind data the
system deals with and the algorithms that act upon that data.
The final version of the system was implemented in Java. However, an
initial version was constructed in Prolog and this influenced some of the de-
sign choices. It is also why the input and output data files for the system are
valid Prolog files. The reason the final version of the system was not imple-
mented in Prolog was that Prolog did not allow for many of the performance
optimisations that were required to make the system run quickly to be easily
implemented. Furthermore, the back-tracking facility within Prolog proved to
be more hindrance than help in this case.
The section will first look at the kinds of data the system deals with,
describing the structure of that data. The four subsections following that will
each look at the implementation of each of the four modules that make-up the
system. The final sub-section shall describe the format of the output and how
it is produced.
4.6.1 System Ontology
The system data structures can be represented as a series of tuples, which shall
be described in this section. In reality, these tuples are encoded in the system’s
code as Java classes. The reason for representing the data as tuples instead of
Java classes is to abstract away from the programming details. Note that in
the pseudo-code listings in this section, the notation “x.y” denotes accessing
the variable labelled y in tuple x.
There are eight main kinds of data the system deals with: The base ob-
jects, track-boxes for those objects, sets of track-boxed separated into frames,
the derived state of a frame, event instances, event types, event association
instances and the moving window. These are the primary concepts that the
system deals with and are each discussed in the following subsections. Some
of the types of data contain further aspects and this will be discussed as it
arises.
4.6.1.1 Objects
Objects are a 2-tuple (ι, σ) where ι is an integer that represents the id of the
object and σ is a string denoting the name of the object. The object id is
maintained to be unique for each object name. The object id is to allow for
equality checking without having to resort to string-matching. Note that in
the Java code, objects are named items to avoid conflicts with Java’s own
internal naming system.
- 125 -
4.6.1.2 Track Boxes
A track-box is a 6-tuple (O, t, x, y, w, h) where O is the set of objects in that
track box; t is an integer representing the time (frame number) in which
the track-box exists; x and y are integers representing the two-dimensional
coordinates of the centre of the track box and w and h are integers representing
the width and height of the track-box. This track box data is directly created
from parsing the input Prolog file, as described in section 4.2.1. It is also
during this parsing that the detected object strings are assigned a unique id
number.
4.6.1.3 Frames
A frame is a set of track-boxes that are present in a given frame of the input.
It is a 2-tuple (t, B) where t is an integer that represents the frame’s time (the
frame number) and B is the set of track-boxes present in the frame.
4.6.1.4 Frame-States
A frame state represents the state of all the objects in a given frame, including
the state of the spatial relationship between objects. A frame-state is a 4-tuple
(t, O, Su, Sb) where t is an integer that represents the frame’s time; O is the
set of all objects present in that frame; Su is the set of all unary frame-states
and Sb is the set of all binary frame-states.
A unary frame-state represents the state of an individual object at a given
point in time and is a 5-tuple (t, o, ω, x, y). In the 5-tuple, t is an integer that
represents the time at which the state applies; o is the object for which the
tuple applies; ω is an integer that represents the area of the object and x and y
are integers that represent the coordinates of the centre of the object.
A binary frame-state represents the relationship between two objects in
at a given point in time and is an 8-tuple (t, o1, o2, Rt, Rx, Ry, Rdc, Rde). In
the 8-tuple, t is an integer that represents the time at which the relationships
hold; o1 and o2 are the two objects in the relationship; Rt is the topological
relationship between the two objects; Rx is the horizontal orientation rela-
tionship between the two objects; Ry is the vertical orientation relationship
between the two objects; Rdc an integer that represents the distance between
the two centres of the objects and Rde is an integer that represents the shortest
distance between the two object boundaries (the external distance). The topo-
logical relationship is one member of the enumeration {DisC, ExtC, Co} where
DisC, ExtC and Co stands for disconnected, externally connected and coales-
cent respectively and are described in section 4.2.2. The horizontal orientation
relationship is one member of the enumeration {leftAB, leftBA, inlineX}
and the vertical orientation relationship is one member of the enumeration
{aboveAB, aboveBA, inlineY} which are both again described in section 4.2.2.
The discussion of frame-states in section 4.2.2 talks of fluents and pred-
icates. These functions do exist, but instead of calculating the respective
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properties each time that function is called, they perform a look-up in the rel-
evant frame-state tuple. This allows for the actual calculation to be performed
only once.
4.6.1.5 Event Instances
An event instance E is a 3-tuple (T, tS , tE) where T is the event type as
described in the following subsection; tS is an integer denoting the event in-
stance’s start time and tE is an integer denoting the event instance’s end time.
There is a single sub-class of an event instance, known as a composite event
instance. An event instance can either be the base type (used for atomic event
types, described in the following subsection) or the composite type.
A composite event instance is a 5-tuple (T, tS,1, tE,1, tS,2, tE,2) where T is
the event type; tS,1 and tE,1 are integers representing the start and end time
respectively of the first component event instance and tS,2 and tE,2 are integers
representing the start and end time respectively of the second component
event instance. The start and end times of the event instance as a whole
are then derived from the component event instances: tS is the earliest of
either tS,1 or tS,2 and tE is the latest of either tE,1 or tE,2. This extra timing
information needs to be recorded for use in the significance module.
The composite event instance tuple also encodes whether the event instance
is a potential event instance, as described in section 4.3.4. This is done by
initially setting both the start and end times to −1 for the component event
type that has yet to be observed, signifying that the information is not known
yet. While any of the four time variables are set to −1, then the composite
event instance is considered to be a potential event instance. The pseudo-code
listed in algorithm 4.1 details the function that is used to test a composite event
instance to see if it is a potential event instance.
Algorithm 4.1 isPotentialEvent
Input:
e: The composite event instance to be tested to see if it is a potential
event instance.
Output:
True if the composite event instance is a potential event instance,
False otherwise.
1: if e.tS,1 = −1 ∨ e.tE,1 = −1∨
2: e.tS,2 = −1 ∨ e.tE,2 = −1 then
3: return True
4: else
5: return False
4.6.1.6 Event Types
The event type T is a 4-tuple (l, V,D,M) where l is an integer denoting the
recursive level of the event type; V is a real denoting the significance level of
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the event type set by the significance module; D is a set of the composite event
types that this event type forms a part of;M is a reference to any supplemental
data that is stored by the chosen model of classical conditioning. Event types
are polymorphic and must be one of two sub-types: Atomic event types, and
composite event types. It is in these sub-types that stores the qualitative
nature of the event type.
Atomic event types are a 3-tuple (ζ, o1, o2) where ζ is a member of an
enumeration listing tokens for all the atomic event types (e.g. approaching,
mergeR etc.) and o1 and o2 are objects to which the event type occurs. Where
an event type in the enumeration only operates on a single object (e.g. found,
moveUp etc.), then only o1 is used and o2 is ignored (though set to be the same
event as o1). Atomic event types define the recursive level l to be zero and
the significance level, V , to be one. D and S are handled by the super-class.
Composite event types are a 2-tuple (T1, T2) where T1 and T2 are event
types. The recursive level value l is calculated on creation of the tuple by
incrementing the l value of T1 (T2 is enforced to have the same value). The
significance value V is initialised to be equal to the lower significance thresh-
old τlower.
The key to understanding the event-type system is that though the list D
and the T1 and T2 values of the composite event type, the event type system
forms a doubly-linked layered graph without edge weightings (Black, 2005).
Each node in a layer has two parent nodes (except for the atomic event types)
but can have an arbitrary number of child and sibling nodes. This is the event
type database that the recognition module uses to recognise patterns of event
instances and the significance module uses to maintain the state of an event
pairing’s signficiance data. The event type database can be accessed by two
methods: Firstly, as described above, each event instance has a direct reference
to its corresponding type in the event type database. Secondly, the set of all
atomic event types T0 is maintained, this list can be used to allow the whole
database to be traversed, though this is only done once, when producing the
final output of the system, as described in section 4.6.6.
4.6.1.7 Event Association Instances
In the third module, event instances of different types are associated together.
An event association instance records this association pairing. An event asso-
ciation instance is a 2-tuple (e1, e2) where e1 and e2 are event instances.
As part of the third module, there also exists a two-dimensional list A of
event association instances. This list is a list of all the association instances
where one or both of the component event instances has not yet terminated.
It is used to compensate for the fact that different pairs of event instances will
terminate at different times and to mark which pairs have been associated
within the current position of the moving window.
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4.6.1.8 The Moving Window
The moving window is a fixed-length queue, where each item in the queue
is a set of all event instances that was observed to occur at a given time
(known as a window frame, described below). The window is implemented
as a 3-tuple (F, c, u) where F is a list of the observed window frames; c is an
integer representing the index of the most recent window frame and u is and
integer representing the number of elements of the array that are currently in
use. The reason the variable u is needed is that while the queue is fixed-length,
for the first few frames of input there will be unused array elements, which
can affect some of the element-access calculations. Note that as also defined
in other areas of this thesis, the symbol W denotes the system parameter for
the maximum allowed size of the moving window.
Window frames are a 3-tuple (E, lmax, t) where E is a two-dimensional
list of event instances that last occurred in that frame, lmax is an integer
representing the size of the largest recursive level event instance present in
that frame and t is the time that the frame referrs to. The reason that E
is two-dimensional is that event instances are grouped by their recursive-level
size. Both the two-dimensionality of E and the presence of the variable lmax
are performance optimisations. As event instances are constrianed to only be
associated by module three with event instances of the same level in the event
type heirarchy, by grouping the event instances by their recursive level, the
module can avoid reading event instances that cannot meet that constraint.
Similarly, by storing lmax, it allows for whole window frames to be skipped by
the association module.
There are three operations that can be applied to the window data struc-
ture. These are required due to the shifting nature of which indices are used
for that last and first frame. Algorithms 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 each list the pseudo-
code of these operations. Algorithm 4.2 corrects a given index to allow for the
wrap-around in the window frame array3. Algorithm 4.3 moves the moving
window along by adding a new current window frame and deleting the oldest.
Algorithm 4.4 returns a window frame indexed by how many frames in the
past it occurred. In addition, there is one window frame operation, which is
required to find an event instance of a particular type. The pseudo-code of
the window frame search operation is listed in Algorithm 4.5.
4.6.2 Module 1 – Pre-Processor
This first module is the most straight-forward of the modules in its imple-
mentation. As discussed before, there are two stages of processing: One stage
3In algorithm 4.2, it should be noted that the modulo function wraps-
around with negative numbers too, something that does not happen with the
“%” operator present in most languages. Because of this lack of negative
wrap-around, a correction is needed, the actual operation needs to add W to
i′ for negative values of i only.
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Algorithm 4.2 translateWindowPosition
Input:
i: The index position to be corrected.
W : The window size system parameter (a global-scope variable).
Output:
i′: The corrected index.
1: i′ ← i mod W
2: return i′
Algorithm 4.3 addWindowFrame
Input:
w: The moving window.
f: The window frame to be added to the moving window.
W : The window size system parameter (a global-scope variable).
1: w.c← translateWindowPosition (w.c+ 1)
2: w.F [w.c]← f
3: if not every element of w.F is in use (i.e. w.u < W ) then
4: increment w.u
Algorithm 4.4 getWindowFrame
Input:
w: The moving window.
i: The frame to get, numbered by how many frames in the past it
occurred (0=current frame, 1=previous frame).
W : The window size system parameter (a global-scope variable).
Output:
f: The window frame requested, null on error.
1: f ← null
2: if i < W ∧ i < w.u then
3: i′ ← translateWindowPosition (w.c− i)
4: f ← w.F [i′]
5: return f
Algorithm 4.5 fetchEvent
Input:
f: A frame of the moving window.
T : The event type to find.
Output:
e: The event instance of type T present in the supplied window f,
if it was present, null if an event instance of type T could not be
found.
1: if f.l ≤ T.l then
2: Repeat (for each e ∈ f.E [T.l]):
3: if e.T = T then
4: return e
5: return null
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to turn a set of track boxes into a frame-state and another stage to turn a
frame-state into a set of atomic event instances. In both these states, all that
happens is that each of the possible qualitative cases (state or atomic event
instance) is tested for. If those cases are found to be true, the corresponding
tuple is generated and added to the relevant list.
For turning a list of track boxes into a frame-state, algorithm 4.6 is used.
This algorithm implies the existence of two sub-algorithms to calculate unary
and binary components of the frame-state. These algorithms are not explicitly
listed due to their obviousness and long-winded nature. The unary frame state
simply copies the relevant information from the track box and calculates the
area of the track box. The binary frame state directly applies the tests for the
relations described in section 4.2.2.
Algorithm 4.6 buildFrameState
Input:
t: The time of the frame.
B: The set of track boxes for each object present in the frame.
Output:
s: The frame-state of the supplied track-boxes.
1: O ← ∅
2: Su ← ∅
3: Sb ← ∅
4: Repeat (for every integer value of i, 0 ≤ i < size (B)):
5: add B [i] .O to O
6: build the unary state for B [i] and add it to Su
7: Repeat (for every integer value of j, i < j < size (B)):
8: build the binary state for B [i] and B [j] and add it to Sb
9: return (t, O, Su, Sb)
Once the frame-state has been constructed for two consecutive frames,
the two frame-states are used to calculate the atomic event instances that
occurred between them. This is a case of testing the frame-states against each
of the event type definitions listed in appendix A and then generating the
event instances for the event types that are found to apply. The definitions
in appendix A use the event calculus (Kowalski & Sergot, 1986), which is not
strictly used within the system internally. The reason for this is that the use of
the event calculus is considered to make the definitions easier to follow while
having notational equivalence. The equivalence can be seen in the fact that
the holdsAt predicate, which is the only event calculus predicate used in the
definitions, effectively corresponds to a frame-state lookup. Once an atomic
event instance has been generated, it is added to the first level of the current
window frame. The recognition system then uses the atomic event instances
that have been generated and added to the current window frame.
There is one part of the atomic event instance generation that needs to
be explicitly stated. This is to do with the “visible” state – whether a par-
ticular object is present in a frame. This state is not computed directly but
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instead needs to be inferred from the presence or otherwise of an object in
the object list. When comparing frame-states to produce the atomic event
instances, the two sets of objects in each frame-state are processed to build
three derived sets: the intersection of the two object sets and the two possible
subtraction sets. The two subtraction sets (O1 \O2 and O2 \O1) are used to
define the lost and found event types. The intersection is then used as the set
of objects to be compared against the definitions of the other atomic event
types. Algorithm 4.7 creates these three derived sets.
Algorithm 4.7 compareObjectLists
Input:
O1: The first set of objects.
O2: The second set of objects.
Output:
Λ: The intersection of sets O1 and O2
Ξ1,2: the set resulting from subtracting O2 from O1
Ξ2,1: The set resulting from subtracting O1 from O2
1: Λ← ∅
2: Ξ1,2 ← ∅
3: Ξ2,1 ← O2
4: Repeat (for each o1 ∈ O1):
5: η ← False
6: Repeat (for each o2 ∈ O2):
7: if o1 = o2 then
8: η ← True
9: add o1 to Λ
10: remove o1 from Ξ2,1
11: if η = False then
12: add o1 to Ξ1,2
13: return (Λ,Ξ1,2,Ξ2,1)
4.6.3 Module 2 – Recognition
The second module is the most intricate in terms of the processing that oc-
curs. There are two primary sub-stages to the processing that occurs in the
recognition module: generating composite event instances and growing event
instances. In the generation stage, the composite event instances are created
by iteratively matching the previous level against the known derived types. In
the event instance growing stage, each of the newly generated event instances
is merged with a matching version of the event instance (if one exists) that
occurred in a previous frame of the window.
Algorithm 4.8 is the primary algorithm for generating the derived event
types. This algorithm generates a composite event instance for each of the de-
rived event types that have already been generated. This is done on a level-by-
level basis, starting with generating instances of the derived composite event
instances of the already-present atomic event instances and then generating
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the derived composite event instances of those generated event instances. This
continues until an iteration of the algorithm produces no new event instances.
Algorithm 4.9 is the algorithm that actually generates the composite event
instance. This is listed as a separate algorithm to that listed in algorithm 4.8
to aid readability. When generating a composite event instance, there are
three possible cases that need to be dealt with: One where instances for both
component event instances already exist and two where one of the component
event instance does not yet exist (the case where both don’t yet exist would
mean no composite event instance would be generated, and so does not need
to be handled). The algorithm checks which case holds for the current event
type and then sets the start and end times of the component event instances
as required. In the cases where only one of the two component event instances
has been observed, it is these instances that are considered to be the potential
event instances that were discussed previously.
Algorithm 4.8 recogniseEventTypes
Input:
w: The moving window.
1: fn ← getWindowFrame (w, 0)
2: fn−1 ← getWindowFrame (w, 1)
3: tn ← fn.t
4: tn−1 ← fn−1.t
5: E ← fn.E [0]
6: Repeat (while size (E) > 0):
7: E′ ← ∅
8: Repeat (for each e1 ∈ E):
9: Repeat (for each T ∈ e1.T.D):
10: e2 ← generateCompositeEvent (fn, T, tn−1, tn)
11: if fn.lmax < e2.t.l then
12: fn.lmax ← e2.t.l
13: add e2 to fn.E [e2.t.l]
14: add e2 to E
′
15: E ← E′
The second stage is to grow the event instances that were generated on a
per-frame basis so that they instead occur over multiple frames. This is done
by comparing the event instances that occurred in the current window frame
with those in previous window frames. Where the types match, the event
instances are merged together. This is done by copying the relevant times of
the previous event instance on to the newly generated instance followed by
deleting the old instance.
Algorithms 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 list the event instance growing procedure.
This has been split-up to aid readability. The first pseudo-code listing in
algorithm 4.10 iterates through each level of each window frame, merging
event instances of the same type that have occurred in the both current and
a previous frame. For the first level, only the immediately previous frame
has to be compared, as otherwise a contradiction may be formed in the event
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Algorithm 4.9 generateCompositeEvent
Input:
fn: The most recent frame of the moving window.
T : The composite event type to generate an instance of.
tn−1: The start time of the event.
tn: The end time of the event.
Output:
e: The generated composite event instance.
1: e1,2 ← null
2: e1 ← fetchEvent (fn, T.T1)
3: e2 ← fetchEvent (fn, T.T2)
4: if e1 6= null ∧ e2 6= null then
5: e1,2 ← (T, tn−1, tn, tn−1, tn)
6: else if e1 6= null ∧ e2 = null then
7: e1,2 ← (T, tn−1, tn,−1,−1)
8: else if e1 = null ∧ e2 6= null then
9: e1,2 ← (T,−1,−1, tn−1, tn)
10: return e1,2
instance stream – as discussed in section 4.3.3. At the other levels, the event
instances are compared with the corresponding level at every frame of the
moving window, as there is no possibility of forming a contradiction by growing
event instances over a gap.
There is another special case for the first level, in that there are no com-
posite event instances. Composite event instances have more data (four time
variables instead of two) and so need to be merged differently. This is done
using the pseudo-code listed in algorithm 4.11. The pseudo-code in algo-
rithm 4.11 iterates through each possible pairing of instances between the two
lists and if the pair has the same type, the pair is merged.
Window frame levels other than the first level are made up entirely of
composite event instances. As composite event instances have more time data
values, it means that they need to be merged in a different manner to the
atomic event instances. Algorithm 4.12 lists the pseudo-code that does this
merge over a given pair of event instance lists of the same hierarchical level.
As with algorithm 4.11, the pseudo-code first iterates through every possible
pairing of instances between the two lists and merges the pair if both parts of
the pair are of the same type. The difference is seen in how the time values
are copied. Time values should only be copied if they are not a placeholder −1
value, such a copy may overwrite a real time value. In addition, copying the
end time values needs to take into account that one of the event instances may
have already stopped.
It is in the activity of merging event instances together that potential event
instances get confirmed to be real event instances. This is due to −1 time val-
ues being overwritten when they exist at the destination of the copy operation,
but not when they exist at the source of the copy operation. By defining po-
tential event instances this way, it means that the change between a potential
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and an actual event instance is automatic, with no further processing needed
beyond that which would have been needed even if potential event instances
were independently defined. If an event instance reaches the end of the moving
window and there still exists time values that are −1, then the event instance
is passed to the fourth module as negative evidence for that composite event
type existing as an event type to be associated.
After the two processing stages are complete, the module produces a list
of all the potential event instances that, due to being in the oldest window
frame after the growing operation, will no longer have any opportunity left
to be grown into actual event instances. Algorithm 4.13 produces this list of
failed potential event instances. The list is passed to the significance module
to be used as negative evidence for the existence of the composite event types
the failed potential event instances represent.
Algorithm 4.10 growEvents
Input:
w: The moving window.
1: fn ← getWindowFrame (w, 0)
2: fn−1 ← getWindowFrame (w, 1)
3: growFirstLevel (fn−1.E [0] , fn.E [0])
4: Repeat (for every integer value of i, 0 < i ≤ fn.l):
5: Repeat (for every integer value of j, 0 < j < w.u):
6: fn−j ← getWindowFrame (w, j)
7: growHigherLevel (fn−j .E [i] , fn.E [i] , fn−1.t)
Algorithm 4.11 growFirstLevel
Input:
En−1: The atomic events that were in the previous window frame.
En: The atomic events that are in the current window frame.
1: Repeat (for each e1 ∈ En):
2: η ← False
3: Repeat (for each e2 ∈ En−1):
4: if η = False ∧ e1 = e2 then
5: e1.tS ← e2.tS
6: remove e2 from En−1
7: η ← True
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Algorithm 4.12 growHigherLevel
Input:
En−1: The atomic events that were in a previous window frame.
En: The atomic events that are in the current window frame.
t: The time of the previous frame.
1: Repeat (for each e1 ∈ En):
2: η ← False
3: Repeat (for each e2 ∈ En−1):
4: if η = False ∧ e1 = e2 then
5: if e2.tS,1 6= −1 then
6: e1.tS,1 ← e2.tS,1
7: if e2.tS,2 6= −1 then
8: e1.tS,2 ← e2.tS,2
9: if e1.tE,1 = −1 ∨ (e2.tE,1 < t ∧ e2.tE,1 6= −1) then
10: e1.tE,1 ← e2.tE,1
11: if e1.tE,2 = −1 ∨ (e2.tE,2 < t ∧ e2.tE,2 6= −1) then
12: e1.tE,2 ← e2.tE,2
13: remove e2 from En−1
14: η ← True
Algorithm 4.13 failedPotentialEvents
Input:
w: The moving window.
W : The window size system parameter (a global-scope variable).
Output:
E: The list of failed potential event instances.
1: E ← ∅
2: if w.u =W then
3: f ← getWindowFrame (w,W − 1)
4: Repeat (for each E′ ∈ f):
5: Repeat (for each e ∈ E′):
6: if e.T.l 6= 0 ∧ (e.tS,1 6= −1⊕ e.tS,2 6= −1) then
7: add e to E
8: return E
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4.6.4 Module 3 – Association
As described in section 4.3.1, associations between event instances are recorded
as pairs of event instances in a list grouped by the hierarchical level of the
event instances involved. Once per input frame, the module conducts two
processing stages. In the first stage, all the new event association instances
are generated and added to the association list. In the second stage, each
event association instance is checked to see if both component event instances
of the event association instance have terminated. If both event instances have
terminated, then the event association instance is removed from the association
list and passed to the significance module as positive evidence for the event
type that the two event instances form in compound.
New event association instances are built as novel event instances are en-
countered. What counts as novel event instances are the most recent event
instances which did not have any timings modified by the recognition module.
The way this criterion is detected is that novel event instances will have a
start time equal to the time of the second most recent frame. Algorithm 4.15
lists the pseudo-code of the algorithm that creates a list of all the novel event
instances. The algorithm assumes that Algorithm 4.10 has already executed
for the current frame.
Each novel event instance is then paired with every other event instance
present in the moving window that has a high enough significance measure
and is at the same hierarchical level. These pairs are added to the relevant
group of the list of on-going associations. Algorithm 4.14 lists the pseudo-
code for the algorithm that builds the new event association instances. It is
in this algorithm that the constraints listed in section 4.4.1 are applied, either
implicitly or explicitly.
Algorithm 4.14 buildNewAssociations
Input:
w: The moving window.
A: The level-grouped list of on-going associations.
W : The window size system parameter (a global-scope variable).
τupper: The upper significance threshold (a global-scope variable).
1: E ← newEvents (w)
2: Repeat (for each e1 ∈ E):
3: Repeat (for every integer value of i, 0 ≤ i < W ):
4: f ← getWindowFrame (w, i)
5: Repeat (for each e2 ∈ f.E [e1.T.l]):
6: if e1 = e2 ∧ e2.T.V ≥ τupper then
7: add (e1, e2) to A [e1.T.l]
The second processing stage of the association module is to detect which
event association instances have reached the state where both of their con-
stituent event instances of the association have terminated. When an event
association instance has terminated, then it is added to a list of terminated
instances and removed from the grouped list of on-going instances. This is
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Algorithm 4.15 newEvents
Input:
w: The moving window.
τupper: The upper significance threshold (a global-scope variable).
Output:
E: The list of novel events that occurred during the current frame.
1: E ← ∅
2: fn ← getWindowFrame (w, 0)
3: tn−1 ← getWindowFrame (w, 1) .t
4: Repeat (for each e1 ∈ fn.E [0]):
5: if e1.tS = tn−1 then
6: add e1 to E
7: Repeat (for every integer value of i, 0 < i ≤ fn.lmax):
8: Repeat (for each e2 ∈ fn.E [i]):
9: if ¬isPotentialEvent (e2)∧
10: (e2.tS,1 = tn−1 ∨ e2.tS,2 = tn−1) ∧ e2.T.V ≥ τupper then
11: add e2 to E
12: return E
the task that is carried out by algorithm 4.16. The list of terminated event
association instances is then passed to the significance module as instances of
positive evidence for existence of the event types that the two event instances
of each event association instance forms in compound.
4.6.5 Module 4 – Significance
As discussed in section 4.5, the significance module aggregates the available
evidence for whether a candidate event type pairing can be considered to have
a predictive relationship. The evidence is aggregated to a single value – the
significance measure V . The significance module consists of two parts: A
diverse set of models for how the presented evidence should be aggregated
into the significance measure, and an abstraction layer that allows for differ-
ent models to be selected on program launch with no programming changes
needed. In addition the abstraction layer also does an amount of processing
of the module’s input and output that would be common to each model. The
full detail of the models themselves has already been covered in section 4.5.3
and so this section will concentrate on the abstraction layer.
The abstraction layer defines five functions that each model is required to
implement so that the models can be interchangeable. These five functions
are listed in table 4.5.
The remainder of the subsection shall describe the processing that takes
place outside any of the models but within the significance module.
The input to the system is in the form of two lists of evidence, one for the
positive evidence and one for the negative evidence. The form an item on the
positive evidence list takes is that of an event association instance. The form
an item on the negative evidence list is that of a composite event instance.
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Algorithm 4.16 terminatedAssociations
Input:
w: The moving window.
A: The level-grouped list of on-going associations.
Output:
A′: The list terminated event association instances.
1: A′ ← ∅
2: tn ← getWindowFrame (w, 0) .t
3: Repeat (for each L ∈ A):
4: Repeat (for each a,∈ L):
5: set tE to be the larger of a.e1.tE and a.e2.tE
6: if a.e1.T.l = 0 then
7: if tE 6= tn then
8: add a to A′
9: remove a from L
10: else
11: if tE 6= tn ∧ ¬isPotentialEvent (a.e1)∧
12: ¬isPotentialEvent (a.e2) then
13: add a to A′
14: remove a from L
15: return A′
Function Name Description
applyReinforcement This function is called to provide the
model with a piece of positive evidence for
a specific composite event type. The pa-
rameters are the composite event type be-
ing reinforced and the start and end times
for both component event instances.
applyNonReinforcement This is the function that is called to pro-
vide the model with negative evidence.
This function has a single parameter, the
composite event type that the evidence
counts against.
needsSupplementalData This function has no parameters and re-
turns true if the selected model needs to
attach supplemental data and false other-
wise.
defaultSupplementalData This zero-parameter function returns the
initial state for any custom-defined sig-
nificance measures that that the selected
model requires.
frameTick This function has no parameters and no
return values. Its purpose is to be used to
notify the selected model that all process-
ing for the current frame has been com-
pleted.
Table 4.5: A list of the functions required to be defined by any significance
model.
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Algorithm 4.17 shows the overall processing that takes place within the
module. First the positive evidence is processed, followed by the negative. As
the positive evidence is in the form of event association instances, the first task
is to get the corresponding composite event type for the two event instances
of the event association instance. If that event type does not exist yet, then
it is created. This is the task of algorithm 4.18. Note that in algorithm 4.18,
the 2-tuple consisting of a 4-tuple and a 2 tuple in line 10 represents the
instantiation of both the event type 4 tuple and the sub class composite event
type 2 tuple.
After the corresponding event type has been either retrieved or created
then the evidence is processed by the model. With the negative evidence, the
event type is already available, and so when processing each item on the list
of negative evidence, the composite event type is immediately passed to the
model. However, after the model has processed the composite event type, the
new significance level of the composite event type may be lower than lower
significance threshold. If the composite event type’s updated significance level
is below the lower significance threshold, then the composite event type and
the composite event types that are derived from it are deleted. This recursive
deletion task is handled by algorithm 4.19.
Algorithm 4.17 applyModel
Input:
A: A list of finished event association instances (the positive evidence).
E: A list of failed potential event instances (the negative evidence).
τlower: The lower significance threshold (a global-scope variable).
1: Repeat (for each a,∈ A):
2: T ← getCompositeEvent (a)
3: e1 ← a.e1
4: e2 ← a.e2
5: applyReinforcement (T, e1.tS , e1.tE , e2.tS , e2.tE)
6: Repeat (for each e,∈ E):
7: applyNonReinforcement (e.T )
8: if e.T.V < τlower then
9: deleteCompostiteEventType (e.T )
10: frameTick ()
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Algorithm 4.18 getCompostiteEvent
Input:
a: The event association instance.
τlower: The lower significance threshold (a global-scope variable).
Output:
T : An event type that corresponds to the event association instance.
1: T ← null
2: Repeat (for each T ′ ∈ a.e1.T.D):
3: if T ′.T1 = a.e2.T ∨ T
′.T2 = a.e2.T then
4: T ← T ′
5: if T = null then
6: l← a.e1.T.l + 1
7: M ← ∅
8: if needsSupplementalData () then
9: M ← defaultSupplementalData ()
10: T ← ((l, τlower,∅,M) , (a.e1.T,a.e2.T ))
11: add T to a.e1.T.D
12: add T to a.e2.T.D
13: return T
Algorithm 4.19 deleteCompostiteEventType
Input:
T : The composite event type to delete.
1: Repeat (for each T1 ∈ T.D):
2: deleteCompositeEventType (T1)
3: Repeat (for each T2 ∈ T.T1.D):
4: if T = T2 then
5: remove T2 from T.T1.D
6: Repeat (for each T3 ∈ T.T2.D):
7: if T = T3 then
8: remove T3 from T.T2.D
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4.6.6 System Output
Once the system has processed every frame of input, it outputs a text file
consisting of every composite event type that which has a significance value
above the upper significance threshold. This subsection looks at how this is
done and the format of the text file.
As the database of event types is a layered graph, this database needs
to be flattened into a single list of those composite event types that have a
significance value above the upper significance threshold. This is the operation
performed by algorithm 4.20.
Algorithm 4.20 getCompositeEventTypes
Input:
T0: The list of atomic event types.
τupper: The upper significance threshold (a global-scope variable).
1: T← ∅
2: T1 ← T0
3: T2 ← ∅
4: Repeat (while T1 6= ∅):
5: Repeat (for each T1 ∈ T1):
6: Repeat (for each T2 ∈ T1.D):
7: if T2.V ≥ τupper ∧ T2 /∈ T1 then
8: add T2 to T2
9: add T2 to T
10: T1 ← T2
11: T2 ← ∅
12: return T
Once the database of composite event types has been flattened, it needs
to be encoded into a format that is both human and machine readable. For
this purpose, the event types are encoded into a Prolog format. This format
expresses the composite events in terms of an atom predicate and a function.
The atom predicate is happensTogether (T1, T2, V ) which expresses the belief
that event types T1 and T2 are believed to have a predictive relationship with
significance value V .
The other component of the format, The compositeEvent (T1, T2) func-
tion, expresses the pairing of the two event types T1 and T2. Formally, the
function takes the input event types and outputs a singular composite event
type, but this definition is not required to understand the output format of
the system. As with event types in general, the function is used in a recursive
manner to build the patterns the composite event type represents.
These two functions are combined together to describe the format that the
system outputs each individual composite event type in. An example of the
how this is done is shown in equation 4.31 for a composite event would be
at level two in the event type hierarchy. In the example, T1 to T4 represent
atomic event types and V represents the significance value. Note that the
stacking of parts of the line is purely stylistic, to allow the example to fit
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within the page. In order to differentiate this output format with the internal
system’s representation of a composite event, an individual line of this output
is referred to as a “rule”.
happensTogether
(
compositeEvent
(
compositeEvent (T1, T2) ,
compositeEvent (T3, T4)
)
, V
)
(4.31)
4.7 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has described the system that was designed and built to test
the hypotheses that were stated in the first chapter. The system comprises of
four modules that pass data between each other, recognising event types and
creating pairs of their corresponding event instances. When a pair of event
types is observed enough times, that pair becomes a new event type to be
recognised and paired up which allows for events of further complexity to be
learned.
The system makes regular use of the ideas of classical conditioning within
the learning process. This ranges from the concept of pairing of events for
association, to the explicit implementation of the phenomena within the sig-
nificance module. It is through the use of these ideas that the methods the
system uses for dealing with noise, and for learning in a computationally effi-
cient manner, were developed.
This system is evaluated in the next two chapters by exposing it to three
separate learning scenarios. Each of the learning scenarios is based around
the atomic event types recognised by the pre-processor module. Chapter five
describes how the system was evaluated and chapter six then provides the
results of that evaluation.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation Methods
Chapter four presented a system that is built to test the hypotheses stated in
chapter one. This chapter looks at the specific testing that was done using that
system. By testing and characterising the system’s ability to learn patterns of
event types given different significance models, the hypotheses that the system
was based upon are tested.
In order to test and characterise the patterns of event types the system
can learn, the tests presented by this chapter are in the form of three learning
scenarios. Each learning scenario involves a set of objects moving, based on
a kinematic system that is observable within the real world. The movements
were created with a program built to simulate the kinematics of each system.
Bounding boxes were provided to each object based upon the object’s position,
current size and distance from the scene observation point.
In order to characterise how each model learned, different lengths of data
were generated. Each generated dataset of each length for each scenario was
then inputted into the system frame-by-frame for each of the ten models pre-
sented in section 4.5.3. The composite event types that were above the upper
significance threshold at the end of each processing run (i.e. those composite
event types that the system has a high level of belief in their existence) were
then used as the output data from the system. The output datasets were then
compared with a manually created proxy ground truth, one for each learn-
ing scenario, which listed the composite event types that were expected to
be learned based on the knowledge of that learning scenario. The statistics
employed in the comparison make up the first set of results that test and
characterise the patterns of event types that the system can learn.
The other result set is based upon the observation from the analysis made
in chapter two, that compensating for the noise of happenstance is a primary
driver for many of the phenomena of classical conditioning. In order to test
this idea, further input datasets were created. For each of the scenarios at
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each length of video, several datasets were created that added various levels
of noise to each of the input bounding boxes. The noise that was created
simulated the typical sort of noise that would be present in a visual object
tracking program.
The typical sort of noise present in a visual object tracking system does not
at first appear to be related to the noise of happenstance discussed thus far.
However, due to the way the atomic events of the system presented in chapter
four have been defined, the typical kind of noise found in a visual object
tracking system becomes the noise of happenstance. This is due to the noise
distorting the position and shape of each object changing the relationships
between objects, and between objects and the scenario. This would in turn
create new atomic event instances that were not a part of those event types
that define a scenario and would also mask event instances that were. For
example, the slight vibration of the boundaries of a track box due to tracker
noise can cause two stationary objects to appear to be rapidly and frequently
approaching and receding from each other.
By comparing the output data between a noisy version of a scenario and
the corresponding non-noisy version of the scenario, a characterisation of how
each of the significance models and the system as whole is able to handle noise
can be created. This characterisation would test the idea that some of the
phenomena of classical conditioning exist to reduce noise.
For a while, it was considered that the input data to the system should
be from real videos being tracked. The reason this method was favoured was
because it was feared that by simulating the data, it would create the risk of
introducing a confirmation bias. After spending considerable time on building
a suitable tracking program it became apparent that it was infeasible using
this method to create the quantities and varieties of data needed to give a
reasonable characterisation of the system. In addition, the approach of using
a genuine tracking system would not allow for characterisation of the system’s
noise handling capacity. As for the issue of confirmation bias, the stance was
taken that while vigilance is always needed, the risk of confirmation bias could
never be eliminated – for instance there is a risk of a confirmation bias in the
scenarios that were selected. It was also deemed that in this case the risk of
there being a confirmation bias in the simulator is reduced by using scenarios
that are based on very widely-known and understood kinematics.
This chapter is divided as follows. First the learning scenarios that will
be used are described, along with the scenarios that were considered, but
for various reasons were rejected. This will be followed with a description of
the simulator program that produces the data for each of the three learning
scenarios. The next section will look at how the proxy ground truth for each
scenario was created. Following on from that there is a section detailing how
the output of the system was analysed. Next there is a description detailing
how the various system and significance model parameters were set and the
values used in the evaluation.
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5.1 The Learning Scenarios
Due to the existing state of the system, there are two constraints that needed to
be taken into account when selecting a learning scenario. The first constraint
is that the target knowledge to be learned within the scenario must involve
the external motion of the objects within the scene. This constraint exists
due to the selection of atomic event types within the system solely describing
external motion.
The second constraint is that the system in its present state would only
be able to learn deterministic patterns – those patterns of event types that al-
most always happen due to a causal relationship existing that either one event
type causes the second or that a third (potentially hidden) event type causes
both component event types of the composite event type. This is because of
the system not implementing some of the phenomena of classical conditioning.
As briefly touched upon in chapter two, there also exists two further types of
pattern; patterns that only exist if some (potentially hidden) state holds and
patterns that are stochastic in their nature. If all the phenomena that were
argued to contribute to learning these types of patterns (those phenomena
that contribute towards criteria 8 a–d and criterion 9: Reacquisition, Sponta-
neous Recovery, Partial Reinforcement, The Partial Reinforcement Extinction
Effect, Conditioned Inhibition and Configural Cues) were implemented then
this constraint should not apply, as argued in the analysis in section 2.4.
When selecting the scenarios, six candidate scenarios were considered and
are listed below. Scenarios one to three are those that were selected and
scenarios four to six were not.
Scenarios that were selected
1. A person throwing a ball up into the air. The concept here is that the
system would learn to expect that when the ball went up into air that
the ball at some point would return.
2. Two objects rotating around a common axis. This was the test scenario
that was presented by dos Santos et al. (2009), whose work formed the
basis for the first module of the system. In this scenario the system
would be learning a larger pattern of the objects approaching, crossing
each other and then receding from each other. This scenario would allow
the project to be related to the event type pattern recogniser presented in
dos Santos et al. (2009) by being effectively the pattern learning system
dual of their recognition system.
3. Pairs of balls and multiple balls colliding, such as those found in the
game of pool. This was thought to teach the system the pattern of a
ball approaching another ball and making contact would cause both balls
to be moving after the contact was made.
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Scenarios that were not selected
5. A fragile object falling and breaking into multiple pieces. The act of a
single object splitting into multiple other objects would make use of the
lost and found atomic event types. The system would learn that by
losing the single object would mean that multiple other objects would
then be observed. This was not selected because it would need some
form of symbol-level generalisation to deal with the variable number of
pieces.
6. Two people passing a ball between each other. In this scenario, it was
thought that the system would be able to learn the general pattern of the
ball being passed. This would in theory allow it to detect similar pass
event type in other ball games such as basketball. This scenario would
also allow the system of this thesis to be related to the work reported
in Bennett et al. (2008), which the system of this thesis used for its
input format. The work reported by Bennett et al. (2008) was evaluated
using a basketball scenario, though did not do any pattern learning on
that video. This was not selected because the system would again need
some form of symbol-level generalisation (i.e. where the system allows
for object typing rather than just unique object identifiers) in order to
recognise the event type occurring given any two people, rather than the
specific two people of a given video.
7. Rigid objects bouncing around an enclosed space in the style common
to many screensaver programs. The concept that could be learned is
that of the configuration space1 of an object, which could be learned
for arbitrary shaped-objects in an arbitrary enclosed space despite only
having access to the rectangular bounding box. It would in principle
be possible to represent the configuration space as a set of event type
patterns – for example the system could be used to form predictions of
an imminent change of direction near a container side (this would have
needed a minor extension to the set of atomic event types recognised).
This scenario was not selected because of this needed representation of
the configuration space would make its interpretation and evaluation
unfeasibly complex.
5.2 Scenario Simulation
The simulator program produces the simulated tracker data that forms the
input data for the system. This section describes how that input data is
1A configuration space is a concept from the field of commonsense knowl-
edge as part of knowledge representation. A configuration space is the space
that describes where an object is allowed to be located and orientated based
upon the existing location and shape of the object and the shape of its sur-
roundings (Davis, 1990, pp. 282–286; Lozano-Pere´z, 1983).
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generated. The simulator takes three input parameters: The scenario desired,
the amount of noise that should be applied to each object as a percentage (the
reason it is a percentage is explained later) and the length of output needed in
seconds (the program converts this to frames assuming 30 frames per second).
The data sets that were generated were for each combination of the three
learning scenarios, six different lengths of video (1, 2, 5, 10, 15 and 30 minutes)
and seven different noise percentages (0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% and 30%).
In simulating the tracker data, there are two stages: Motion simulation and
tracker simulation. The motion simulator as its name suggests applies an an-
imating function to change the positions of the various objects present within
the scenario’s scene. The tracker simulator then takes the object position data
and transforms this data into the sort that can be expected a tracking system
would produce, including the noise due to tracker error.
Before describing each of these stages, in order to improve the realism of
the simulation, many stages of the simulator, both during motion simulation
and tracker simulation require the use of a Gaussian random number genera-
tor that has been truncated at both tails. In order to save repeating the same
information, this number generator is described here and then the main de-
scription of the simulator shall refer to the generator without description. The
Gaussian random number generator is a random number generator where the
cumulative distribution curve matches that of a Gaussian cumulative distribu-
tion curve. The random number generator has four parameters, the mean, the
standard deviation, the minimum value and the maximum value. The mini-
mum and maximum values define the truncation level. The Gaussian curve
is ensured through a Java library function that provides a random number
which when called several times cumulatively creates a Gaussian curve with
a mean of zero and a variance of one. This number is then multiplied by
the desired standard deviation squared and then added to the mean. If the
resultant random number lies outside the range of acceptable values, then the
process is repeated until a number is selected that lies within the acceptable
range. The reason for the truncation is to allow for strict definition of the
range of acceptable values.
5.2.1 Motion Simulation
Motion simulation is based within a scene. A scene is composed of a set of
two-dimensional objects and a set of animation functions that are applied to a
subset of the scene’s objects. An object is initially made up of five parameters:
one for position and one for size for each of the two spatial dimensions and
a layer depth parameter that is used to calculate occlusion. Each object is
assumed to be a rectangle permanently orientated with the axes. Each scene
is able add further parameters to an object such as mass.
An animation function calculates the change in motion and size for each
object it is defined to apply to. For each frame, each motion function is passed
its set of objects. Outside of the motion functions, the motion is not interfered
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with in any way. The implication of this non-interference is that any collision
detection or handling of objects that have moved outside the visible volume
of the scene need to be dealt with by the motion functions.
The remainder of this subsection will look in turn at each of the specifics
of simulating each of the scenarios.
5.2.1.1 The Throwing Scenario
The throwing scenario is animated using equations and constraints derived
from the standard Newtonian equations of motion to create a simulation of
the motion of a person throwing a ball in the air. There are two objects within
the scenario – the ball and the thrower. The objects have two extra parameters
each: a component of velocity for the horizontal and vertical dimensions. The
complexity of this scenario is that, to add realism, each throw of the ball is
thrown at a random angle with a random start point and a random apex, with
each random element being generated using a truncated Gaussian distribution.
In order to improve intuition regarding what is being simulated before
explaining how it is simulated, a selection of frames from the output of the
throwing simulator, figure 5.1 and figure 5.2 are a selection of frames captured
from the output video of the throwing scenario simulator. The noise added by
the tracker simulator discussed in section 5.2.2 has been disabled so that the
tracker noise can be discussed separately. Figure 5.1 shows a sample frame
from the simulation. In the frame, the ball (represented by the blue box) is in
mid-air having just been thrown upwards by the person (represented by the
red box). The green outlines represent the track boxes for each object.
Figure 5.1: A sample frame from a video depicting the throwing scenario.The
box representing the person is coloured red and the box representing the ball is
coloured blue. The green outlines represent the track boxes for their respective
objects.
Figure 5.2 shows a representative selection of 12 frames that occurred
within a set of approximately 30 frames that happened within one second of
the output video. This figure exists to show the kind of movement that occurs
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in the output video. There are several features of the simulation that are worth
highlighting. The first is that the ball can randomly have a small horizontal
motion, as can be seen in the figure by the ball moving right. Secondly,
the size of the box changes in size horizontally, tracking the ball’s horizontal
movement, to simulate the person stretching their arms out to catch the ball.
This is then reversed in the last few frames as the person returns the ball to
their core ready for another throw. The final feature worth highlighting is
that because the simulator uses the Newtonian equations of motion, there are
far fewer frames in the middle of the ball’s flight than those near the apex of
the flight. This final feature may not be wholly apparent from the selection
of frames. This is because, as mentioned earlier, over half the frames in the
sequence were left out for the sake of making the differences in consecutive
frames more noticeable.
Figure 5.2: A selection of frames depicting the kind of movement found in
the throwing scenario. The box colours are the same as in figure 5.1.
The remainder of this subsection describes how this motion was simulated.
There are four input parameters to the throwing scenario: the acceleration
due to gravity, the throwing acceleration due to the thrower, the catching
deceleration due to the thrower and the maximum apex height of throw. The
parameters for the throwing acceleration and catching deceleration may be
modified if the chosen parameters are unable to allow the motion of the ball
to fit within the constraints for the apex of a throw.
There are three phases for a single throw: the initial acceleration of the
throw, the ball under the influence of gravity alone and the deceleration of
the catch. Once the ball has reached a velocity of zero, the first phase begins
again.
The height of the thrower defines a number of other important heights.
The height of the thrower defines the highest release height, the lowest release
height, the highest catch height, the lowest catch height and the lowest possible
height that the ball can be decelerated to zero. The thrower’s height defines
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the highest release height because the release point cannot be higher than
the height of the thrower’s reach, which is set at 1.25 times the thrower’s
starting height. The thrower’s height defines the lowest apex height (and so
the lowest release height) because the ball’s track box should always cease to
overlap the thrower’s track box, this is defined to be 1.25 times the thrower’s
starting height plus the height of the ball. The thrower’s height defines the
highest catch height again because this must be within the thrower’s reach.
The thrower’s height defines the lowest possible height that the ball can be
decelerated to zero because the ball must not go below a height that would
not be reachable by the throwers arms – defined to be 0.25 times the thrower’s
starting height. The lowest possible height for the ball to come to a stop due
to deceleration then defines the lowest possible catch point due to the fixed
deceleration.
It is these heights, the maximum apex height, the deceleration/acceleration
due to gravity and the integral nature of time that defines the constraints on
the throwing acceleration. The throwing acceleration must at least be large
enough so that the maximum apex height is able to be reached by the longest
possible acceleration time – which is constrained by the distance between the
lowest height the ball can be at zero velocity and the highest possible release
height. The throwing acceleration must be also small enough that the smallest
possible amount of acceleration (1 frame’s worth) does not put it over the
highest apex point. If the throwing acceleration is outside these constraints,
then it is set to be the nearest value that satisfies the constraints.
The constraints on the catching deceleration are similarly derived. The
minimum catching deceleration is defined to be the amount of deceleration
needed to bring the ball to a halt at the minimum halt height from the maxi-
mum catch height given the ball reached the maximum apex height and was
accelerated by gravity. The maximum catching deceleration is defined to allow
the constrained throwing acceleration enough distance between the stop point
and the highest release point for one frame’s worth of acceleration. Again, if
the catching deceleration is outside the constraints, then it is set to be the
nearest value that satisfies the constraints.
The random nature of the apex of each individual throw is controlled by
varying the release height of the ball and so controlling how long the first
phase lasts defines the velocity of the ball at release which defines the apex.
The release height is chosen at random from a truncated Gaussian distribution
with a minimum and maximum release height as previously defined, a mean
that is half way between the two truncation points and a standard deviation
that is half the difference between the two truncation points. The random
nature of the stop point of each individual catch is controlled by varying the
catch height of the ball in the same manner to the way the apex of a throw is
controlled but with the corresponding minimum and maximum catch points.
When watching a person throwing a ball, each throw is never directly up-
wards. There is always at least a small amount of movement in the horizontal
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axis. This is simulated in a similar manner to the vertical, though is simpler to
calculate as there is no acceleration or deceleration of the ball due to gravity.
The width of the thrower determines the extreme left and right distance the
ball is allowed to travel between release and catch, which are defined to be
the centre of point of the thrower plus or minus two times the width of the
thrower. Using a truncated Gaussian distribution, a point within these two
extremes is selected using a mean equal to the centre point of the thrower and
a standard deviation that is equal to the difference between the two extreme
points. This selected point is then used as the point that the ball is caught
on the horizontal. After the ball is caught it is decelerated so that it returns
to the centre of the thrower. This means that unlike the vertical calculations,
the horizontal throw acceleration and catch deceleration are not provided as
parameters but are instead calculated. The throw acceleration is calculated to
create the correct velocity so that it is at the correct point horizontally when
it reaches the chosen vertical catch height. The catch deceleration is calcu-
lated so that the ball decelerates to zero horizontal velocity when it reaches
the centre of the thrower and that it reaches that point at the same time as
the vertical velocity reaches zero.
The final part of the simulation is changing the size and shape of the
rectangle representing the thrower to simulate the thrower reaching for the
ball. This is done by having an original size and position and a current size
and position. For the vertical reach simulation, if the release height is above
the original height of the thrower, then the height of the thrower is increased
so that the top edge of the thrower and the top edge of the ball remain the
same until after the release point. While the ball is only acting under gravity,
the height of the thrower is gradually increased up to the maximum height.
When the ball is moving downwards and when the top edge of the ball goes
past the top edge of the thrower, regardless of when the ball is caught, the
thrower’s height is reduced to keep the two top edges the same until it has
been reduced back to the original height.
The thrower’s width is also changed to simulate the thrower reaching for
the ball and tracking it as it moves horizontally. The width of the thrower is
continually changed such that when the ball is flight, it is always directly above
some part of the thrower. However, when the ball is caught, the thrower’s
width moves back towards its initial width, simulating the thrower returning
the ball to the core of their body.
5.2.1.2 The Rotating Scenario
The rotating scenario is the simplest of the three scenarios presented. The
rotating scenario shows two objects of the same size rotating around a fixed
rotation point that is equidistant from both objects. Both objects have the
same constant angular velocity and are always opposite each other. The ob-
jects rotate on the x-z plane, meaning that from the point of view of the
observer the objects move towards the viewing pane and then away from the
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viewing pane. The layer depth parameter described at the beginning of this
motion simulation section is re-interpreted in this scenario is as a depth coordi-
nate. The scenario adds several extra parameters to each object: the distance
from the focus point, the angle of how far around the rotation the object is
and the angular velocity (in angles of rotation per frame).
As with the throwing scenario simulator, to improve intuition regarding the
kind of motion being simulated, this subsection will first discuss a selection of
frames from the output of the simulator. Figure 5.3 shows a single frame of the
output video from the rotating scenario simulator. In the rotating scenario,
the two objects are rotating clockwise (as viewed from above) around a central
point. The frame in figure 5.3 was captured as the red object is receding from
the viewpoint and the blue object is approaching it.
Figure 5.3: A sample frame from a video depicting the rotating scenario.
The first object is coloured red and the second object is coloured blue. The
green outlines represent the track boxes for their respective objects.
Figure 5.4 depicts the kind of motion that occurs within the rotating sce-
nario. The frames are again a representative selection of 12 frames from 30
that occurred over a one second period of an output video of rotating scenario
simulator. There is no variation in the motion of the objects between video
outputs. The simplicity of the motion is due to the provenance of the scenario.
As discussed in section 5.1, the rotating scenario was chosen as it was a test
scenario used by dos Santos et al. (2009). Due to this origin, the motion of
the objects in this scenario was designed to closely match the corresponding
scenario considered by dos Santos et al. (2009), which entailed restricting the
variability of the motion in the scenario.
The motion function has three parameters: the position coordinates of
the rotation point that the objects rotate around. At each frame, the angular
position is increased by its angular velocity. If the angular position is increased
above 2π radians then 2π is subtracted from the angular position. When the
angular position of an object is updated, the absolute position coordinates are
also updated in line with the change of angular position.
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Figure 5.4: A selection of frames depicting the kind of movement found in
the rotating scenario. The box colours are the same as in figure 5.3.
The value of the depth coordinate influences both the observed width and
height parameters, in order to allow nearer objects to appear larger than
those that are further away. This is done by defining a larger depth value to
mean that an object is further away from the viewing pane and dividing the
width and height parameters of each object by its depth parameter to give its
corresponding coordinates and size for the two dimensional scene expected by
the tracker simulator.
5.2.1.3 The Collision Scenario
The collision scenario involves four balls on a (non-tracked) table with a bor-
der. At the start a randomly selected ball (not selected using a Gaussian
distribution) is given an initial impulse force with a random (non-Gaussian)
angle and random (Gaussian) force magnitude. The ball is then allowed to
move under friction, colliding with other balls and the border of the table.
When all balls have come to a standstill, another ball is randomly selected
to be given another impulse force. This continues for the whole time of the
scene.
The intuition for this scenario is that of a game such as pool or snooker.
Figure 5.5 depicts a frame captured from the output video of the collision sce-
nario simulator. In the frame, the red ball was recently struck in the direction
of the orange ball and has just glanced the pink ball out of the way. There are
two points regarding the collision simulation that need to be highlighted. The
first point is that the table does not have a green outline as it is not a tracked
object. The second is that due to thickening the green outlines so that they
are visible in a print format, it may not be noticeable that the balls objects
are circular, rather than the rectangles used in the other scenarios. The reason
for using a circular object representation is to produce an accurate simulation
of the collision dynamics. Because of the tracker simulator still tracking the
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objects as rectangles, there can be instances as shown in the figure between
the red and pink balls where there is some overlap of the track boxes. This
case is one of the reasons that the box overlap merging process described in
section 5.2.2 has an overlap tolerance.
Figure 5.5: A sample frame from a video depicting the colliding scenario.
The balls are coloured red, blue, pink and orange. The black rectangle repre-
sents the border of the table. The green outlines represent the track boxes for
their respective objects.
Figure 5.6 depicts the kind of motion produced by the collision scenario
simulator. As with the other two scenarios, the figure depicts 12 representative
frames from a sequence of 30 frames that occurred over 1 second. The depicted
motion demonstrates the fidelity of the motion simulation. The glancing blow
between the red and pink balls shows that after the blow, the pink ball is
slowly moving in a direction nearly perpendicular to the original motion of
the red ball, as would be expected by a glancing blow between two balls
in a game of pool. In addition, by the time the red ball has reached the
orange ball, it doesn’t have the momentum to move the orange ball. This
part of the figure’s example output showing a loss in the red ball’s momentum
demonstrates two further aspects of the collision scenario simulator. Firstly it
indicates the simulation of kinetic energy losses due to friction and secondly it
demonstrates the simulation of imperfect collision elasticity, in this case from
the glancing blow between the red and pink balls.
Each ball has four extra object parameters: the radius of the ball, the
mass of the ball and an x and y velocity component. In this scenario the balls
are not treated as rectangles but as spheres, though the size of the bounding
rectangle is maintained in line with the ball radius. The motion function
has six parameters: The elasticity of collisions between balls, the elasticity of
collisions between a ball and the edge of the table, the initial impulse force
mean and standard deviation, the percentage of velocity lost in each frame due
to friction (the friction inefficiency) and the number of sub-frames to compute.
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Figure 5.6: A selection of frames depicting the kind of movement found in
the colliding scenario. The box colours are the same as in figure 5.5.
The collision detection employed is relatively simple. At each sub-frame,
each ball is moved along by its velocity vector. Each ball is then compared
with each other pair-wise. When the distance between two objects is smaller
than the sum of their radiuses, a collision has occurred. This is the reason for
a sub-frame parameter. In order to make sure that a ball does not move so
fast in a single frame that it moves through a collision event instance and at
the end of a frame is no longer overlapping the other ball.
When a collision event instance is detected, two stages of computation
happen. First, both balls of the collision event instance are moved back along
their current velocity vector so that the balls are in the position where the
actual collision event instance took place. This is done proportionally to the
magnitude of the velocities. The second stage is that the velocity vectors of
each ball are changed based on the momentum of each ball, the angles of
incidence, and collision elasticity.
The collision detection and resolution between a ball and each edge of
the table is similar but simpler to that of two balls colliding. A collision is
detected when the distance between the centre of the ball and the edge is less
than the radius of the ball. When there is a collision, first the ball is moved
back along the velocity vector to the position that the collision took place as
before. Second, the component of the velocity vector that caused the ball to
cross an edge is multiplied by −1, which has the effect of reversing the direction
of the vector, and then the total magnitude of the vector is multiplied by the
table edge collision elasticity parameter.
The final calculation that is computed in each sub-frame, after ball move-
ments and collisions are detected and resolved, is the efficiency due to friction.
Each ball’s velocity magnitude is multiplied by the friction inefficiency param-
eter, ensuring that all the balls that are moving eventually come to a rest.
The reason that the effect of friction is expressed as a per-frame movement in-
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efficiency percentage rather than with coefficients of friction is to reduce both
the number of parameters and the amount of computation required.
5.2.2 Tracker Simulation
The tracker simulator uses the data produced by the motion simulator and
manipulates the data to simulate the sort of noise that a video object tracker
adds during the tracking process. The tracker simulator is independent of any
of the three scenarios. There are three stages in the tracker simulator: the
addition of noise, the grouping of overlapping objects and output of the final
data.
For each object, only the two-dimensional rectangles parameters are taken
into account. This means that for each object in the current frame, there are
four pieces of data to be held: the observed two-dimensional coordinates and
the observed two-dimensional size values. For each object, before the noise
is added, each of those four pieces of data is copied so that the data can be
modified without changing the original simulated values. This copied data is
referred to as a track box.
In order to define the noise that is added to the track boxes, there needs
to be some qualitative understanding of the typical sources of noise that are
found in visual object trackers. Tracking errors are the result of uncertainties
in where and how large the bounding track box of an object should be. The
observed causes of this uncertainty are: video compression artefacts, similarity
of foreground and background, occlusion and the tracker using a poor model
of the tracked object.
Video compression artefacts and foreground-background similarity both
cause position uncertainty in the same way, by making the boundary of the
object hard to detect. When the boundary of the object is hard to detect,
then it may create small errors where the edge of a track box is placed. This
misplacement in that edge will cause the size and position to be incorrect.
As video compression artefacts and the background change, then so can the
detected boundaries.
Occlusion causes some or all of an object to be not directly visible in the
observed scene. In the case of partial occlusion, there is uncertainty regarding
the true size of the object, and so what the size and position of the track
box should be, especially if the object is moving or can change shape. This
uncertainty introduces noise, as the estimate for how far into the occlusion
the track box should go2 is likely to be incorrect. In the case of full occlusion,
then neither the position nor the size of an object can be ascertained with any
certainty – the tracker must exclusively use expected trajectories for both size
and shape. Again, as there is an estimate involved in where an object may be
while under full occlusion, that estimate can be erroneous.
2Some trackers only try to track the non-occluded parts of an object. In
the context of the discussion, these trackers always produce incorrect tracks.
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The final observed source for error is the employment of a poor model of
the tracked object. Consider searching for a dark blue object on a light blue
background – if the model of the tracker has quantised the colour space too
coarsely, then it may not be able to make the distinction between the two
shades of blue. More generally, the model of the tracked object informs the
tracker as to what features of a scene to look for. If those features are either
not well-defined enough or too prescriptively defined, then the tracker will be
looking for the wrong features and probably incorrectly identify a part of the
scene as being a part of the tracked object, when in fact it is not (which is
referred to as a phantom detection). Depending on how poor the model is,
the errors that can be caused range from minor positional and size errors to
not being able to detect the object at all.
Now that the possible errors that can be found in a tracker have been
enumerated, the way that these errors are simulated can be described. The
tracker simulator assumes that model errors are restricted to minor size and
positional errors, that occlusion between two tracked objects is dealt with
by merging the track boxes and there is no occlusion between any tracked
objects and any non-tracked objects (as introducing this would entail changes
to nature of the selected scenes). This means that all observed errors due
to the tracker are perturbations in the track box position and size which are
caused by uncertainty in each track box boundary edge and this perturbation
rarely strays too far from the true value. Figure 5.7 shows the effect of adding
tracker noise in all three scenarios.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5.7: The effect of adding track-box noise to each of the three learning
scenarios. The noise level in all three of these examples is 20%.
The perturbations in the track box position and size can be modelled by
moving each edge of a track box independently by a random amount each
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frame, with the random quantity being selected using the truncated Gaussian
random number generated described earlier. This Gaussian distribution is
how the noise percentage simulator parameter is used. The noise percentage
simulator parameter defines the minimum, maximum and standard deviation
of the distribution. For the left and right edges, the noise percentage is of
the object’s width. For top and bottom edges, the noise percentage is of the
object’s height. The absolute portions of the object’s width and height are
added and subtracted from each edge as appropriate providing the minimum
and maximum allowed perturbation and so the minimum and maximum points
on the Gaussian distribution. The standard deviation for each distribution is
defined to be the appropriate absolute portion of either the width or the height.
The random perturbation is selected and applied to each track box edge to
give noisy track box data.
By setting the noise as being relative to the object size rather than an
absolute noise level, it simulates the fact that in many kernel tracking systems,
the perturbations are greater for larger objects. This is because during a pixel-
level foreground-background segmentation, there can be many small clusters
of pixels that are incorrectly classed as being foreground. If these clusters are
near to an object, then they can be incorrectly classed as being part of that
object. This has the effect of perturbing the size and position of the object’s
calculated boundary. With larger objects, there is a greater risk of this effect
occurring as there is a greater chance of an erroneous foreground pixel cluster
occurring near the object’s boundary.
The next step in the tracker simulator is the grouping of overlapping track
boxes. Each object’s track box is compared pair-wise with every other track
box. Where there is a significant overlap between the two track boxes, the two
track boxes are merged into a single track box. The reason there needs to be a
significant overlap is to mimic the tolerance observed in tracking software, such
as the tracking software reported on by Bennett et al. (2008). The way this
tolerance is included is by measuring the area of the overlap and comparing
that to the total area of each track box. If the area of the overlap is greater
than or equal to half the size of the smallest object then the two track boxes
are merged. The result of the merging of two track boxes contains both object
labels and the borders of the single track box are set to encompass the borders
of both original track box. An example of the result of this merging process,
which occurs regardless of noise level, can be seen in figure 5.4. The third
frame of figure 5.4 shows an object overlap that is not large enough so that
the object track boxes are merged and the fifth frame shows an object overlap
that is large enough so that the object track boxes are merged.
Finally, the remaining track boxes are written to an external file as a frame
of data. The output data is in the input format used by the system, which is
described in detail in chapter four. The process of simulating another frame
of motion then beings again and the loop continues until there are enough
frames of track box data recorded to the output file to fill the specified time.
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5.3 Proxy Ground Truth
To gain a measure of the quality of the results produced by the system, there
needs to be data that the results can be compared to. In the absence of another
system that produces comparable output, the data needs to be gained through
a manual process that uses the output of human intellect as the data by which
the quality of the output of the system is judged. This output is known as the
ground truth. However in this case, the complexity of creating such a ground
truth would make the task completely infeasible, and so only an approximation
can be created. This thesis calls this approximation the proxy ground truth.
This section discusses how such a proxy ground truth is created.
Using a manually produced proxy ground truth has pitfalls, as it is effec-
tively a form of introspection, as discussed in chapter one. The very nature
of data produced by humans is subjective, even if the subject matter at hand
is emotively neutral. Another pitfall, related to the first, is that a human
produced proxy ground truth may not be entirely complete: There may be
other output data, that when the human is shown that data they would agree
to knowing, but would not think to produce that datum without prompting.
Finally, there may also be constraints on what data a human can consciously
express due to the tractability of the task at hand. Therefore there needs to
be a more objective method of creating a proxy ground truth that involves the
employment of human intellect in a more systematic and structured manner
than simply giving a human the task of producing the proxy ground truth.
A systematic approach has been used by this thesis to produce a proxy
ground truth. The proxy ground truth takes the form of a list of composite
events that would be expected to be in the output of the system. This was
generated by using a five stage process: two human stages and three determin-
istic stages. For each scenario, a set of expected key-frames for that scenario
are produced by a human. A key-frame is a frame that a human deems to
be qualitatively distinct from the previous key-frame. In the next stage, these
key-frames are then used to create the frame state predicates used by the sys-
tem. In the third stage these key-frame states were turned into atomic event
instances that occur between the key-frames. In the fourth stage, a human
gives each atomic event instance an expected duration which are then placed
onto a Gantt chart. The final stage then deterministically compiles each pair
of atomic event instances that are within a fixed timing to give a set of com-
posite event instances, which are placed on a new Gantt chart. The final stage
is repeated using the Gantt chart of the composite events to produce higher-
level Gantt charts of composite event instances. The repetition continues until
either there are no new pairs of composite events or the number of levels of
the Gantt charts matches the system’s maximum level of event instances.
The proxy ground truth for each scenario will now be looked at in turn.
The first level Gantt charts for each of the scenarios is presented in appendix C.
The higher-level charts are not included within this thesis because their size
can run to hundreds of rows. In the throwing scenario, seven key-frames were
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found, as shown in figure 5.8. This created 42 frame states, six per key-
frame. In turn this created 12 different atomic event types, each with one
corresponding instance. These were compared with the same window size of
six frames as used by the system (the way this parameter was set will be
described later in this chapter in section 5.5), producing 64 pairs of atomic
event instances. These pairs in turn created 2,248 pairs of second-level pairs
for a total count of event type pairs of 2,312. No further levels were created
for this or any other scenario for reasons that will be discussed in chapter six.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 5.8: The key-frames of the throwing scenario. The circle represents
the ball and the rectangle the person. The first frame is the person accelerating
the ball. The second frame represents the person releasing the ball. The third
frame represents the ball moving away from the person. Frame four shows the
ball being stationary its apex. The fifth frame represents the ball approaching
the person. The sixth frame shows the person catching the ball. The seventh
frame is the person decelerating the ball.
In the rotating scenario, nine key-frames were found as shown in figure 5.9.
This created 54 frame states. In turn this created 24 atomic event instances
of 22 different atomic event types. These instances compared with the same
window size of six frames, producing 130 pairs of atomic event instances. These
pairs in turn created 6,013 pairs of second-level pairs for a total count of event
type pairs of 6,143.
The colliding scenario needed a slightly different approach to the creation
of key-frames. This is because twelve independent sequences of event types
can occur: eight sequences that involve a pair of balls and four sequences
that involve one ball. The first four two-ball sequences depict the first ball
colliding with the second from each of the four primary directions. The second
four two-ball sequences depict the first ball colliding with the second for each
of the four diagonal directions. The four one-ball sequences depict the ball
colliding with the edge of the table – though note that the table itself is not
a tracked object. Each of these twelve sequences has three key-frames. The
sequences at this point do not take into account that there are four balls in
the scenario; the sequences just use a single ball or single pair of balls. Each of
the sequences and their key-frames are shown in figure 5.10 for the sequences
involving pairs of balls and figure 5.11 for the sequences involving a single ball.
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Figure 5.9: The key-frames of the rotating scenario. The objects A and B
are rotating counter-clockwise around a central axis that runs parallel to the
vertical dimension. This has the effect of each object in turn approaching the
observer and then receding from it.
Analysing the key-frame sequences created 120 frame-states over all of the
sequences. In turn this created twelve Gantt charts (one for each sequence)
with a total of 112 atomic event instances of 26 different atomic event types.
These instances were compared with a window size of six frames, producing 253
unique pairs of atomic event instances. These pairs in turn created 9,647 pairs
of second-level pairs giving a total count of event type pair rules of 9,901 (recall
from section 4.6.6 a rule is a compound event written in the system’s output
format). As said before, the total event type pairs currently generated are for
a single ball or pair of balls. Therefore, the rules that were created need to
be populated with every combination of pair of balls. When this is done, the
final count of the total number of rule pairs becomes 106,218; this is because
there are twelve combinations of balls for rules that involve pairs of balls and
four combinations for rules that involve a single ball.
5.4 Performance Analysis
The end goal of the evaluation, is to characterise how well the system per-
formed. In this case there are four approaches to distinguishing the perfor-
mance of the system:
• How does each output of the system compare with the proxy ground
truth?
• What is the qualitative nature of the output of the system?
• How well does the system cope with noise?
• How fast does the system run?
The first two approaches are considered to be the primary approaches.
This is because they attempt to characterise the worth of the final output,
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Figure 5.10: The key-frames for the eight two-ball sequences of the col-
liding scenario. Arrows depict the direction of movement where relevant for
understanding the key-frame.
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Figure 5.11: The key-frames for the four one-ball sequences of the colliding
scenario. Arrows depict the direction of movement where relevant for under-
standing the key-frame.
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whereas the other two approaches are more concerned with how that output
is arrived at. Each of these four approaches requires some level of analysis
so that the interpretation of the results produces well-founded conclusions.
The first, third and fourth approaches are quantitative in nature, whereas
the second approach is qualitative in nature. Each of the three quantitative
approaches was applied to each triple of the three input parameters of model,
video duration and video noise. This section describes the methodology of the
three quantitative approaches. The methodology used for the second approach
is explained alongside the results themselves in section 6.3. This is because the
justification for the methodology choices of the second approach made relies
on some of the other results.
The first and third approaches involve comparing two sets of data. This is
obvious in the case of comparing the results against the proxy ground truth,
but the same is true for characterising how well the system and model responds
to noise. The way that the system responds to noise is measured by comparing
the output of the system with the noise present against the output of the
system when the noise is not present but had the same selection of model
and video duration input parameters. Comparing the system’s output for a
noisy input against the system’s output for a 0% noise input is preferred over
comparing the system’s output for a noisy input against the proxy ground
truth. This is because it would be very rare for the proxy ground truth to
be in full agreement with the output of the results, whereas if the system is
very insensitive to noise, then it could be in full agreement with the zero-noise
output, as this was also produced by the same system. This allows the issue
of sensitivity to noise to be evaluated independently from any bias in either
the proxy ground truth or any systematic bias in the output of the system.
The motivation for measuring how well the system and the models cope
with noise is based on the analysis of classical conditioning presented in chapter
two. In that chapter, it was argued that many of the phenomena of classical
conditioning examined exist to reduce the influence of noise on the associations
that the agent learns. By characterising the nose robustness of the system and
the various significance models implemented within as part of it, this idea that
classical conditioning phenomena exist to counteract noise can be tested. If
the idea is correct, then it would be expected that the significance models that
implement a greater number of the phenomena of classical conditioning would
have better noise tolerance.
Answering the question as to how fast the system runs requires that the
output of the system not only provides the list of rules that are above the upper
significance threshold but also provides several other metrics. In addition to
the list of significant rules, the system recorded the time it took in seconds to
process the provided video using the selected model. This measure is not the
measure that was analysed however. A larger level of input data will naturally
take longer to process, so instead of reviewing the total time taken, the number
of frames in the input video was divided by the total time taken to give an
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estimate of the mean frames per second. This is the metric that is discussed
when presenting the results.
The remainder of this section discusses the methods used for comparing of
two sets of rules, as used in the first and third approaches. These comparison
methods appear to be well established within machine learning literature. The
methods are included within this thesis for completeness and so that it is
known which evaluation methods of the range used within the machine learning
literature were employed. The methods used are used for the evaluation of a
classifier or other information retrieval system.
When comparing two sets of results, one set is used as the standard and
the other is then compared against it. In this comparison there are four
types of rule that may be present, two types of agreement and two types of
disagreement. The two forms of agreement are called a true positive and a
true negative. A true positive result is a rule that appears in both sets. A
true negative result is a rule that appears in neither set. The two forms of
disagreement are termed false positive and false negative. A false positive
result is a rule that does not appear in the standard set of rules but does
appear in the comparison set of rules, this concept is related to the type I
error used in hypothesis testing. A false negative result is a rule that does
appear in the standard set of rules but does not appear in the comparison
set of rules and is related to the type II error used within hypothesis testing.
All four types of result can be presented in a diagrammatic form known as a
confusion matrix as shown in table 5.1.
Standard set rule inclusion
Included Not included
Comparison set
rule inclusion
Included
True Positive
(TP )
False Positive
(FP )
Not Included
False Negative
(FN)
True Negative
(TP )
Table 5.1: The confusion matrix for comparing two sets of rules.
From the size of each of type of result, the measures that are used can be
derived. The first of these are known as precision and recall. Precision is the
fraction of true positives against the size of the comparison set. Recall is the
fraction of true positives against the size of the standard set. These can be
calculated through the sizes of each of the types of result and are shown in
equation 5.1 and equation 5.2.
Precision =
|TP |
|TP |+ |FP |
(5.1)
Recall =
|TP |
|TP |+ |FN |
(5.2)
From these measures, a further single measure that combines and balances
the two individual measures of precision and recall can be created, called the
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F or F1 measure. The F measure was first described by van Rijsbergen (1979)
and is shown in equation 5.3.
F1 =
2 · Precision · Recall
Precision + Recall
=
2 · |TP |
2 · |TP |+ |FP |+ |FN |
(5.3)
The final measure used to compare two sets of rules is known as the
Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC). The MCC is a correlation measure
between predicted and observed classifications of a binary classifier and is
shown in equation 5.4. The MCC was first described by Matthews (1975)
based on a correlation measure described by Fisher (1958).
MCC =
|TP | · |TN | − |FP | · |FN |√
(|TP |+ |FP |) (|TP |+ |FN |) (|TN |+ |FP |) (|TN |+ |FN |)
(5.4)
The MCC requires a measure of the true negative count. This value is not
able to be recorded by any of the result sets because the set it represents is by
definition not listed. Therefore the true negative count needs to be calculated
from the values that are known. This can be done by first calculating the
total size of all possible results (N) and then subtracting the known counts as
shown in equation 5.5.
|TN | = N − |TP | − |FP | − |FN | (5.5)
The size of all the possible results for each learning scenario is defined
as the list of every possible pair of event types for each level. This can be
calculated based on the number of tracked objects in the scenario and the
number of atomic event types that the system detects. The throwing and
rotating scenarios both use two objects and the colliding scenario uses four
objects. As the system detects 8 unary, 2 reversible and 16 non-reversible
atomic event types, this gives 50 possible atomic event types for two objects
and 236 possible atomic event types for four objects. A possible pairing is any
selection of two separate atomic event types. This means that there are n2−n
possible pairs of event types at a particular level in the event type hierarchy
if there are n event types in the level below. This gives a count of 2,450
level one event pairs for two objects and 55,460 level one event pairs for four
objects. This in turn produces 6,000,050 level two event pairs for two objects
and 3,075,756,140 level two event pairs for four objects. These level one and
level two counts summed together produce a total size of all possible results
of 6,002,500 for two objects and 3,075,811,600 for four objects. The count of
the number of atomic event types is not included in the totals as these are not
produced as results of the system as they are not rules to be recognised.
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5.5 System Constants
Over the whole system including each of the various models there are 11 con-
stants that determine the behaviour of the system above the four input pa-
rameters of:
• The scenario.
• The input tracker noise percentage.
• The input video duration.
• The significance model to use.
Most of the constants are specific to each model, but there are some system-
wide constants. This section looks at how the values for each constant were
arrived at.
Each constant affects the utility of other constants – for instance, the
reinforcement learning rate, k1, affects the number of rules that can be subject
to the extinction process controlled by non-reinforcement learning rate, k2.
This means that the only way to guarantee that an optimal combination of
settings has been chosen is to try every combination. This is not feasible
though, as to try 8 possible values for each of the 11 constants in the context
of each model gives 2.73 × 108 combinations. Even running the maximum
observed frame rate of the system of approximately 3000 frames per second3
and each combination was tried using only a one minute duration video with
no noise as input, it would take over five years of constant processing to process
every combination. Therefore, in the interests of feasibility, each setting had
to be dealt with as if it independently affected the results. Further, it was not
feasible to perform a full analysis of the results as described in the previous
section; the only measures used were those directly output by the system:
The processing time and the number of rules in the output. While each model
has its own separate constants, due to later models being based upon earlier
models, many of the model parameters have equivalents in other models. In
order to improve the feasibility of determining a value to each constant, each
constant was reviewed only once, in the model that first uses that constant.
For each constant, the two measures were collated and plotted over ap-
proximately eight possible settings. The final setting was set based on what
appeared to be the best balance between the number of rules produced and
the time taken to produce them. Appendix D lists the values that were used
for each constant.
3This is an extreme frame rate. A more typical frame rate would be ap-
proximately 100 frames per second; the lowest extreme is approximately one
frame per second.
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5.6 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has described how the system presented in chapter four was evalu-
ated. The system was evaluated within the context of three different learning
scenarios: A ball being thrown into the air, two objects rotating around a
common axis and four balls colliding with one another. These three scenarios
were generated as simulations based upon the physics equations relevant to
each scenario plus a method of adding noise to the simulation. The output of
the simulations was input into the system. The output of the system was com-
pared in two ways. Firstly the output was compared against a proxy ground
truth that was created for each scenario based upon a process comprising of
human and deterministic decisions. Secondly where the input of the system
included a level of noise, the output was compared against the output that
was produced for the same video without the noise. The comparisons were
based on several widely-used methods. However, the same widely-used meth-
ods were not feasible for determining the large number of constants within the
system and so a weaker form of analysis was used to determine what value
should be used for each constant.
The results of the comparisons produced in this system are presented in
the next chapter, chapter six. In the final chapter, chapter seven, those results
are then used in the context of the hypotheses presented in chapter one to form
a set of conclusions about the ideas presented in this thesis.
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Chapter 6
Results
This chapter presents the results of the evaluation that was discussed in chap-
ter five. Along with the results, the chapter analyses the salient points of the
results. This analysis also allows the discussion to present an interpretation
of which phenomena used in the system and its accompanying models worked
well and those that worked less well.
During the evaluation of the system, a flaw in its design was discovered. A
description of the flaw and the work-around introduced to reduce its impact
is the topic of the first section of this chapter. This is presented first because
it influences the remainder of the results. The second and third sections look
at the primary results – the system’s ability to produce a model that matches
the description of what the system was supposed to learn in each scenario.
This is done quantitatively in section two through a comparison between the
output of the system and a proxy ground truth. The third section reviews the
output of the system qualitatively.
The fourth and fifth sections look at the secondary results. The fourth sec-
tion looks at how the system and its models respond to different levels of noise
in the input data. The fifth section considers the computational performance
of each model. The chapter then ends with a wider discussion of the results.
Note that so as to not break-up the text into very small chunks, spoiling flow,
in each section that presents results in the form of charts, those charts are
presented at the end of that section, after the accompanying discussion text.
6.1 The System Design Flaw
While the system was processing input data, it was found that due to the
interaction between the event type hierarchy and an unforeseen aspect of the
extension for multi-frame events, there was a combinatorial explosion in the
number of event types at each level. The combinatorial explosion meant that
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the system was unable to finish processing all but the shortest of video du-
rations. This was rectified by capping the number of levels of the event type
hierarchy at two levels of composite event types, creating a hierarchy of three
levels when atomic event types are included.
The reason for the combinatorial explosion is due to a combination of
the way the event-type hierarchy is represented and the situation of three or
more multi-frame events that always occur together in a manner that means
that they always overlap one another and all the overlaps fit within the size
of the window. This can cause three more event types to be created at the
next level up, which will lead to three event types at the level above that
and will continue forever. This concept is shown in figur 6.1, which depicts a
type configuration of event instances that for the purposes of this discussion
occurs many times causing event types as shown. In the case of the exam-
ple in figure 6.1, a third level would consist of the composite event type tu-
ples ((T1, T2) , (T1, T3)), ((T1, T2) , (T2, T3)) and ((T1, T3) , (T2, T3)). When the
results were being processed, not just three-way overlaps were observed, but
even higher order overlaps – for example, in the case of the colliding scenario,
some twenty-way overlaps were observed.
In theory, the infinite chain of levels is amortised by the fact that each
new level has to wait for the events of the level below to reach the significance
threshold. However, this issue is enhanced by a further factor. Three-way over-
lapping event types cause a combinatorial explosion when other event types
are associated in serial with them. When a further event type is associated
serially with the three overlapping event types, six event types are created
at the next level. Each event type that gets associated with the overlapping
events effectively becomes a multiplier for the number of event types created,
increasing the overall count for each higher level. This is demonstrated in
figure 6.2. When this multiplier effect is combined with the infinite hierarchy
and the larger numbers of atomic events used in the learning scenarios, it does
not take very many frames or levels before the speed of processing one frame
becomes too slow to feasibly process every scenario at each video duration and
noise level. This led to the enforcement of a limit to the type hierarchy of two
levels of compound events.
When developing the system, it was assumed that there were a finite num-
ber of levels that could be created in the event type hierarchy. The reasoning
was based on the fact that one-on-one serial associations and associations be-
tween two-way overlaps would both only produce a single event type the next
level up. This would mean that every level would have fewer event types than
the level below it. Eventually each pairing and pairing of pairs and so on
would combine to a single high-level pairing. The reduction in the number of
event types at each level would thusly cause the number of levels to be finite.
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Figure 6.1: Two levels of multi-frame events. The window is marked by the
two black vertical lines – solid for the current frame, dashed for the last frame.
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C,D
Figure 6.2: A serial association with a three-way overlap. The existence
of the serial association increases the number of event types that are created
at the second level of event types. The window is marked by the two black
vertical lines – solid for the current frame, dashed for the last frame.
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6.2 Proxy Ground Truth Comparison
Other than the need to cap the number of levels allowed in the event type hi-
erarchy, the comparison with the proxy ground truth has produced the results
least in line with expectations. However, on analysis, there are some signs
that these results may be due to flaws in the proxy ground truth, rather than
due to flaws in the system’s design. In addition, further analysis indicates that
even with the flawed proxy ground truth there are some aspects that are in
line with expectations. The reason for the proxy ground truth may be flawed
is discussed in section 6.3.
By far the largest determining factor for all the comparison measures pre-
sented is the model employed. The video duration has some effect but usually
stabilises after the first few minutes of input. The noise level has negligible
impact. As the hypotheses are linked to the comparison between the models
more than any other factor, and are the largest determining factor, the results
and discussion shall focus on the comparison between the models. The plots
presented will show the duration data as separate lines. This allows the plot
to both show the variation that a model can have and show to some extent the
influence in the measures that the video duration has. The influence over noise
levels will not be shown – each plot is based only on the data for zero noise.
This lack of noise data is also justified by the fact that the noise tolerance is
analysed separately later on within this chapter.
There is another general influence on the comparison measures presented –
the complexity of the learning scenario. Through the three learning scenarios,
the complexity affects the measures in two ways: Firstly, there is a reduction
in both the typical and peak performance for each measure, which is due to
the difficulty of getting a good score against a proxy ground truth with a larger
set of rules than a smaller set of rules. Secondly, as the complexity increases
the variation in each measure that is based on the video duration increases for
each model. This occurs because more complex models take longer for their
corresponding observed rule sets to stabilise.
As mentioned previously, some results more in line with expectations can
be found within the results. The results more in line with expectations can be
separated from those less in line with expectations by their level within the
event type hierarchy. The vast majority of the results less in line with expecta-
tions can be attributed to the second level of compound event types (i.e. those
rules that are compounds of compound event types). This again can be at-
tributed to the much larger proxy ground truth than is present for the second
level than the first level in each learning scenario. This is because the second
level is derived from the first, which means that any disagreement between
the output of the system and the proxy ground truth on the first level will
be magnified exponentially on the second level. The exponential divergence
arising from the previous multiple overlap problem already discussed.
The first measure that shall be reviewed is the precision measure. Fig-
ure 6.3 shows the precision score for each model for both levels of the hierarchy
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and figure 6.4 shows the precision score of each model for just the first level
of the hierarchy. For some models and scenarios, the precision gives results
that are reasonably in line with expectations, and even some that are very in
line with expectations, with the Inhibition and Pre-Exposure models perform-
ing the best across each scenario. The results least in line with expectations
are those of the Temporal / Reacquiring / Blocking group of models, it was
expected that these would perform better than the Absolute and Iterative
Acquire-Extinguish models.
Of the three non-conditioning models, the performance rank-order for the
precision measures is as expected across the models, with the general trend of
the Fixed Increment model showing the worst performance, a modest increase
in performance for the Symmetrical Fixed Increment model and then a larger
increase for the Count Only model. There are some outliers in this trend,
but these appear to be for the one minute and two minute inputs, so the rule
sets had not stabilised by that point, and the first rules to be generated are
more likely to be correct because they reached the significance threshold the
fastest. There is another outlier in the precision scores of those three models
that cannot be explained by the data points being from the short duration
inputs. This is that in figure 6.4c, the Count Only model has a much lower
score than the other two models. No explanation was found for this result.
Even more anomalous is that in the same subfigure, with the exception of the
one minute input, the precision scores for the Count Only model are in the
reverse order. Again no explanation could be found for this behaviour.
A similar trend for all of the models with the level one precision results
can be seen as that of the all-level precision results, but each point having a
generally higher absolute precision value. Defying this general observation is
the two Acquire-Extinguish models, which shows some improvement in per-
formance when only taking into account the level one results.
Of all the results presented in this chapter, the recall results are least in
line with expectations. However, as with the precision results, the level one
results show significant improvement when viewed alone. The recall results for
every level are shown in figure 6.5. The corresponding recall results for only
the level one event types are shown in figure 6.6. The all-level results show
very poor recall performance for every scenario, with the best recall score over
every run being 0.042 – effectively meaning that the very best result only found
4.2% of all the proxy ground truth rules. However, taking only the level one
results, the recall values are transformed – with the best result being 0.938.
This implies that almost the entire issue with these is that there is a great
deal of disagreement between the output of the system and the proxy ground
truth, and there is little evidence that it is not the proxy ground truth that is
being overly broad. As with the precision results, the relative trend between
the models for the two sets of plots is broadly the same.
The individual recall results for each of the models appears to be somewhat
of a mirror for the precision results – those models that did less well with the
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precision measure performed better with recall measure, and those models that
performed well with the precision measure did less well with the recall measure.
To some extent this is expected, since there is a form of inverse relationship
between precision and recall. It is possible to score well with both measures
however, so it is not a true inverse relationship. This can be seen through
a trivial method of getting a high recall – if every possible rule is generated,
the recall would be 100%, as every correct rule would be generated, but this
would lead to a very low precision as there would be a very high number of
false positives. Conversely, a higher precision can be obtained by producing
very few rules, as then each true positive gained would not be divided by a
significantly higher number. This appears to be what has happened in the
results. The two Fixed Increment models and the Temporal group of models
generated the highest absolute number of rules and so created a better recall,
but at a high cost of precision. The Count Only, Inhibition and Pre-Exposure
models produced considerably fewer rules, giving a higher precision at the
expense of recall. The two Acquire-Extinguish models then fell in the middle
for the number of rules produced, and so fell in the middle for both precision
and recall.
The recall results demonstrate that there is a difference between the Tem-
poral and Reacquisition models showing a deviation in both the all-level and
level one results. Over every result in this section, a difference between the re-
sults of the two models is rare. The reasons why the Temporal, Reacquisition
and Blocking models have such similar results is discussed in section 6.5.
With the balance between precision and recall being different for each
model, the results of the F1 measure and the MCC becomes of even greater
interest. The results of both measures take a similar broad shape and so
both measures will be discussed simultaneously. The very low recall figures
for the data that includes both levels heavily influences the F1 measure and
the MCC which means that their respective all-level data is also less in line
with expectations. Because of this, only the plots for the level one data are
presented. Figure 6.7 presents the level one data for the F1 measure and
figure 6.8 shows the level one data for the MCC.
The most remarkable observation between the F1 and MCC measures is
how similar both sets of results are – with a few exceptions, the MCC takes
almost the exact same shape as the F1 measure, but at a slightly higher ab-
solute value. The slight increase can be accounted for by the inclusion of the
very large true negative values in the MCC calculation. Of the exceptions
to the similarity between the two plots, the MCC slightly favours the two
Fixed Increment models, the Inhibition model and the Pre-Exposure model
and slightly disfavours the Temporal group of models. As the learning scenar-
ios become more complex, again the values of the measures in general reduce.
Overall, it appears that the models that demonstrated a higher recall (i.e. the
two Fixed Increment models and the Temporal group of models) have pro-
duced higher scores in these two measures than the models that demonstrated
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a higher precision (i.e. the Count Only, Inhibition and Pre-Exposure models),
although the discrepancy between the two groups is certainly less than either
the individual precision or recall results. As the recall values are worse than
the precision values are good, the end result is that the more indiscriminate
models are preferred over the more discriminating ones.
Other performance comparison measures not discussed in section 5.4 or
presented in this section were collected and calculated. However, the reason
these measures have not been fully included in this thesis is that they are not
a discriminator for any of the four input variables. These measures are the
specificity and the accuracy. The specificity is a measure of the proportion
of true negatives out of all the negatives found, which is calculated using
equation 6.1. The accuracy is a measure of the proportion of correct results
that were found out of the set of all possible rules, which is calculated using
equation 6.2. The reason the measures were not used is because for every value
calculated, the answer returned rounded to the value one. This is because the
size of all possible results is vast compared to any of the output rule sets or
the proxy ground truth rule sets. This means the true negative set size will
also be much larger than the other set sizes, causing the result to be very near
the value one.
Specificity =
|TN |
|TN |+ |FN |
(6.1)
Accuracy =
|TP |+ |TN |
|TP |+ |FP |+ |TN |+ |FN |
(6.2)
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Figure 6.3: A plot comparing the model employed against its precision value
for every level of the event-type hierarchy. The sub-figures each show one of
the learning scenarios. Each line corresponds to one value of video duration.
Only those runs where the noise level was zero are shown.
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Figure 6.4: A plot comparing the model employed against its precision value
for the first level of the event-type hierarchy. The sub-figures each show one of
the learning scenarios. Each line corresponds to one value of video duration.
Only those runs where the noise level was zero are shown.
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Figure 6.5: A plot comparing the model employed against its recall value
for every level of the event-type hierarchy. The sub-figures each show one of
the learning scenarios. Each line corresponds to one value of video duration.
Only those runs where the noise level was zero are shown.
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Figure 6.6: A plot comparing the model employed against its recall value for
the first level of the event-type hierarchy. The sub-figures each show one of
the learning scenarios. Each line corresponds to one value of video duration.
Only those runs where the noise level was zero are shown.
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Figure 6.7: A plot comparing the model employed against its F1 value for
the first level of the event-type hierarchy. The sub-figures each show one of
the learning scenarios. Each line corresponds to one value of video duration.
Only those runs where the noise level was zero are shown.
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Figure 6.8: A plot comparing the model employed against its Matthews
correlation coefficient (MCC) for the first level of the event-type hierarchy.
The sub-figures each show one of the learning scenarios. Each line corresponds
to one value of video duration. Only those runs where the noise level was zero
are shown.
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6.3 Qualitative Results
The complete output data set is very large, with output rule sets for
1260 different input combinations and an individual rule set typically hav-
ing thousands of generated rules. Due to this sheer quantity of data, it is
not feasible to conduct a comprehensive qualitative review of these results.
This means that any qualitative analysis could easily miss an important de-
tail. However, as long as this risk is acknowledged, a qualitative analysis does
provide insight into the operation of the system.
The qualitative results presented in this section focus on the first-level
association rules. This is for three reasons. The first reason is that due to the
respective sizes of the first and second levels, focusing on the first level rules
allows the results presented to be less sporadic. The second reason is that
the results from the quantitative comparison against the proxy ground truth
suggested that the second-level rules are too inaccurate deal with. The final
reason for focusing on the first-level rules is that they are the biggest influence
on which second-level rules occur, so a qualitative review of the first level rules
at least gives a strong implication of what would be expected to be observed
in the second-level rule sets.
In the rules that are presented in this section, the significance value has
been left out of the rules for notational clarity. These values present no relevant
information to the discussion because by definition all of the rules have a
significance value above the upper threshold which means there is very little
variance in the values.
There are three approaches that have been taken in reviewing the qualita-
tive results, each is discussed in turn in its own subsection. The first subsection
gives the general observations that were made regarding the output of the sys-
tem. The second subsection then gives a qualitative comparison between the
rule sets produced by each of the ten significance models. The final subsec-
tion gives an argument the qualitative results suggest that the results that
are against expectations in section 6.2 are due to the proxy ground truths not
fully representing their respective scenarios.
6.3.1 General Observations
It was observed that the most prevalent and quickly learned associations were
those that had some form of logical necessity – in other words, those associa-
tions that will always happen due to the definitions of the atomic events. For
example, in every output file that was inspected, the rule in equation 6.3 was
present, with different object labels.
happensTogether
(
makeContactRight (O1, O2) ,
makeContactLeft (O2, O1)
)
(6.3)
This rule states that if the first object makes contact with the second on
its right-hand side, then the second object makes contact with the first object
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on its left-hand side. Similar rules for the other directions, the break contact
events and the merge and emerge events are also almost always present, with
the notable exception of the low-noise rotation outputs, which are missing
the vertical definitions due to the object only moving horizontally. These
rules are nearly always present because the respective atomic event definitions
mean that both events are always generated side-by side.
There are some less expected results that involve rules that were learned
due to logical necessity that are seen in the models that implement the tem-
poral model’s features. These unexpected rules are those that associate two
events that always start at the same time, for instance, due to a logical neces-
sity between the events or due to some weaker causative effect. These rules
were not expected because if the two events start simultaneously, they will
have an inter-stimulus interval of zero because the inter-stimulus interval is
defined as the interval between the two start times. An inter-stimulus interval
of zero would mean that the models would produce a change in significance
value of zero, implying that if two event types always start together, the rule
associating them should not appear. One possible explanation for this be-
haviour is that the event types have associated together from different event
instances. Due to the repetitive nature of the input, if the duration of a whole
repetition of the scenario was lower than the width of the moving window,
an association could form between the two event types that start at the same
time.
The next most frequently observed kind of pairing are those associations
that are nearly inevitable – in other words, where the case that the association
does not apply in is a rare exception. For example, in the throwing and
rotating scenarios (and the colliding scenarios that have noise in the input –
see section 6.4), every output file that was inspected has the rule shown in
equation 6.4.
happensTogether
(
makeContactLeft (O1, O2) ,
mergeLeft (O2, O1)
)
(6.4)
Along with the above rule, other similar ones were frequently found such
as the counterpart rules for the other three directions and the converse rules
associating the emerge and the break contact atomic events. In the association
above and others like it, the only time that this association would not be
learned is either in the case when objects never make contact, or the case
when objects can never pass in front of another object – as in the case of the
output rule sets produced from low-noise colliding scenario inputs.
It is almost inevitable that this association occurs in the scenarios it did
occur in. This is because, in those scenarios, the need for objects to pass in
front of each other is essential to the nature of the scene. In addition, the
converse rules involving the emerge atomic events and the break contact were
also found in the throwing scenario, associations between the make contact
and merge event types were also found for all four of the cardinal directions.
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6.3.2 Model Comparison
In order to compare the models qualitatively, a small number of rules were
selected from each scenario’s proxy ground truth that were deemed to be the
most important for describing the scene. The output from the system for the
zero-noise input for each scenario was checked to see if they contained the
chosen rules. The thirty minute output sets were used as this gives the best
chance that the rule sets will have stabilised.
For the throwing scenario, four rules were chosen, which are listed in equa-
tions 6.5 to 6.8. The rule in equation 6.5 states that after the ball is no longer
in front or behind the person, the ball will be receding from the person. The
rule in equation 6.6 states that the ball will move down after it has moved
up. The rule in equation 6.7 states that after the ball stops receding from the
person, it will approach the person. Finally, the rule in equation 6.8 states
that when the ball is approaching the person, it will eventually be in front or
behind the person.
happensTogether
(
emergeBottom (Person, Ball) ,
receding (Person, Ball)
)
(6.5)
happensTogether (moveUp (Ball) , moveDown (Ball)) (6.6)
happensTogether
(
receding (Person, Ball) ,
approaching (Person, Ball)
)
(6.7)
happensTogether
(
approaching (Person, Ball) ,
mergeBottom (Person, Ball)
)
(6.8)
In the throwing scenario, the rule in equation 6.5 was observed in all out-
puts other than the outputs of the Inhibition and Pre-Exposure models. For
the rule in equation 6.6, only the Fixed Increment model and the Count Only
model produced the rule. Every model produced the rule in equation 6.7 and
the rule in equation 6.8 was found in the outputs of all of the models with the
exception of the Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model.
For the rotating scenario, seven rules were chosen, which are listed in
equations 6.9 to 6.15. The rule in equation 6.9 states that when the two objects
are receding from one another, they will soon start approaching each another.
The rules in equation 6.10 and equation 6.11 state that after approaching
one another, the two objects will merge. The rules in equation 6.12 and
equation 6.13 state that after merging with each other on one side, the objects
will soon separate from each other on the opposite edge. The final pair of
rules, in equation 6.14 and equation 6.15 state that after separating from each
other, the two objects will begin receding from each other.
happensTogether (receding (O1, O2) , approaching (O1, O2)) (6.9)
happensTogether (approaching (O1, O2) , mergeRight (O1, O2)) (6.10)
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happensTogether (approaching (O1, O2) , mergeLeft (O1, O2)) (6.11)
happensTogether (mergeRight (O1, O2) , emergeLeft (O1, O2)) (6.12)
happensTogether (mergeLeft (O1, O2) , emergeRight (O1, O2)) (6.13)
happensTogether (emergeRight (O1, O2) , receding (O1, O2)) (6.14)
happensTogether (emergeLeft (O1, O2) , receding (O1, O2)) (6.15)
In the rotating scenario, the rules in equations 6.9, 6.12 and 6.13 were found
in the output from every model. The rules in equations 6.10 and 6.11 were
produced by every model with the exception of the Count Only Model. The
final pair of rules, those in equations 6.14 and 6.15 were found in the output
from every model excluding the Count Only, Inhibition and Pre-Exposure
models.
In the final scenario, the rotating scenario, a slightly different approach
had to be taken. The main descriptive sequence of event types are where two
balls approach each other, make contact, break contact and then recede from
each other. The issue here is that there are four balls in the scenario, of which
any pair of balls is valid. In addition, for making and breaking contact event
types, there are four directions in which contact is made and broken. This
has meant that to encapsulate the main descriptive sequence, there are 300
rules that would need to be searched for, making a qualitative analysis not
feasible. So instead, four rules were searched for that included wildcards to
make allowances for the different ball combinations and allowed directions.
This is represented in the rules listed below as a star.
There were four wildcard rules searched for in the system outputs for the
throwing scenario. These are listed in equations 6.16 to 6.19. The rule listed
in equation 6.16 states that when two balls are approaching each other, they
will soon be receding from each other. The rule in equation 6.17 states that
when two balls are approaching each other, they will soon make contact with
each other. The rule listed in equation 6.18 states that when to balls make
contact with each other, they will soon break contact with each other. Finally,
the rule in equation 6.19 states that when two balls break contact with each
other, they will soon recede from each other.
happensTogether
(
approaching (Ball∗, Ball∗) ,
receding (Ball∗, Ball∗)
)
(6.16)
happensTogether
(
approaching (Ball∗, Ball∗) ,
makeContact∗ (Ball∗, Ball∗)
)
(6.17)
happensTogether
(
makeContact∗ (Ball∗, Ball∗) ,
breakContact∗ (Ball∗, Ball∗)
)
(6.18)
happensTogether
(
breakContact∗ (Ball∗, Ball∗) ,
receding (Ball∗, Ball∗)
)
(6.19)
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In the throwing scenario, all of the models outputted at least one rule that
matched the rule in equation 6.16 with the exception of the Absolute Acquire-
Extinguish model, the Inhibition model and the Pre-Exposure model. For
the rule in equation 6.17, four models outputted at least one matching rule:
The Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model, the Temporal model, the Reacquir-
ing model and the Blocking model. All but four models produced at least
one rule that matched the rule in equation 6.18, the models that did not be-
ing the Fixed Increment model, the Symmetrical Fixed Increment model, the
Iterative Acquire-Extinguish model and the Inhibition model. For the final
rule, the rule listed in equation 6.19, half the models had output a matching
rule. The models that were unable to produce a matching rule were: The
Symmetrical Fixed Increment model, the Count Only model, the Iterative
Acquire-Extinguish model, the Inhibition model and the Pre-Exposure model.
Table 6.1 summarises the results in this section. Discussion of these results
is included as part of the overall discussion that takes place in section 6.6.
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6.5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.6 ✓ ✓
6.7 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.8 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.9 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.10 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.11 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.12 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.13 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.14 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.15 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.16 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.17 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.18 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6.19 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 6.1: A matrix showing whether a given model was able to match a
specified rule. The equation numbers refer the given rules.
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6.3.3 Proxy Ground Truth Weakness
The output of the system could in fact be more in line with expectations than
the quantitative comparison with the proxy ground truth would suggest. As
previously mentioned, the reason for the results that were against expectations
in comparing the outputs of the system against the proxy ground truth is
believed to be due to each proxy ground truth being a poor representation of
its scenario, as opposed to the system’s output being a poor representation.
The basis of this argument is due to the qualitative review of the results.
In appraising the raw output rules, it was found that some of the false
positives are quite reasonable things for the system to have learned. For
example, in the throwing scenario, it was found that a large number of the
models had produced the rule shown in equation 6.20 and most models had
produced the rules shown in equations 6.21 and 6.22. In the throwing scenario,
the majority of the models produced the rule shown in equation 6.23 and in
the colliding scenario, the rule shown in equation 6.24 was found in all but
one of the model outputs.
happensTogether (moveUp (Ball) , moveUp (Person)) (6.20)
happensTogether (moveLeft (Ball) , moveLeft (Person)) (6.21)
happensTogether
(
moveLeft (Ball) ,
mergeLeft (Ball, Person)
)
(6.22)
happensTogether
(
mergeRight (ObjectA, ObjectB) ,
moveLeft (ObjectA)
)
(6.23)
happensTogether
(
receding (Ball 0, Ball 1) ,
receding (Ball 1, Ball 3)
)
(6.24)
All of these rules in equations 6.20 to 6.24 are reasonable for the system to
learn, but were not included in the proxy ground truth. In retrospect this was
due to assumptions made about each scenario. If these assumptions were not
made, then it would not have been feasible to create the proxy ground truth
in the first place, due to the increased complexity.
In the throwing scenario, the rule in equation 6.20 is due to the fact that
the when a person throws a ball, their arms move up, as their arms move
up, the centre of the person’s bounding box moves up. This rule was not
included because the relevant proxy ground truth was created assuming that
the motion of the person was irrelevant. The rules in equations 6.21 and 6.22
are caused by the simulation of some horizontal movement in the ball and the
person tracking the ball, leading to both moving left (or right) at a similar
rate and at the catch, the ball will merge on that edge, as well as the usual
top edge of the person with the bottom edge of the ball. These two rules were
not included because of the previous assumption stated and the assumption
that the horizontal motion of the ball was irrelevant.
- 187 -
In the rotating scenario, the rule in equation 6.23 is due to the need to as-
sume the durations of each atomic event instance in making the proxy ground
truth. Some of the assumed timings were incorrect, which meant that the
two event instances occurred close enough to be associated, but were not close
enough with the assumed event instance timings when creating the proxy
ground truth.
In the colliding scenario, the rule in equation 6.24 can be seen to be due
to there being more than two balls in the scenario, which ball one is moving
away from two of the other balls simultaneously. This would be highly likely
to occur when there is more than one ball. However, in order to allow for the
creation of the proxy ground truth to be tractable, it was assumed that the
event type associations only ever involved two balls. The final proxy ground
truth then allowed for the fact that there were four balls in the scenario by
applying the generated two-ball rule set to each pair of balls in the four ball
set.
These qualitative observations suggest there may be another contributory
factor for some of the weaker than expected proxy ground truth comparison
results. Some of the results could be attributable to the use of a flawed proxy
ground truth in each scenario. By extension this suggests a flaw in the methods
used to produce each proxy ground truth. It is likely that the way human
judgement and deterministic processing were combined was too prescriptive,
leading to rule sets for each proxy ground truth that were larger than they
should be in some aspects yet smaller than they should be in other aspects.
The qualitative analysis in section 6.3.2 showed a series of rules that were
deemed to be those key to describing each scenario. The summary of which
models produced a match for each rule in table 6.1 has a far higher match
rate than would be suggested by the comparison with the proxy ground truth.
This fact that of a better match with some independently selected core rules,
again suggests that the proxy ground truth rule sets are a poor representation
of their respective scenarios.
There is a final observation regarding the qualitative nature of the sys-
tem’s output that contributes to the argument about the proxy ground truth.
This observation is of a more speculative nature, but is still worth expressing.
In the not-insubstantial inspections made of the output during the qualita-
tive analysis, no rules were found with the zero-noise outputs that were not
explainable in the context of the scenario the rule set came from. However,
it has to be again emphasised that as with the rest of this section, no sys-
tematic qualitative review of the results could ever have been conducted and
so this observation could well be wrong. This being said, even if there are
some anomalous rules, they cannot be wide-spread as if that were the case,
the inspections conducted would have detected them.
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6.4 Noise Robustness
Of the results presented, the noise robustness results are the most in line with
expectations. While the system and the models are influenced by noise, they
show considerable robustness. For most models the difference between 5%
noise and 30% noise is typically less than 10% for each measure considered.
As described in section 5.4, the measurement of noise robustness is entirely
independent of the comparison against the ground truth. In addition, as
described in section 6.2, it is probable that it is the proxy ground truth that
is the cause of the results that were against expectations, rather than the
design of the system. The implication of both of these facts combined is that
the significance of the noise robustness results is not diminished by the proxy
ground truth results that were not in line with expectations.
The results are in line with expectations over both level one and level two
result sets. This can be explained by the fact that with the noise robustness
figures, the comparison is against the output of the noise-free version of the
same input data. By comparing the results with other actual output from the
system, there is no possibility of bias within that comparison data. As both
the level one and level two data is in line with expectations, the plots presented
in this section use the data for every level of the event type hierarchy, rather
than just the first level.
All three of the non-noise input parameters – video duration, model se-
lection and scenario complexity – show a comparable level of influence on the
system’s noise robustness. As the focus for the testing is on the comparison
between the models, the effect due to video duration is not displayed in the
plots presented; this is because to do so would double the number of plots (one
for each measure) but convey little extra information beyond this discussion.
The model selection and scenario complexity are represented within the plots
however. The values presented in the plots represent the mean noise response
over the set of all video duration values.
In each presented plot, there is a recurring and very noticeable result for
the colliding scenario. This is the very sudden drop between 0% noise and 5%
noise followed by no further response to noise (i.e. the plots for each model
roughly remain horizontal – showing little to no influence by the amount of
noise). This sudden spike over every plot has a common explanation. In the
collision scenario, the objects are not allowed to overlap, as this would go
against the point of the scenario. However, when even a little noise is added
to the position of an object, there is suddenly scope for overlap states to occur.
This in turn introduces an extra set of atomic events which were not a part
of the noise-free dataset. This introduction of extra atomic events will in
turn create composite events that were not part of the dataset, and so rapidly
reducing each robustness measure employed for even low noise levels. To some
extent, the throwing scenario also exhibits a faster-than-typical drop in each
measure between 0% and 5%, indicating the possibility that an analogous
process is happening with that scenario too.
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The two Fixed Increment models seem to be some of the most robust to
noise with every measure. This may be because those two models had the
largest absolute number of rules in the comparison set. This means that any
rules that in other models get added through noise are already present in the
zero-noise rule set – reducing the potential for there to be a difference in the
rule set due to noise. This effect is likely to account for the vast majority of the
initial differences between the models, as for the most part those models that
produce the fewest rules in their zero-noise rule set are those that have the
lowest robustness to increasing levels of noise. Because of this, discussing the
absolute value comparison between each model is to some extent meaningless.
Instead, the relative change between the models shall be discussed.
The precision of each model’s noise response is shown in figure 6.9. After
initial reductions are taken into account, the precision data for most models
shows only a very slow reduction as the noise is increased. The Count Only
model shows the most resilience in retaining precision as the noise increases
once each scenario is taken into account – remarkably, for the rotation scenario,
the Count Only model shows no average reduction at all. This appears to be
an effect of the use of the mean value, as there are some values that do show
an effect due to noise, but the majority of the values do not show any or very
little effect of noise. The two Acquire-Extinguish models and the Temporal
group of models each produce a similar absolute and relative change in noise
levels, with these models only being beaten in the lack of relative decline
by the Count Only model. Showing very similar relative results but with a
higher absolute value, are the two Fixed Increment models, with the higher
absolute value attributable to the effect discussed in the previous paragraph.
The models most affected by noise in both an absolute and relative manner
are the Inhibition and Pre-Exposure models, but even these models, for two
of the scenarios, give a reasonable absolute result.
The recall for the noise response for each result is shown in figure 6.10.
Again, in general, once the initial reductions have been taken into account,
the noise robustness for the majority of the models is reasonably in line with
expectations. The most noticeable observation of the recall result set is the
very poor relative performance of the Count Only model. This result mirrors
the very good performance of the precision data, in a similar way to the
mirroring that occurred in the proxy ground truth comparison data. This
mirroring can also be seen in the better relative performance of the Inhibition
and Pre-Exposure models, which now are as good as the Temporal group of
models and show the best relative robustness to noise. The Inhibition and
Pre-Exposure models do still have a lower absolute value, but this can be
accounted for by the low number of rules produced. Again, the two Fixed
Increment models show little decline due to the large starting size of their
input.
The results for the F1 measure and the MCC are plotted on figures 6.11
and 6.12 respectively. The most prominent observation between the two mea-
- 190 -
sures is that they have both produced results that are even more similar than
for the proxy ground truth – the largest relative divergence in value between
the two plots is so small that it cannot be seen on the plots, even when the
plots are overlaid on top of one another. There is some absolute difference,
which can be observed in the slightly different scale used on the y axis for the
two measures, with marginally better results being given by the MCC.
With all the measures of noise robustness presented in this section, it is
the rate of decline in performance as the noise increases that is a better mea-
sure of how resilient a model is to noise more than the absolute performance.
This is because a low rate of decline indicates ability for a model to maintain
consistency, which is the desirable attribute for resilience to noise. Because
a steep rate of decline indicates a lower robustness to noise, the Count Only
model shows by a large margin the least robustness to noise for the F1 and
MCC measures.
The greatest relative robustness is demonstrated by the Temporal group
of models, presumably because of consistently good relative noise robustness.
In the same manner, due to consistency and the effects previously described,
the two Fixed Increment models are the second best for relative robustness
and best for absolute robustness. The results for the Inhibition and Pre-
Exposure models have in general the worst absolute robustness and the second
worst relative robustness. It is worth noting though that for the throwing and
rotating scenarios, even the Inhibition and Pre-Exposure models have overall
proven relatively robust, with the exception of the Count Only model.
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Figure 6.9: A plot comparing the level of noise in the input with the output’s
precision value. The sub-figures each show one of the learning scenarios. Each
line corresponds to one model. Each value shown is the mean value for the
output for every video duration value.
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Figure 6.10: A plot comparing the level of noise in the input with the
output’s recall value. The sub-figures each show one of the learning scenarios.
Each line corresponds to one model. Each value shown is the mean value for
the output for every video duration value.
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Figure 6.11: A plot comparing the level of noise in the input with the
output’s F1 measure. The sub-figures each show one of the learning scenarios.
Each line corresponds to one model. Each value shown is the mean value for
the output for every video duration value.
- 194 -
(a) Throwing
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Noise (%)
M
C
C
V
al
u
e
(b) Rotating
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Noise (%)
M
C
C
V
al
u
e
(c) Colliding
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Noise (%)
M
C
C
V
al
u
e
Model
Fixed Increment
Symmetrical Fixed Increment
Count Only
Absolute Acquire-Extinguish
Iterative Acquire-Extinguish
Temporal
Reacquiring
Blocking
Inhibition
Pre-Exposure
Figure 6.12: A plot comparing the level of noise in the input with the
output’s Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC). The sub-figures each show
one of the learning scenarios. Each line corresponds to one model. Each value
shown is the mean value for the output for every video duration value.
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6.5 Computational Performance
The processing time performance was measured for each separate input, based
on the number of rules the system outputs after processing and the time taken
to do so, as described in chapter five. Unsurprisingly, it appears that the main
factor determining the mean frames processed per second is the number of
compound event types, as measured by the number of rules the system outputs.
This is unsurprising because each rule needs to be checked to see if it has been
matched once per frame. A scatter plot comparing the two variables for every
output instance at every noise level of each of the three scenarios is shown in
figure 6.13. The figure shows an inverse correlation between the mean frames
per second and the number of rules, which reduces rapidly before tailing off
asymptotically towards zero. The gap of results and subsequent increase in
the frame rate between counts of 200 and 600 rules in sub-figure b is believed
to be due to the fact that the distribution of the video duration times is not
linear, and that this is reflected in the observed gaps.
In turn, the main factor determining the number of rules produced is the
video duration. As the video duration increases, the number of rules also
increases; in general this association follows a pattern of rapidly increasing
for smaller video durations but slowing for longer durations. This pattern is
shown in figure 6.14, which demonstrates how the number of rules produced
responds to differing durations for video. The pattern of rapid growth followed
by slower growth mirrors the drop in frame rate shown in figure 6.13. As it
is the main factor determining the number of rules, the length of the video in
turn is indirectly but strongly related to the mean frame rate. This indirect
association is shown in figure 6.15. It is unsurprising that a longer video
duration produces a larger number of rules, as a longer video duration gives
greater opportunity for all rules to reach the significance threshold.
There are other factors that influence the number of rules created. Com-
paring between the sub-figures of figure 6.14, it can be seen that the number
of rules is also related to the scenario being learned. This can be seen in the
different scales of each plot that more rules are created as the complexity of
the scenario increases. In these scenarios the complexity can be seen in the
number of objects in the scene and the variability of the motion being learned.
The model being employed also affects the number of rules that are cre-
ated, as can be seen in figure 6.16. The Fixed Increment model shows the
highest number of rules, which is to be expected given that the model does
not implement any way in which a significance measure can be reduced, mean-
ing that any event type pair will become a rule no matter how uncorrelated if
through happenstance it appears enough times.
The Symmetrical Fixed Increment model, which introduces a rule removal
mechanism, has results that vary between no removals in the number of rules
to a near complete removal. This variation can be explained by the complexity
of the scenario – in a complex scenario where there is more variation in the
movement and so a greater freedom for pairings to occur due to happenstance.
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The Count Only model has some of the lowest rule counts, which can be
explained to be due to the need for both congruity and full contingency, a
requirement also shown in the Pre-Exposure model, which is comparable in
magnitude for the numbers of rules produced. The Count Only model has the
interesting artefact that except for the most complex scenario, every result in a
scenario has the same number of rules – this suggests that the model converges
extremely quickly for simple scenarios, and can be explained at least partially
by the fact that a rule can have a significance value above the threshold from
the very first observation of a rule.
There is some variance between the Absolute and Iterative
Acquire-Extinguish models, which was unexpected given their common basis.
Upon investigation it appears that the result is due to the fact that once the
significance value in the Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model has been reduced
through extinction, that quantity cannot be regained. To understand why
the Absolute Acquire-Extinguish model cannot regain any loss in the signifi-
cance value, the significance value update function for the Absolute Acquire-
Extinguish model is repeated in equation 6.25.
Vn =
1
1 + e−k1ǫ+
− k2ǫ
− (6.25)
With the absolute equation, the positive and negative evidence counts
(ǫ+ and ǫ− respectively) are counted separately. Consider the case where an
event type has reached the plateaux of the sigmoid curve for the positive ev-
idence (the first term in equation 6.25). If some negative evidence for the
event type is then received, the linear subtraction of the second term would
reduce the significance value as expected. However, this subtraction cannot
be reversed by further positive evidence as the first term has already reached
its plateaux. The same is not true for the iterative function as there is a
singular internal state that both positive and negative evidence contributes
to, rather than the two separate internal states of the Absolute Acquire-
Extinguish model.
The most counter-intuitive result is that for two of the scenarios, the in-
crease in the number of results in the Temporal model from the Iterative
Acquire-Extinguish model. The Temporal model expands on the Iterative
Acquire-Extinguish model by adding a curve that modifies the gain in signifi-
cance value from positive evidence to account for the timing effects. Crucially,
that curve always acts to reduce the gain in significance value from a piece of
positive evidence. It would thus be logical to assume that this would cause
a reduction in the final rule count. This is because it would take more event
instances to get an event type past the upper significance threshold and so
fewer event types can be expected to reach the upper significance threshold
within the duration of the input. Instead, as shown in figure 6.16, for the
throwing and colliding scenarios, the rule count quadruples in some cases. An
explanation for this result has not yet been found.
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The fact that the Reacquiring and Blocking models have nearly the same
results as the Temporal model is more explainable, however. The similar
results between the Temporal and Reacquiring models can be accounted for
by the weak effect of reacquisition. This is because the reacquisition effect
is both subtle and for it to be truly visible, requires that associations are
extinguished and reacquired many times. The fact that the results between
the Reacquiring and Blocking models are almost identical on every input can
be explained to be due to the fact that none of the scenarios selected have any
sequences that would cause the blocking phenomenon to be largely applicable.
These two effects can be observed throughout all the results, with either no or
a small change in results between Temporal and Reacquiring model and then
no change in results between the Reacquiring model and the Blocking model.
The reduction in the number of results for the models that include condi-
tioned inhibition is consistent with conditioned inhibition being a phenomenon
that acts to reduce gains in significance value. Less consistent however is the
slight gain in the number of rules as the pre-exposure mechanism is introduced
– the mechanism is again one that should act to reduce the gain in association
strength, as with the gains in the Temporal model, this has no obvious expla-
nation based on the function of the model, but unlike the Temporal model,
the gains are slight enough that it could be down to chance.
Figure 6.17 shows a plot of the frames per second for each of the models.
This mostly follows a rough inverse of the corresponding rule counts, although
there are a couple of results that do not follow this pattern. The first notable
result is that the Inhibition model appears to out-pace the other models for
every video duration value, some by a very large margin. This can be explained
to be due to the non-linear gains in frame rate for reductions in the number
of rules produced. A second notable result is that this plot is one place where
the results for the Blocking model do differ from the Reacquiring model. The
explanation for this is that the Blocking model still has to check for blocking
event instances, even if there are none present. The final notable result is
that the Count Only model, despite producing rule counts that are a similar
order of magnitude as the Inhibition and Pre-Exposure models, does not have
similar frame rates. This is because each time a piece of positive or negative
evidence is observed, it requires three look-ups of event types to access the
counts for each: the composite type and the two component types. This is not
the case for the Inhibition model which only needs the composite type record,
however it is again the case for the Pre-Exposure model, which could account
the large drop in frame rate.
The final potential influencing factor in the number of rules produced and
therefore the frame rate of processing, the level of noise, has very little effect on
either. Figure 6.18 shows the effect of noise on the number of rules produced
and figure 6.19 shows the effect of noise on the frame rate. The vast majority
of the plots are broadly flat, indicating only a little influence. This is a good
indication of the system’s overall noise handling capabilities. As always, there
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are some exceptions. The largest influence on whether noise plays a role in the
number of rules and frame rate appears to be the complexity of the scenario.
This is exemplified in the colliding scenario, where the colliding scenario plots
are the most chaotic for both measures. It appears that the frame rate of
the Inhibition model is the most affected by noise, but it could be argued
that this is because it is a larger absolute value, so any relative effect the
noise has would be amplified by the larger absolute value. The Temporal /
Reacquiring / Blocking group of models appear to be influenced by noise, this
time made manifest more in the number of rules produced than the frame rate.
The general down-then-up pattern seen in figures 6.18a and 6.18c could be
explained through the noise causing the timing of different overlap transition
event instances to change, thus reducing the speed at which rules reach the
upper significance threshold. At some point, the increase in noise starts adding
many more transition event instances, which become recorded as rules, thus
increasing the number of rules again. The final point worth noting is the
sudden large increase in frame rate for the largest level of noise in figure 6.19c.
The best explanation found for this result is that as the motion of the balls
and the noise is randomly generated, the particular input video instance used
for input for those data points included noise and motion that meant that the
noise had less effect on the atomic events generated than would be so for the
average case.
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Figure 6.13: A scatter plot comparing the number of rules produced with
the mean frame rate for each input provided to the system. The sub-figures
each show one of the learning scenarios. All models, durations and noise levels
are included.
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Figure 6.14: A plot comparing the duration of the input video with the
number of rules produced. The sub-figures each show one of the learning
scenarios. Each line corresponds to one model. Only those runs where the
noise level was zero are shown.
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Figure 6.15: A plot comparing the duration of the input video with the mean
frame rate. The sub-figures each show one of the learning scenarios. Each line
corresponds to one model. Only those runs where the noise level was zero are
shown.
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Figure 6.16: A plot comparing the model employed with number of rules
produced. The sub-figures each show one of the learning scenarios. Each line
corresponds to one value of video duration. Only those runs where the noise
level was zero are shown.
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Figure 6.17: A plot comparing the model employed with the mean frame
rate. The sub-figures each show one of the learning scenarios. Each line
corresponds to one value of video duration. Only those runs where the noise
level was zero are shown.
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Figure 6.18: A plot comparing the level of noise in the input video with
the number of rules produced. The sub-figures each show one of the learning
scenarios. Each line corresponds to one model. Only those runs where the
video duration is 30 minutes are shown – this level was chosen as it gives the
maximum amount of time for the rules to stabilise.
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Figure 6.19: A plot comparing the level of noise in the input video with
the mean frame rate. The sub-figures each show one of the learning scenarios.
Each line corresponds to one model. Only those runs where the video duration
is 30 minutes are shown.
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6.6 Chapter Conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the results presented are a
mix of both results that are and are not in line with expectations. The result
least in line with expectations is that the concept of the event type hierarchy as
described in this thesis has been shown to have major problems, both with the
combinatorial explosion discovered and the poor proxy ground truth results
for the second-level rules. The results most in line with expectations can be
found in how robust the system and the models are to the introduction of noise
to the input data. In addition the results found for the first-level comparison
with the proxy ground truth are somewhat in line with expectations.
In terms of an overall comparison between the models, different models
have different strengths. Some models rank well quantitatively, some quali-
tatively, some are more robust to noise and some are more computationally
efficient. This means that producing an overall performance measure to com-
pare the models depends on the importance of each measure. Also, it is not
wholly clear-cut how to rank each model within a measure. In order to produce
an overall list of how the models compare, a ranking for each individual mea-
sure is given with a description for how that ranking was arrived at. These
rankings are then combined into a single overall ranking. One of the ways
the hypotheses are tested is by seeing if those significance models that imple-
ment a greater number of phenomena are also the better all-round models in
producing knowledge of a scenario.
The model ranking of proxy ground truth comparison is given in Table 6.2.
These rankings are based on the first-level MCC values, shown in figure 6.8.
The reason for using this as the basis is that the MCC is considered by this
thesis to be a more robust measure of the match between two than the F1
measure. The ranking considered the mean value for each model, weighted
in favour of longer durations the standard deviation was also taken into ac-
count. Models were considered tied if the differences in these measures were
considered to be negligible.
Rank Model
1 Absolute Acquire-Extinguish
2 Iterative Acquire-Extinguish
3 Pre-Exposure
Joint 4
Fixed Increment
Symmetrical Fixed Increment
Joint 6
Temporal
Reacquiring
Blocking
9 Inhibition
10 Count Only
Table 6.2: The significance model rankings for the results of the proxy ground
truth comparison.
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Table 6.3 shows the ranking for the qualitative comparison. This was the
most straightforward and objective to calculate of all four performance mea-
sures. The significance models are ranked by the number of matches against
the selected key rules that a model had in table 6.1.
Rank Model
Joint 1
Temporal
Reacquiring
Blocking
4 Fixed Increment
5 Absolute Acquire-Extinguish
Joint 6
Iterative Acquire-Extinguish
Symmetrical Fixed Increment
8 Count Only
9 Pre-Exposure
10 Inhibition
Table 6.3: The significance model rankings for the results of the qualitative
comparison.
The ranking for the noise robustness comparison is shown in table 6.4. As
with the proxy ground truth comparison, the MCC value shown in figure 6.12
was used for the performance metric. Unlike the proxy ground truth compar-
ison, the mean and standard deviation of each model was not used. Instead
the mean gradient was used to rank the significance models. The reason for
this difference is that with noise, some degradation of the results is expected,
what matters is how the model responds as the noise increases.
Rank Model
Joint 1
Temporal
Reacquiring
Blocking
Joint 4
Fixed Increment
Symmetrical Fixed Increment
6 Absolute Acquire-Extinguish
7 Iterative Acquire-Extinguish
Joint 8
Pre-Exposure
Inhibition
10 Count Only
Table 6.4: The significance model rankings for the results of the noise ro-
bustness comparison.
For the ranking of the computational efficiency comparison, the mean
frames per second, as shown in figure 6.17, was chosen to be the compari-
son metric. As with the proxy ground truth comparison, an input-duration
weighted mean and the standard deviation were used to compare the signifi-
cance models.
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Rank Model
1 Inhibition
2 Pre-Exposure
3 Symmetrical Fixed Increment
4 Fixed Increment
5 Iterative Acquire-Extinguish
6 Absolute Acquire-Extinguish
Joint 7
Temporal
Reacquiring
9 Blocking
10 Count Only
Table 6.5: The significance model rankings for the results of the computa-
tional efficiency comparison.
The final ranking is based on an award of points for each ranking: ten
points for being ranked first, nine for being ranked second and so on with one
point for being ranked tenth. The points for each were then added, with double
weight for the proxy ground truth comparison and the qualitative comparison.
The models were ranked in order of how many points were scored over all the
other rankings. The overall ranking of the significance models is shown in
table 6.6.
Rank Model
Joint 1
Temporal
Reacquiring
Joint 3
Blocking
Absolute Acquire-Extinguish
Fixed Increment
6 Symmetrical Fixed Increment
7 Iterative Acquire-Extinguish
8 Pre-Exposure
9 Inhibition
10 Count Only
Table 6.6: The overall ranking of the significance models.
In the next and final chapter, chapter seven, the thesis is concluded starting
with a discussion of the implications of these results in terms of the hypotheses
proposed in chapter one.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This chapter has three sections, each concluding an aspect of this thesis. The
first section looks at the hypotheses presented in chapter one and, incorpo-
rating the results and discussion presented in chapter six, discusses whether
each of the two hypotheses should be allowed to stand, or be declared to have
been falsified. The second section then states the claims of a contribution to
knowledge made by this thesis, which are then discussed in turn, looking at
whether the claims are supported. The final section of the chapter then looks
to what further work could be done using this thesis as a starting point.
7.1 Hypotheses
To recap, the two hypotheses that this thesis proposed in chapter one are
re-stated below. This section reviews each of these hypotheses in turn.
Hypothesis A: The phenomena of classical conditioning can be used as a
mechanism-independent specification for a system that allows an agent
to learn a commonsense knowledge model of its environment.
Hypothesis B: An agent using the phenomena of classical conditioning that
passively observes a dynamic environment will still be able to learn a
partial commonsense knowledge model of that environment.
7.1.1 Hypothesis A
There was a presumption that as the fidelity of the model of classical condition-
ing increased, so would the fidelity of the model of the environment learned.
This was based on the concept that if the model of classical conditioning in-
creased in fidelity, then there would be a greater constraint on the sort of
rules allowed, thus the rules that still passed each of the constraints would be
a better match to the optimum model for the environment presented. If this
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presumption had held, it would have confirmed the hypothesis by showing a
positive correlation between the fidelity of the model of classical conditioning
and how well that model fared in the various measures used.
This presumption has not held true in the results. However, the results that
have falsified the presumption have not completely falsified the hypothesis.
There are two reasons why this is so. Firstly there were observed to be failings
in the proxy ground truth that the results were tested against. Due to the
method employed to create the proxy ground truth, each proxy ground truth
included a very large number of rules. This meant it was biased against those
results that produced fewer high quality rules by producing a very high number
of false negatives – and so a low recall was obtained. This in turn meant
that, if each of the higher fidelity models of classical conditioning restricted
the number of rules, its recall would decrease regardless of how much the
precision increased. As the recall results were much worse for every output,
this biased the results of any measure that aimed to find a balance between
the false positives and the false negatives. The initial presumption implied
that an increase in the fidelity of the model would be due to an increase in
precision with a more fixed recall. The precision results tentatively show that
rise as the classical conditioning model fidelity increased.
The second and most important reason why the presumption failed but
not necessarily the hypothesis is that the results provided tentative evidence
in favour of the hypothesis. This evidence showed itself in a way other than
the presumed correlation between fidelity of the model of classical conditioning
and fidelity of the environmental model. This demonstrated by to two pieces
of evidence. The first piece of evidence is that the three models not based upon
classical conditioning, in general, did worse than the models that were based
on classical conditioning. The second piece of evidence is that the general
results for the system, regardless of which classical conditioning model was
employed, produced some results that could be regarded as being in line with
expectations. Many of the ideas of classical conditioning were used throughout
the system – for example the associative behaviour conducted by the associa-
tion module and the window system being based on the inter-stimulus interval.
Because many of the ideas of classical conditioning are found throughout the
system and not just in the models of classical conditioning, there can be seen
to be evidence in favour of classical conditioning. As this evidence ignores the
individual results of each model of classical conditioning, the presumption can
fail without the hypothesis failing.
These two reasons as to why the presumption can fail but not the hypoth-
esis do not lead to the conclusion that the hypothesis is deemed to be true
however; while the results do include some evidence in favour of the hypoth-
esis, this is not clear-cut enough to declare the hypothesis as standing nor to
declare the hypothesis being falsified. Some of the suggestions for future work,
discussed later on in this chapter, focus on improving the failings found within
both the system and the manner in which the system was evaluated.
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7.1.2 Hypothesis B
This hypothesis has held better than the first hypothesis. The evidence in
favour of this hypothesis, as with some of the evidence in favour of the first
hypothesis can be found in the fact that a system could be built in the first
instance. The system itself passively observes an environment (in the case
tested, various real-world physical effects) and learns a model of commonsense
knowledge regarding the observations made.
While the system does show that a passive system is able to learn some
information about its environment using conditioning, as with hypothesis A,
the results have removed some of the clarity from the evidence in favour of
this hypothesis. This clarity has been reduced in two ways. The first way is
the result regarding the event type hierarchy. In building an event type hier-
archy it was assumed that the event types would be organised as a collection
of pyramids, where the top of the pyramid represented a maximal sequence of
event types that cannot be added to due to the unpredictability of the con-
necting further event types. Each top-level event type would therefore be a
complete frequently observed episode. An episode would be, in the case of
the learning scenarios “throwing an object in the air”, “one complete rotation
of the objects” or “a collision between two balls”. For a more intuitive case,
if the system was observing someone doing household chores, the top-level
event types would be episodes of regular sequences of activities that follow
one another – for example “clean the carpet” and “a trip to the local shop”.
In addition a “clean the carpet followed by a trip to the local shop” high-
level episode would not appear because of a low correlation between the two
episodes occurring (unless the observed person has a very fixed routine for
chores).
Because of the discovered incompatibility between an event type hierarchy
and multi-frame event types leading to a cap on the number of levels in the
hierarchy, the top level event types never form, except for extremely low peaks.
This means that the fidelity of the learned model of the environment in general
is severely curtailed as it is these top-level event types that completely repre-
sent the target concepts as an episode. The consequence for the hypothesis is
that, while a partial model is still achieved with the level count cap in place,
it is a much “more partial” model than was ever intended, and the learning
scenarios were specifically chosen so that the system could potentially learn
what could be regarded as a full model of the environment presented.
The second way where the results have removed some of the clarity in being
able to state that the hypothesis stands are the results produced when com-
paring against the proxy ground truth. While the level one results were in line
with expectations, they could have been better, and the overall results were
less in line with expectations, though some of this can be attributed to the
issues with the event type hierarchy. The failings in each of the proxy ground
truth rule sets to completely and precisely depict their corresponding scenarios
led to a potential reduction in how well the output of the system compared
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with the proxy ground truth. As demonstrated in the results section, some of
the rules output by the system that were not in the proxy ground truth could
be interpreted as being identifiably true statements about their corresponding
input scenario. This clouds the ability to state that the hypothesis stands be-
cause the results that were obtained indicate that in a wider sense, the system
produces a commonsense model that is even “more partial” than was implied
by the hypothesis and was discussed in chapter one. This is especially true
considering that the scenarios were chosen to allow for a complete model to be
potentially created by the system. The results being biased by an inaccurate
proxy ground truth may have reduced the overall results for the system. Had
the results that were obtained been better that they were, it could have been
stated with more confidence that the hypothesis stands.
As was implied earlier, these two factors leading to a lower confidence
in stating that the hypothesis stands are weaker than those same factors,
weakening the conclusion for hypothesis A. The fact that the system works
to any extent is confirmatory evidence of the hypothesis, however less than
perfect results will always leave the possibility that the hypothesis could still
be falsified.
7.2 Contributions
There are three main contributions of this thesis. These contributions are
stated below and are then each discussed in turn.
1. The thesis has contributed a demonstration that the phenomena of clas-
sical conditioning could be used for an agent to learn a commonsense
model of its environment.
2. The thesis has contributed a demonstration that a system using classical
conditioning is able to passively learn about an observed environment.
3. The thesis has contributed an observation from analysis, which was sub-
sequently demonstrated, that some of the phenomena of classical con-
ditioning can be interpreted to exist in order to deal with the noise of
happenstance that arises when learning associatively.
7.2.1 The First Contribution
In tentatively allowing hypothesis A to stand, for reasons discussed in the
previous section, the thesis has demonstrated the possibility of using the phe-
nomena of classical conditioning to learn a commonsense knowledge model of
its environment. While this has only been shown in the more limited case of
visual event types, there is no requirement for the event types to be visual –
the only place within the system where it matters that the event types are of
a visual nature is in the initial recognition of the atomic event types in the
pre-processor module. If the pre-processor was changed for a different source
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of atomic event types, there would be no changes needed within the remainder
of the system. One of the pieces of future work looks at the possibility of using
other sources and multiple sources of atomic event types.
The commonsense knowledge of the system is also very much incomplete
compared to that knowledge expressed in human-made commonsense knowl-
edge bases. For instance, a commonsense knowledge theory of gravity would
also include, for example, the concept of objects supporting other objects.
The knowledge learned by the system is much more limited in that example
to “a ball moving up will move down”. It is to be expected that the knowl-
edge learned from a nascent system will be much more limited than can be
achieved by a human explicitly encoding knowledge into a knowledge base.
Human learning has access to a great many sources of event instances and
information ranging from the base senses to higher sources of knowledge such
as conversation and reading. This thesis represents a start on the path to de-
veloping a system capable of explicitly and directly learning all commonsense
knowledge.
By learning a form of commonsense knowledge, rather than any form of
value function, the thesis has contributed a distinctly different approach than
that used by other reinforcement learning systems. While TD learning was
created by making use of the same ideas and concepts, because that system
learns a value function, the two systems are distinctly different.
7.2.2 The Second Contribution
The construction of the system was designed in such a manner that any knowl-
edge learned was due to passive observation of the presented environment,
rather than through interaction with the environment. By demonstrating that
a system can be constructed that learns in a conditioning style, it meant that
hypothesis B was allowed to stand. Such a system is a departure from other
conditioning-based systems – reinforcement learning systems – which learn a
value function for the actions performed.
It is not claimed that it is possible for all knowledge regarding an envi-
ronment can be obtained through passive observation alone. As was discussed
in chapter one, there are two occasions where action is required to allow for
learning to occur. The first occasion is where observable environmental states
are only reachable through action of the agent. This first occasion could be
due to the environment state only changing as a consequence of agent action.
Another possibility for this first occasion could be due to the fact that the
agent is the only actor in the environment able to perform a particular action,
and performance of that action is a prerequisite for the environment to en-
ter a particular state or sub-set of states. The second occasion where action
is required is where particular states of the environment require the agent to
change its perspective to observe a particular aspect of an environmental state
– for example the system will not learn from a person throwing a ball in the
air if the camera is pointed in the wrong direction.
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7.2.3 The Third Contribution
This thesis did not set out to make any commentary on the ideas, concepts
and phenomena of classical conditioning itself, merely intending to make use of
those ideas within a new artificial intelligence system. However, in the course
of developing the thesis, it became apparent that a possible reason why some
of the phenomena exist is to minimise the effect on learning that is due to the
noise of happenstance.
The analysis of classical conditioning presented in chapter two of this thesis
was written to explain why classical conditioning could be used to learn com-
monsense knowledge. From this analysis, it arose that, of the derived criteria
for a passive learning system, the criterion for a passive system to have to deal
with noise was by far the most common criterion for the phenomena reviewed
to contribute towards. Of the twenty-eight phenomena reviewed, ten were
argued to contribute towards minimising the effect of noise, with the mean
number of phenomena contributing to a criterion being 3.6 and the second
most commonly contributed towards criterion having six phenomena.
When the system was being built, several of the phenomena that were
argued to contribute towards noise minimisation were included within both
the models produced and some also inspired the design of the overall system.
When the system was being tested, the noise robustness was specifically tested
for. The results of the noise robustness test proved to be reasonably positive.
This allowed for confirmation of the idea that from the perspective of the sys-
tem, some of the phenomena of classical conditioning did contribute towards
how robust the system was to the introduction of noise.
There were some results less in line with expectations for the noise robust-
ness testing. Like the results that provided a level of doubt to the acceptance
of the hypotheses, the results of the tests of the noise robustness less in line
with expectations lend a level of doubt to the idea that the purpose of some of
the phenomena of classical conditioning is to minimise noise. An example of a
result that is less in line with expectations is the performance of the Inhibition
and Pre-Exposure models within the system. Both models of classical condi-
tioning introduced phenomena that were argued in the analysis to contribute
to noise reduction. However, as discussed in the results chapter, even these
results are reasonable overall.
In all the classical conditioning literature reviewed, not once was there any
mention of the concept of noise or any other analogous concept. This does
not necessarily mean that the concept is new within the context of classical
conditioning; there are four possible interpretations for the absence of the con-
cept. The first possibility is that the concept has appeared within parts of the
literature that were not reviewed in the development of this thesis. However,
given the relative importance of the concept within artificial intelligence, it
would have been thought that some reference would have been made, at least
in the literature surrounding models of classical conditioning.
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The second possibility is that the contribution is obvious to researchers
within the field of classical conditioning. This again is not a satisfactory ex-
planation because if it were so obvious, then again it would have been thought
that the concept or an analogous concept would have appeared at the very
least as a side remark in the literature, given that the concept and its analogues
can explain the animal behaviours observed.
The third possibility is that the concept was experimentally falsified as
playing a role in classical conditioning – for example, by using subjects with
brain lesions that don’t exhibit a particular phenomenon still showing re-
silience to learning the noise). Other theories and concepts of classical condi-
tioning have been falsified, such as the stimulus-substitution model advanced
by Pavlov (1927) and the criticisms of the SOP model (Wagner & Brandon,
1989). But these issues were documented and discussed, including in text-
books of classical conditioning (Anderson, 2000; Klein, 1996). As there has
been no reference, even to that of falsification, it again is not a satisfactory
explanation.
The final possibility is that the concept of the noise of happenstance plays a
significant part in determining the mechanism of classical conditioning. From
the perspective of this thesis and the literature review of classical conditioning
conducted, nothing has been found that contradicts this claim. However, given
that this thesis never intended to make a contribution to the field of classical
conditioning, there is doubt due to the unknown-unknowns that would be less
valid in a similar contribution to artificial intelligence.
7.3 Future Work
Throughout the development of this thesis, a number of ideas for future work
have become apparent. These ideas are presented below. Some of the ideas
are direct and concrete plans for improvement of the system, some of the ideas
are more nebulous and tangential. The order of the ideas presented roughly
follows a progression from concrete to nebulous.
7.3.1 Revising the Hierarchical Event Type System
The issue that caused the hierarchical event type system to fail was a discov-
ered incompatibility between event instances that occur over multiple frames
and the use of hierarchical event types. However, the learning between indi-
vidual pairs of atomic event types has provided reasonable results. There are
currently two potential approaches that would allow for the build-up of more
complex event types that would not suffer the same problem.
The first approach is that, instead of pairing event instances of equal level,
the system should pair each atomic event instance with every confirmed com-
posite event instance. This effectively means that the system learns whether
an atomic event type should be appended on to a linear composite event type.
The advantage is that only the maximal patterns would be stored. The chal-
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lenge to the design would be that allowing re-use between composite event
types would be difficult. Another challenge to be overcome would be the ques-
tion of how to represent and learn the expected overlap-and-gap structure of
the event types. This approach would be similar to that taken by Ivanov &
Bobick (2000).
The second approach is to extend the event type system to use arbitrary
sized groupings, rather than just pairs of event types. This means that where
three or more event instances regularly mutually overlap, only a single rule
would be created, stopping the infinite tower of event type levels that such
a relationship creates within the current system. One possible approach to
achieving a method of allowing the learning of arbitrary size groups is in-
spired by Grossberg & Schmajuk (1989) which can be interpreted to suggest
that there should be separate processes to learn serial compound relation-
ships and parallel compound relationships – this differentiation is described
in section 7.3.2. Another possible approach, which could feed-into the first
approach is to identify complete sub-graphs of an overlaps relation, where in
the graph event instances are nodes and overlapping event type nodes have
an edge. This second approach bears some similarity to ideas advanced by
Sridhar, Cohn and Hogg (2008).
These two approaches could be augmented by another concept, which was
also is inspired by Grossberg & Schmajuk (1989), who demonstrated in their
model of classical conditioning an ability to learn not just predictions of an
incoming unconditioned stimulus but also the timing of the stimulus. A sim-
ilar approach of learning timings could be used in conjunction with either
approach, where it would contribute to both of the previous approaches by
allowing a method to represent and learn the overlap and gap structure of the
composite event types.
7.3.2 Separate Processes for Parallel Compounds and Serial
Compounds
Another possible augmentation of the system is again inspired by Grossberg
& Schmajuk (1989). In the model presented in the aforementioned paper, it
was demonstrated that the inter-stimulus interval curve can be constructed
from a sigmoidal decay curve multiplied by a sigmoidal growth curve. This
suggests that the inter-stimulus curve could be the product of competition
between two separate processes. One possible competition could be between
one process that attempts to “claim” event instances as being facets of the
same event instance due to there being little or no time difference between
the two and one process that attempts to “claim” event instances as being
serial conjunctions where the first event instance is predictive of the second.
With the inter-stimulus interval curve, there would be little need to learn to
react to stimuli that are facets of the unconditioned stimulus, as they are
not predictive; the curve is then a result of a compromise between the two
processes.
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Implementing this competition between processes would allow for the sys-
tem to reduce the number of prediction rules created. Predictions could also
become more accurate as when only one of two normally parallel compound
event types is observed, the level of confidence in a prediction could be repre-
sented as being lower. This means that the impact of the resultant extinction
could also be reduced, should the prediction be false. This system will have
a bearing on how configural cues are implemented, as the process competing
for “claiming” two event instances are facets of the same event instance could
be the same system that decides how parallel compound stimuli are treated in
terms of prediction.
7.3.3 The System as a Classifier
The focus of this thesis was to create a system that passively learned a model of
its observed environment. This focus meant that the evaluation of the system
looked at how accurate the environmental model it created matched that of
a human conception of that environment. A different perspective is that this
output of the different environmental models the system creates will contain
event patterns that are unique to each scenario the system is presented with.
Therefore, by comparing the list of environmental models of known scenarios,
the system may be able to classify unknown scenarios.
By using the environmental models as essentially feature vectors, the sys-
tem may be able to be used as a supervised machine learning system. This
would allow the system to be evaluated in a more conventional manner and
so be directly compared against existing machine learning systems.
The system in its current state would not be able to do this, as there would
need to be an extension that creates a database of environmental models and a
comparison system that allows comparison between two given environmental
models, with some similarity metric. Given the potential size of each envi-
ronmental model, it may be non-trivial to find an efficient system to do this.
One potential way to extend the system to create easily comparable environ-
mental models is to restrict each environmental model to only those rules that
are unique to each classification, which would limit their size and so speed-up
classification.
7.3.4 Generalisation and Discrimination
The implementation of these two phenomena is discussed separately from the
discussion of implementing the other phenomena of classical conditioning due
to their higher importance. When deciding which phenomena would be imple-
mented, these two phenomena were the borderline cases. They were eventually
not included due to having limited time and the amount of implementation
time the two phenomena would need, meant that they had to be left out.
The reason for the amount of time needed is that these two phenomena
require that learned objects are no longer atomic symbols, but instead will have
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to be comprised of a composite of other lower-level data. In generalisation and
discrimination, there needs to be a measure of how similar any two objects are
so that a decision to whether to generalise an association to another object
can be made.
There is a nascent idea for a possible generalisation and discrimination sys-
tem that would fit with the system described in the thesis. For these systems,
event types are conditioned as before, but patterns of event types are allowed
to apply to more than one type of object, based on the generalisation and
discrimination system selected. The nascent generalisation system is in part
based on a system proposed by Alonso, Mondrago´n & Kja¨ll-Ohlsson (2006).
Each object comprises of a feature vector. When two event types are paired
together, a Gaussian curve around each value of the feature vector is grown.
When a prediction of a compound event type occurring is being made, pre-
dictions are based on the event type and the similarity of the object to the
feature vector of each rule, based on the Gaussian curves. Discrimination can
be implemented in this manner by changing the Gaussian curve to that of a
Gaussian Mixture Model – a technique that has shown success within com-
puter vision (Stauffer & Grimson, 1999). In the Gaussian Mixture Model,
when a negative prediction occurs, a negative Gaussian curve is grown around
the values of the feature vector. This means that in the overall curve for the
Gaussian Mixture Model, any exceptions are less likely to match the prediction
pattern.
Another more nebulous idea for implementing generalisation and discrim-
ination while still retaining object symbols is for the system to independently
learn an ontology of observable objects. When the same compound event type
is observed to occur using different objects, the objects within the compound
event type recognition rule could then be replaced with the common ancestor
within the learned ontology. Discrimination could be implemented as a list
of exceptions to the learned rule; again this exception list could be expanded
on the basis of “the least general generaliser” as with the main object of the
recognition rule. A possible route for creating a system to learn an ontol-
ogy would be to follow the functional object category learning described by
Sridhar, Cohn & Hogg (2008).
7.3.5 Further Phenomena of Classical Conditioning
As more phenomena of classical conditioning are considered, both for inclusion
within the model system, or through other mechanisms added to the wider
system, the design of the system is forced to take into account wider forms
of knowledge that could be learned, and the accuracy with which that knowl-
edge is learned. Inclusion of further phenomena cannot be taken to guarantee
improvement of the results. However, by considering many of the remaining
phenomena of classical conditioning in turn, in a machine learning context,
this can lead to ideas on how the implementations of phenomena that have
previously been implemented could improve.
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While generalisation, discrimination and to a lesser extent configural cues
have been given some consideration on how they might by implemented, this
is not yet true of the other phenomena. Of the remaining phenomena, partial
reinforcement and the partial reinforcement extinction effect would be the next
most important to consider, as implementing those could allow the system to
be expanded to deal with more stochastic event type sequences.
7.3.6 Learnable Pre-Processor Atomic Events
The system as presented will always be limited in scope by the atomic event
types that have been defined. For a more general learning system, these atomic
event types will eventually need to be learned from the input data. While there
will always be a need for primitives of some description, the more basic these
are made, the more general the learning can be.
In appendix A, the atomic event type definitions listed are all based on
changes in the state of the environment between consecutive frames. Instead
of explicitly declaring the separate ways in which a state can change, these
transitions could be learnable. One possible method would be to implement a
similar conditioning method as the system that builds-up sequences in a spatial
domain rather than a temporal domain. A second possible method would be
to simply use the states as the atomic event types, though this method would
require the system in general to learn ordering constraints on the patterns
learned, so that directions can be distinguished where needed.
7.3.7 A Fully Real-Time Version of the System
Currently, the system is only partially real-time, in that the input data is real-
time but the system stores event instances in memory until they are complete,
meaning that the association module and the significance module operate in
a trial-level manner. A fully real-time system would operate throughout in a
real-time manner. The advantage in doing this is two-fold. The first advantage
is that the computational performance of the system would likely be improved,
especially if it could be implemented such that some operations can occur in
parallel. The second advantage would be that the system would increase in
biological plausibility, which means that the system could potentially begin to
give more insight into biological conditioning.
One possible method that could be a part of this effort would be to replace
the moving window with some form of activation trace applied to each rule.
This would be similar to the eligibility trace used throughout the field of
reinforcement learning. Another possible method that should be considered is
that instead of having event instances that occur over intervals, every event
instance is composed of two instances: a single-frame onset event instance
and a single-frame offset event instance. Basing prediction on onsets and
offsets was first suggested by Mowrer (1960) and is used within the temporal
difference model of classical conditioning (Sutton & Barto, 1990).
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There is another possible extension of the system related to moving the
system to be fully-real time: The integration of a real-time tracker directly
in to the system. This would allow for any measure of uncertainty that is
produced by the tracking system to be used, which, when combined with the
predictions of the recognition system, could allow for the accuracy of the track
to be improved.
7.3.8 A Return to Actions and Rewards
The system presented by this thesis can be seen as a system attempting to pre-
dict the consequent event instances given the set of current event instances.
This could easily be extended to include atomic event types that represent
action event types and reward event types. The system would learn the conse-
quences of action event types as if they were any other event type. With more
complex composite event types, reward atomic event types could be included
in the consequent event types of an action atomic event type. This would
mean that every learned composite event type could be given a sum for its
total reward value, based on the reward atomic event types that the composite
event type contains. This would mean that the composite event types that in-
clude an action atomic event type and have a reward atomic event type could
be used for action selection, by selecting an action with a maximal reward.
This would allow the system to also learn to predict the actions it will select
in the future, given the observed external event instances.
In a traditional reinforcement learning system, the state of the environment
gives rise to the actions being selected. This system would not make use of
states in that manner for action selection. Instead, it can be seen that the
system would observe the environment until it could predict a plan of action
that would lead it to a reward. This plan of action would be followed, but as
the narrative of the atomic event instance stream unfolded, the current plan
of action would be corrected based upon new predictions. Should the stream
of event instances indicate a larger reward than the current plan, the plan
would be adapted. This system would also allow for the need to plan timings
of actions so that they have the desired effect based upon the how the dynamic
environment changes. While it would require theoretical work to confirm, it
is conjectured that this style of action selection would mean that the Markov
property would not need to be assumed.
7.3.9 Wider Testing of the System
The system has currently been tested on only three learning scenarios using
one set of atomic event types. There are many ways in which the system can
be tested, both using the same set of atomic event types and using a different
set of atomic event types. The first task would be to repeat several times the
processing for differently generated videos for the same set of experiments,
video durations, noise levels and models as the results presented in this thesis.
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By doing this, and taking the mean of the results, the results would be given
a more robust standing.
A second simple set of additional testing would be to continue to use tracks
of real-world video footage of the existing learning scenarios. By comparing
the results of real-world tracker and the simulated tracker at different noise
levels, a characterisation of the noise levels that are present in the real-world
tracker could be given.
The third source of extra testing could be found in attempting to adapt
the system in general to the three learning scenarios presented in chapter five
that were not used: Fragile objects shattering, two people passing a ball and
rigid object configuration spaces. Some of the other pieces of further work
presented in this section would help with this task, though there may be work
required on top of what is discussed in this section to allow the system to learn
in all six scenarios – particularly in the work needed to learn a configuration
space.
A fourth source of testing is inspired by Pavlov’s (1927) experiments with
dogs. In the experiments, Pavlov measured the amount of saliva by surgically
attaching a collection tube near the dog’s salivary gland. It could be possible
to replicate these experiments on computer. This could be done by making two
relatively simple modifications to the system. The first would be the creation
of a privileged single-frame atomic event that is directly encoded in the input,
rather than detected by the pre-processor. This privileged atomic event would
represent an unconditioned stimulus. The second modification would be to
add a counter variable. When the privileged atomic event is encountered or
predicted, the counter is increased by the strength of the prediction (with the
privileged atomic event having a fixed value). This counter variable would
represent the amount of saliva accumulated in the collection device – i.e. the
conditioned and unconditioned responses. In this manner, the system can be
tested as if it were the subject of a classical conditioning experiment. By
experimenting with the system in this manner, the models can be tested as
part of the system, rather than just the simple bug-testing that was done in
the development of this thesis, to make sure the significance model produced
the expected response.
Another source would be to extend the system to add auditory atomic
event types. Initially the auditory event types could be specific spoken words,
though later if testing was successful enough, the word event types could be
replaced with phoneme event types. These additions could allow the system
to learn rules for simple games such as snap. An existing system that learns
rules of simple games is described by Needham et al. (2005), which learns using
an inductive logic programming system known as Progol (Muggleton, 1995).
Progol is a supervised, oﬄine learning system, and so replacing the learning
element of the system by Needham et al. (2005) would allow the system to
learn the rules as the game was being observed.
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The final proposed test is to apply the system to a typical application area
that makes use of event sequence learning. This is the area of automated
surveillance, which uses event sequence learning to predict if the behaviour
of a tracked individual is going to lead to a crime. One example of this sort
of behaviour is someone approaching the door of multiple cars in a car park.
The system proposed in this thesis, once improved, should be able to learn
sequences of event types that include a “crime” privileged atomic event type,
which acts as a label for any preceding pattern learned. When the system
predicts a crime event instance is imminent, then the relevant person could
be alerted for the prediction to be checked and for any required action to be
taken.
7.3.10 A New Proxy Ground Truth Method
In the analysis of the results, it was found that the proxy ground truth used
was flawed. The proxy ground truth had too many rules, biasing the results
towards indiscriminate significance models, and the proxy ground truth missed
out rules that could be argued to be legitimate. The blame for these issues was
placed on the method used to generate the proxy ground truth rule sets. The
method used seemed sound at the time as it combined steps that used human
intelligence with deterministic steps in an attempt to avoid the problems of
introspection. The concept of using a mix of deterministic and human steps is
still believed to be the best approach to the creation of a proxy ground truth.
However, the actual steps that are used need to be changed. It is unknown
what should be done differently. A thorough review of the steps and how this
led to a very large set of rules would be the first action taken in creating a
new method for creating a proxy ground truth.
There is a wider issue that is highlighted by this example of an inaccurate
proxy ground truth. As artificial intelligence systems become ever more com-
plex, any proxy ground truths that attempt to evaluate the internal knowledge
of those systems will grow in complexity too. This means that at some point of
complexity, the feasibility of accurately and completely evaluating the abilities
and knowledge of artificial intelligence systems will become ever more difficult.
Looking at this proxy ground truth complexity issue and finding solutions to
it may be a worthwhile topic of research.
7.3.11 Stochastic Outcomes
Currently, the system produces rules where there is a single possible predicted
outcome to a rule. It would be more general if a system could learn rules
where the outcome is one of a set of possibilities, with an associated proba-
bility distribution. Consider the act of rolling a die, there is a set number of
event instances that could follow, but that list is finite. The difficulty is how
to discriminate between an outcome event instance that should be considered
a member of the possible outcome set and one that should be rejected as noise.
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The learning of these stochastic outcomes will most likely be related to any
developments of the partial reinforcement and partial reinforcement extinction
effect phenomena. There is a difference between the idea of multiple stochastic
outcomes and the aforementioned phenomena – partial reinforcement refers to
there being only a single prediction that may or may not be true, rather than
a wider set of possibilities. It would be of interest for there to be animal exper-
imentation where a single conditioned stimulus is probabilistically paired with
several different unconditioned stimuli that are known to elicit different and
preferably mutually exclusive conditioned responses. Would the subject al-
ternate between responses, attempting to second-guess the stochastic process
or would there be a dominant response? How does the animal accommodate
entirely unrelated unconditioned stimuli? No literature describing such exper-
iments has been found.
7.3.12 Subjective Probability
As was described in chapter two, some of the phenomena when combined
together allow for the contingency phenomenon as an epiphenomenon. Due
to this, the association strength can be seen to be analogous to a conditional
probability. However, because other factors such as timing and magnitude are
involved, this is not a pure conditional probability, but can be seen as being
more “subjective”. This leads to the concept that the irrational probabilistic
reasoning seen in humans, in such phenomena as those believing in winning
streaks, could in fact be a computational trade-off.
The subjective concept of randomness could be based on an expectation of
the law of large numbers eventually coming into effect. Where a long enough
run of the same outcome is observed, or another outcome is not observed for a
long time, there could be a loss in the belief that the outcome is random. This
suggests a mechanism by which noise and one or more stochastic outcomes
can be distinguished, as by the law of large numbers, genuine members of
the stochastic outcome set would be observed again whereas this is not the
case for instances of noise. With an objective conditional probability, any
outcome, noise or otherwise, could not be removed from the list of possible
outcomes, as each outcome has already been observed. The implication for
the irrational behaviour evidenced in the winning streak is that if the mind
was not susceptible to the concept of a winning streak, it would not be able
to learn stochastic patterns in the first place.
7.3.13 AMultiple-Environment Reinforcement Learning Prob-
lem
During the review of the relevant literature of reinforcement learning, an idea
was conceived for possible future research. Consider the scenario where the
agent is not a singular organism, but instead is an organisation. This organi-
sation could be operating in multiple countries simultaneously. Each country
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shares some similarities but also could have some differences. In this scenario,
if the agent learned in a reinforcement leaning style, it is able to select multiple
actions simultaneously. In this case, one could take the set of states for each
environment and combine them to create a singular “global” set of environ-
mental states, with a similar set for the sets of actions. This set-up though
would not easily be able to exploit the similarities of each environment. If
instead, the differences of each environment are modelled, then the system
would be able to use the similarities and a model of the differences to be able
to explore one environment while maximising the currently best-known policy
in other environments. If the environment that is being used for exploration
produces a better policy that, when the differences between environments are
taken into account, could work in the other environments, then the new policy
could be attempted. This would allow for another type of balance between
exploration and exploitation of policy. The research for this would likely have
to look at: How best to learn the differences between each environment, poli-
cies to select which environment to explore and meta-policies for rolling-out
potential new policies into new environments.
7.3.14 Ideas Concerning Classical Conditioning
During the development of this thesis, a few ideas were conceived that could
lead to fruitful research within the field of classical conditioning. The first of
these ideas was conceived during the analysis of the contingency phenomenon.
During that analysis, the following derivation was found:
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In this derivation, Ω denotes the set of all observed event instances. The
implication of the final equation of the derivation is that it is likely that the
age of the subject determines how conditioning functions. This is because
of the presence of the |Ω| in the second term of the equation, which can be
interpreted as being the count of all observed stimuli that the subject has
ever experienced, regardless of whether event types A or B are present. This
implies that as the subject ages, the total amount of experience the subject
has increases, and so the second term of the equation becomes increasingly
fixed as it becomes dominated by the total experience. This implies that
extinction of a conditioned response based on singular presentations of the
unconditioned stimulus could be possible if the subject is young enough. It is
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usually not possible to extinguish an association through presentation of the
unconditioned stimulus, so if it is possible in young subjects, insight into how
the contingency phenomenon works would be gained.
The second idea concerns a thought experiment. Consider a wind-up toy
or a catapult. The longer the “wind-up” event instance is, one expects that
the magnitude of the corresponding “release” event instance will be greater.
This basic idea leads to the question: is this an expectation that can be
learned through conditioning? If the subject is presented with an environment
where the length of the inter-stimulus interval determined the magnitude of
the unconditioned stimulus, does the compensatory nature of the conditioned
response increase in intensity for longer inter-stimulus intervals?
7.3.15 Ideas Concerning Bayesian Learning
This thesis has not made use of the multitude of Bayesian artificial intelligence
techniques, even though using Bayes’ rule for the significance measure would be
a natural choice. This was deliberate in order avoid allowing the argument that
the system is a new learning system to be subjected to the counterargument
that because the system makes use of Bayes, an existing form of learning
systems, it is not a new learning system in its own right. Now that the system
has been established to be able to learn without the need for a Bayesian
significance measure, it would be a natural extension to include a Bayesian
significance measure into the system.
Due to the knowledge that a Bayesian significance measure would be a
natural extension of the system, during the development of this thesis, a few of
insights into Bayesian learning were conceived. The first idea asks if it would be
possible, using a similar technique used to create an iterative sigmoid function,
to create an iterative Bayes’ rule. For an iterative Bayes’ rule there would have
to be two functions, one for reinforcement and one for non-reinforcement.
The second insight concerns the observation that the association strength
can be seen to be the time-discounted risk of an event type occurring. The
measure is time-discounted due to the influence of the inter-stimulus interval
and is risk rather than probability because it is influenced by magnitude.
In learning patterns of event types, Bayes’ rule can be used to predict the
probability that an event instance will precede another. It could be potentially
rewarding to include measures of both the timing and magnitude into a variant
of Bayes’ rule.
7.3.16 A Universal-Mode Learning System
Machine learning has traditionally been presented as being composed of three
modes of input data. The first is supervised learning, where the agent is given
a piece of data and is expected to apply the labelled data provided to predict
the label for unseen data. The second mode is unsupervised learning, where
the agent is given data with no label and is expected to create its own labels
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based on a derived structure of the data. The third mode is reinforcement
learning, where the agent predicts the label (an action) for some input data
(a state) and then is told whether the produced label is correct or incorrect,
possibly after a batch of action-state pairings.
There exists systems that are in-between these three systems, such as semi-
supervised learning (Xiaojin, 2008; Grira et al., 2004), which lies between su-
pervised and unsupervised learning. Other systems, such as gradient-descent
temporal difference learning (Sutton & Barto 1998, pp. 193–226; Sutton et al.
2009) integrate supervised systems into reinforcement learning, in order for
reinforcement learning to generalise its experience to new states. The sys-
tem presented in this thesis can be argued to lie between unsupervised and
reinforcement learning.
It is proposed that it would be possible to build a system that is able to
learn in each of the three modes of learning. The proposed system would be
able to combine data from each of the three modes of learning. The basis of
such a system could be a far descendent of the system proposed in this thesis.
With such a basis, each of the modes of learning could be used. Traditional
reinforcement learning could be dealt with through action and reward event
types, as described previously. Supervised learning would be a case of learning
to associate between the input data and the label; the source of generalisation
by the system is previously described. Unsupervised learning would be able to
be achieved through the build-up of patterns presented together, both spatially
and temporally. As humans are capable of learning in each mode, if the
eventual goal of artificial intelligence is the creation of a human-level intelligent
agent, then work to merge the three modes will eventually need to happen.
The brief ideas presented here may be a very small start in that direction.
7.3.17 Ultra-High Fidelity Environmental Modelling
The final idea of this thesis will be very complex, and require a great deal of
extra research. The idea is that it may be possible to create video footage
of future predictions based upon an ultra-high fidelity learned model of the
environment. The mind acts to be able to predict what the low-level sensations
would be for an action. In the imagination, the consequent shapes, sounds and
colours of an action that have not yet been performed can be predicted. Yet
these imaginary images and sounds have a level of fidelity below that of when
the same images and sounds are presented in reality, making them feel elusive
compared to reality.
A complete learning system learns how to recognise objects and their move-
ment from pixels of a video and is able to learn repeated patterns of movements
and object interactions. This means it has a model of those very same objects
and their movements. Therefore it should be possible to reverse the learned
model to produce a rendered video of a particular movement. When a system
learns patterns of movements, those patterns would similarly be able to create
a rendered video.
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The primary feedback loop of the system described by this thesis is that
low-level event instances construct high-level event types and then the high-
level event types aid prediction of any low-level event instances. If the agent
is able to learn a model of the environment that is of high enough fidelity
– as discussed in section 7.3.6, it would also be able be augmented to use
this feedback loop over many hierarchical levels to be able to predict specific
pixel values from high-level abstract descriptions such as “someone throwing
a ball into the air”, filling in the relevant detail to the current situation as
the hierarchy descends to create the individual pixel predictions. Similarly, a
system able to learn a pixel-level model of the environment would be able to
take the stream of pixel data and construct ever higher levels of event type
sequences, abstracting away from detail as the hierarchy ascends.
Such a system would allow for much simpler testing of how the system has
learned. Instead of having to create a proxy ground truth, the input data itself
is the ground truth. When testing a learning system, all that would be needed
would be to begin presenting a video to the hypothetical system and part way
through stop showing the video and compare the pixel-level prediction of the
system with the actual video. The longer it maintains an accurate description
of the video, the better the system has become at learning.
There is another work that discusses feedback loops occurring over hierar-
chies. Hofstadter (1979; 2007) argued that the essential nature of conscious-
ness was a loop that occurs over a hierarchy; a loop Hofstadter called a strange
loop. This strange loop was such that when the hierarchy is followed in either
an upwards or downwards manner, the path always returns to the beginning.
When attempting to predict the future at a given level of abstraction, this
entails the predication of some of the details at the lower level of abstraction,
which entails lower still levels of prediction. However, the purpose of creating
predictions of high-level event instances is ultimately to better predict and
plan to achieve the highest-level of the hierarchy: the overall goal event types
of the system. Those same goals however are the low-level reward and punish-
ment event types. Therefore, the highest-level goal event types are the same
as the lowest-level reward and punishment event types and vice-versa. It is
therefore argued that a planning and prediction feedback loop over the hier-
archy of an ultra-high environmental model may be a candidate to be called
a strange loop.
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Appendix A
Atomic Event Definitions
These are the definitions of the atomic events in terms of consecutive frame-
state variables. Atomic events are used as the primitive symbols that the
system learns its event patterns from. An explanation of the notation can be
found within chapter four, most notably section 3.2.1.1 and section 4.2.2. A
discussion of the generation of these atomic events is in section 4.2.3. The
definitions that are directly based on the event definitions by dos Santos et al.
(2009) are starred on the left side of the page. It is noted that these influenced
the other events that were chosen.
In order to reduce the amount of repetition within these definitions, the
here predicate is defined to be true when all members of the input list are
visible at both times:
here (ObjectList, T imeList)←→
∀o ∈ ObjectList, ∀t ∈ TimeList holdsAt (visible (o) , t) (A.1)
The here predicate is not actually used within the system and is only
defined to allow for the atomic event definitions listed here to be shorter. The
remainder of this appendix lists the atomic event definitions.
happens (lost (o) , [t1, t2])←→
holdsAt (visible (o) , t1)∧
¬holdsAt (visible (o) , t2) (A.2)
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happens (found (o) , [t1, t2])←→
¬holdsAt (visible (o) , t1)∧
holdsAt (visible (o) , t2) (A.3)
happens (moveLeft (o) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt (posx (o, x1) , t1)∧
holdsAt (posx (o, x2) , t2)∧
x1 > x2 (A.4)
happens (moveRight (o) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt (posx (o, x1) , t1)∧
holdsAt (posx (o, x2) , t2)∧
x1 < x2 (A.5)
happens (moveUp (o) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt
(
posy (o, y1) , t1
)
∧
holdsAt
(
posy (o, y2) , t2
)
∧
y1 > y2 (A.6)
happens (moveDown (o) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt
(
posy (o, y1) , t1
)
∧
holdsAt
(
posy (o, y2) , t2
)
∧
y1 < y2 (A.7)
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⋆ happens (approaching (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧(
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t1)∨
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t1)
)
∧
¬holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t2)∧
holdsAt (dist (o1, o2, d1) , t1)∧
holdsAt (dist (o1, o2, d2) , t2)∧
d1 > d2 (A.8)
⋆ happens (receding (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧(
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t1)∨
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t1)
)
∧
holdsAt (dist (o1, o2, d1) , t1)∧
holdsAt (dist (o1, o2, d2) , t2)∧
d1 < d2 (A.9)
⋆ happens (mergeRight (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧(
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t1)∨
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t1)
)
∧
holdsAt (left (o1, o2) , t1)∧
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t2) (A.10)
⋆ happens (mergeLeft (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧(
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t1)∨
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t1)
)
∧
holdsAt (left (o2, o1) , t1)∧
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t2) (A.11)
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happens (mergeTop (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧(
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t1)∨
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t1)
)
∧
holdsAt (above (o1, o2) , t1)∧
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t2) (A.12)
happens (mergeBottom (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧(
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t1)∨
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t1)
)
∧
holdsAt (above (o2, o1) , t1)∧
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t2) (A.13)
⋆ happens (emergeRight (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t1)∧(
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t2)∨
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t2)
)
∧
holdsAt (left (o1, o2) , t2) (A.14)
⋆ happens (emergeLeft (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t1)∧(
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t2)∨
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t2)
)
∧
holdsAt (left (o2, o1) , t2) (A.15)
happens (emergeTop (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t1)∧(
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t2)∨
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t2)
)
∧
holdsAt (above (o1, o2) , t2) (A.16)
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happens (emergeBottom (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t1)∧(
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t2)∨
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t2)
)
∧
holdsAt (above (o2, o1) , t2) (A.17)
happens (makeContactRight (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t1)∧
holdsAt (left (o1, o2) , t1)∧(
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t2)∨
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t2)
)
(A.18)
happens (makeContactLeft (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t1)∧
holdsAt (left (o2, o1) , t1)∧(
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t2)∨
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t2)
)
(A.19)
happens (makeContactTop (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t1)∧
holdsAt (above (o1, o2) , t1)∧(
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t2)∨
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t2)
)
(A.20)
happens (makeContactBottom (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t1)∧
holdsAt (above (o2, o1) , t1)∧(
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t2)∨
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t2)
)
(A.21)
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happens (breakContactRight (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧(
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t1)∨
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t1)
)
∧
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t2)∧
holdsAt (left (o1, o2) , t2) (A.22)
happens (breakContactLeft (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧(
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t1)∨
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t1)
)
∧
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t2)∧
holdsAt (left (o2, o1) , t2) (A.23)
happens (breakContactRight (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧(
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t1)∨
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t1)
)
∧
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t2)∧
holdsAt (above (o1, o2) , t2) (A.24)
happens (breakContactBottom (o1, o2) , [t1, t2])←→
here ([o1, o2] , [t1, t2])∧(
holdsAt (extC (o1, o2) , t1)∨
holdsAt (co (o1, o2) , t1)
)
∧
holdsAt (disC (o1, o2) , t2)∧
holdsAt (above (o2, o1) , t2) (A.25)
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Appendix B
Model Equation Derivations
Chapter four presented a series of models, each model determining whether
a composite event type exists by assigning a significance measure value, V to
the composite event type based on input evidence in favour and against the
existence of the composite event type. Each piece of evidence being provided
to the model as the system encounters that evidence.
Four of the models introduce equations that require a more involved deriva-
tion than could be presented in chapter four, as doing so would spoil the flow
of the general description of those models. Those derivations are presented
here instead.
B.1 The Count Only Model
The Count Only model provides a significance measure that is based on a
frequentist probability that the two events that make-up the composite event
type in question are part of the same event type. The formula being derived
compares the number of observed instances of a composite event type (|T1,2|)
with the total number of observed instances of its component event types
(|T1| and |T2|) and is shown in equation B.1.
V =
2 |T1,2|
|T1|+ |T2|
(B.1)
Consider the undirected graph G (E,A) where each vertex in the set E
corresponds to an observed event instance and each edge in the set A cor-
responds to a pairing of event instances created by the association module
of the system. Let atomic event types be defined as a subset of the vertices
of the graph T1 ⊆ E and composite event types be defined as a subset of
edges of the graph T1,2 ⊆ A. Let there be a set T , the union of all possible
atomic event types and all possible composite event types. Let there be two
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functions, a function that maps each vertex to an event type, as defined in
equation B.2, and a function that maps each edge to an event type, as defined
in equation B.3.
type : e ∈ E → T ∈ T (B.2)
type : (e1, e2) ∈ A→ T ∈ T (B.3)
The association module applies some constraints on the type of edges that
can exist which are expressed in equations B.4 and B.5. The first constraint
states that no edge can exist between any two vertices that share the same
type. The second constraint states that each vertex may not be connected to
more than one vertex of the same type.
∀ (e1, e2) ∈ A, type (e1) 6= type (e2) (B.4)
∀ (e1, e2) ∈ A, ∄ (e1, e3) ∈ A, type (e2) = type (e3) (B.5)
From these definitions and constraints, an inequality can be shown to hold
that relates the size of T1 to the size of T1,2.
Proposition: |T1,2| ≤ |T1|
Proof. Assume for the purposes of obtaining a contradiction, that the converse
inequality is possible, i.e. |T1,2| > |T1|. This states that there are more
edges between the vertex sets T1 and T2 than vertices, through the pigeonhole
principle, there must exist a vertex in T1 with at least two edges that each
connect to a vertex in T2. A contradiction occurs as the second constraint
stated in equation B.5 forbids any one node from being connected to more
than one vertex in T2. This proves that |T1,2| ≯ |T1| holds. In order to prove
that both |T1,2| = |T1| and |T1,2| < |T1| are possible, it suffices to provide a
single case of each case. Consider the case where there is one vertex in T1,
one vertex in T2 and T1,2 contains a single edge connecting the two mentioned
vertices together, clearly |T1,2| = 1 and |T1| = 1 and so |T1,2| = |T1|. Consider
the same situation but add a single vertex to T1 that is not connected to any
other vertex, now |T1,2| = 1 and |T1| = 2 and so |T1,2| < |T1|. Therefore,
as |T1,2| = |T1| can hold, |T1,2| < |T1| can hold and |T1,2| ≯ |T1| holds then
|T1,2| ≤ |T1| holds.
From this inequality, as it is impossible to get set sizes that are negative,
a simple re-arrangement of the inequality yields the inequality expressed in
equation B.6.
0 ≤
|T1,2|
|T1|
≤ 1 (B.6)
This rearrangement assumes that |T1| > 0, but this is acceptable as there
is no practical need to define the significance measure for event types that
have never been observed. Besides, as |T1,2| will always be zero if |T1| is zero
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(as any edge in T1,2 must be incident on a vertex in T1), which means that
|T1,2|
|T1|
= 00 and so is meaningless anyway. The ratio of this further inequality
can be said to be the probability that a vertex in T1 is connected to a vertex
in T2, or conversely, the probability that an event instance of type T1 is paired
with an event instance of type T2.
It is not sufficient to just calculate the probability that an event instance
of type T1 is paired with an event instance of type T2; the significance measure
must also refer to the probability that an event instance of type T2 is paired
with an event instance of type T1. These two probabilities can be different, as
the number of instances in each set can be different. In order to incorporate
both probabilities within a single measure of significance, the union of both
sets of event instances is used instead of using one set or the other. In doing
this, an issue that arises is that while both vertices of an edge are being counted
independently, the edge itself is being counted once. This issue is dealt with
by counting each edge twice, once for each vertex the edge is connected to.
The resultant probability, shown in equation B.7, is used as the significance
measure for the Count Only model.
V =
2 |T1,2|
|T1 ∪ T2|
=
2 |T1,2|
|T1|+ |T2|
(B.7)
B.2 The Iterative Acquire-Extinguish Model
The derivation of the Iterative Acquire-Extinguish significance value functions
is mostly straightforward algebraic manipulation, though it is quite lengthy.
Instead of showing each individual step, the focus will be on the important
steps and those steps that are less obvious. Note that in this section, to
abstract away from the model, the derivations will deal in terms of x and y
values of a function.
The overall idea for turning an absolute function into an iterative one is
based on the assumption that the absolute function is a one-to-one relation.
While this assumption is only true for a sub-set of all functions, all the func-
tions concerned satisfy this. As a function is one-to-one, given any y value the
x value can be given exactly. Therefore, given the y value, and the knowledge
of needing to change the x value by one, the change in the y value can be
calculated.
The derivation does not use the differential of the functions involved be-
cause differentiation assumes that the change in x is infinitesimal, whereas the
iterative function assumes that the change in x is integral. To highlight this
distinction, the change in x and y will be written as ∆x and ∆y respectively
rather than δx and δy respectively.
The function for positive evidence will be dealt with first, followed by the
function for negative evidence.
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B.2.1 The Positive Evidence Function
The absolute function for positive evidence is the logistic function, shown in
equation B.8.
y =
1
1 + e−k1x
(B.8)
There are two variants of this equation that are used later, shown in equa-
tions B.9 and B.10.
e−k1x =
1
y
− 1 (B.9)
ek1x =
y
1− y
(B.10)
In order to calculate the iterative change, first the relationship between
iterations must be stated for both x and y values. This is expressed in equa-
tions B.11 and B.12.
xn+1 = xn +∆x (B.11)
yn+1 = yn +∆y (B.12)
The n+1th value of y can be calculated using the absolute formula of B.8,
as shown in B.13. This can be combined with B.15 to give an equation for ∆y
as is done in B.14 and B.15.
yn+1 =
1
1 + e−k1xn+1
(B.13)
yn +∆y =
1
1 + e−k1(xn+∆x)
(B.14)
∆y =
1
1 + e−(k1xn+k1∆x)
− yn (B.15)
The nth value of y can also be calculated using the absolute formula of B.8.
This can then be substituted for the yn term of B.15 as shown in equation B.16.
Equations B.17 through to B.20 are then stages in the re-arrangement of B.16
to allow for further substitutions to take place with the goal of eliminating all
the xn terms.
∆y =
1
1 + e−(k1xn+k1∆x)
−
1
1 + e−k1xn
(B.16)
∆y =
ek1xnek1∆x
1 + ek1xnek1∆x
−
ek1xn
1 + ek1xn
(B.17)
∆y =
ek1xnek1∆x
(
ek1xn + 1
)
− ek1xn
(
ek1xnek1∆x + 1
)
(ek1xnek1∆x + 1) (ek1xn + 1)
(B.18)
∆y =
ek1xn
(
ek1∆x − 1
)
ek1xn (ek1xnek1∆x + ek1∆x + 1 + e−k1xn)
(B.19)
∆y =
ek1∆x − 1
ek1xnek1∆x + ek1∆x + 1 + e−k1xn
(B.20)
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To eliminate the xn terms, the re-arrangements of equation B.8 – equa-
tions B.9 and B.10 – can be substituted into B.20. This is shown in B.21. The
remainder of the derivation, B.22 and B.23, are stages in the simplification to
arrive at the final function of equation B.24.
∆y =
ek1∆x − 1(
yn
1−yn
)
ek1∆x + ek1∆x + 1 +
(
1
yn
− 1
) (B.21)
∆y =
ek1∆x − 1
ek1∆x
(
1
1−yn
)
+ 1yn
(B.22)
∆y =
yn
(
ek1∆x − 1
)
(1− yn)
ynek1∆x − yn + 1
(B.23)
∆y =
(1− yn) e
k1∆x + yn − 1
ek1∆x + 1yn − 1
(B.24)
B.2.2 The Negative Evidence Function
The negative evidence function follows the same lines as the positive evidence
function, but is a lot simpler due to the absolute function that the iterative
function is based on being a lot simpler. The absolute function is shown in
equation B.25 with its rearrangement in B.26.
y = −k2x (B.25)
x =
−y
k2
(B.26)
The n + 1th value of y is expressed in equation B.27. The substitution
of B.12 is applied in equation B.28 and rearranged for ∆y in B.29. Equa-
tion B.30 eliminates xn by substituting in B.26. Through some straightforward
rearrangements, the final formula is arrived at and is shown in equation B.31.
yn+1 = −k2xn+1 (B.27)
yn +∆y = −k2 (xn +∆x) (B.28)
∆y = −k2 (xn +∆x)− yn (B.29)
∆y = −k2
(
−yn
k2
+∆x
)
− yn (B.30)
∆y = −k2∆x (B.31)
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B.3 The Temporal Model
The Temporal model is based upon the observation that the log-normal prob-
ability distribution function from statistics has a similar shape to that of the
inter-stimulus interval curve of classical conditioning. Equation B.32 expresses
the log-normal function, where x and y are the horizontal and vertical vari-
ables, µ is a parameter that influences where the centre of the curve lies and
σ is a parameter that influences the width of the curve1 In accordance with
the curve shape observation, the variable x curve can be seen to correspond
to the inter-stimulus interval.
y =
e
−(ln x−µ)2
2σ2
xσ
√
π
2
(B.32)
The research regarding the inter-stimulus interval, as presented in chapter
two, stated that the inter-stimulus interval curve is influenced by whether there
is any overlap between the two events. There are three common configurations
talked about in the classical conditioning literature. The first configuration
is where the conditioned stimulus terminates at the same time as the uncon-
ditioned stimulus; the second configuration is where the conditioned stimulus
terminates at the same time as the unconditioned stimulus begins and the third
configuration is where the conditioned stimulus terminates some time before
the unconditioned stimulus begins. The larger the distance between the end
times of the events becomes the later-starting and narrower the inter-stimulus
curve becomes.
In order to replicate this effect between the end times of the events, the
measure needs to be codified into a single value φ. While it could be thought
that simply taking the difference between the two end times would suffice, this
does not take into account the relative size of the overlap in relation to the
length of the second event. Therefore the value needs to be normalised by the
second event length to lie in the range 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. However, another issue
is that when there is a gap between the two events, it is more appropriate
to normalise to the size of the moving window instead, as the basis for the
window size is as a cut-off point for inter-stimulus interval.
Therefore, to take into account the need to have a single measure that is
normalised against two different scales leads to the following solution: The
case where the first event terminates as the second begins is defined to lie at
0.5. Where there is an overlap, we normalise the overlap of the two events
against the total size of the second event to lie between 0 and 0.5, with 0 if
there is no overlap. This normalised overlap is then subtracted from the 0.5
of the case where there is no overlap or gap to define the value φ between
0 and 0.5. Where there is a gap between the two events, the size of the gap
is normalised against the size of the size of the window to again lie between
1The variable descriptions here are describing the variables independently
of the function’s use within statistics.
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0 and 0.5 with 0 if there is no gap. This is then added to the 0.5 of the case
where there is no overlap or gap to define the value φ between 0.5 and 1. This
entire definition of φ is expressed in equation B.33. In equation B.33, tE,1
denotes the end time of the first event, tS,2 is the start time of the second
event, tE,2 is the end time of the second event, and W represents the size of
the moving window.
φ =
1
2
−
1
2
max
(
0,
tE,1 − tS,2
tE,2 − tS,2
)
+
1
2
max
(
0,
tS,2 − tE,1
W
)
(B.33)
The inter-stimulus interval is defined by the difference tS,2− tS,1 where tS,1
is the start time of the first event. However, this is not the quantity that is used
in the final curve equation. It was earlier noted that the longer the difference
between the end points becomes the larger the later the curve starts to rise.
The best method that was found to include this effect was to alter the input
inter-stimulus interval such that some multiple s of the φ value is subtracted
from the inter-stimulus interval, meaning that the larger φ is the later the
curve starts, so modelling the observation. The log-normal curve is however
undefined for negative values of x – this is rectified by setting the result to
zero if the subtraction is negative. All this is expressed in equation B.34.
Through experimentation, it was determined that an s value of 2 gave a good
approximation of the relative starts of the curve based on the observed data.
This is reflected in equation B.35.
χ = max (0, (BS −AS − sφ)) (B.34)
χ = max (0, (BS −AS − 2φ)) (B.35)
These two values are then fed into a modified version of the log-normal
curve shown in equation B.36. The value χ has taken the place of x as χ
represents the inter-stimulus interval. The value (2 + φ) has taken place of
the σ parameter to allow the difference between the ends times of the events
to influence the width of the curve, in accordance with observation. It was
found through experimentation that varying the σ parameter between 2 and 3
gave a better difference in the width of the curve. The µ parameter was set to 1
as although each curve needed to start later, each curve needed have a rapid
increase when it does start. The final change to the function, the 2 (2− φ)
section is a scaling factor allowing the φ value to influence the overall peak
size of the curve. It was found again through experimentation that varying
the value between 2 and 4 achieved the best correspondence to the observed
curve.
Z =
2 (2− φ) e
−2(ln(χ)−1)2
(2+φ)2
χ (2 + φ)
√
π
2
(B.36)
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B.4 The Reacquiring Model
The change in the Reacquiring model is multiplying the absolute positive
evidence equation by a value that is also has an asymptote at a y value of
one. This secondary asymptotic function would increase with the number of
positive pieces of evidence but not decrease with the number of negative pieces
of evidence. The resultant absolute function is then taken through the same
steps as done with the derivation iterative positive evidence function to arrive
at a new iterative version that can be influenced by the secondary asymptote.
As the derivations are so similar, the derivation presented below is shortened,
showing only how the asymptote value propagates through the derivation.
The derivation begins with the absolute positive evidence function that
has been multiplied with the value a, representing the secondary asymptote
as shown in equation B.37.
y =
a
1 + e−k1x
(B.37)
Two re-arranged versions of equation B.37 are shown in equations B.38
and B.40.
e−k1x =
a
y
− 1 (B.38)
ek1x =
y
a− y
(B.39)
We then combine B.37 with B.12 to give the n + 1th ∆y value as shown
in B.40. The value of yn is the substituted with equation B.37 to give equa-
tion B.41 which is then re-arranged to give equation B.42.
∆y =
a
1 + e−(k1xn+k1∆x)
− yn (B.40)
∆y =
a
1 + e−(k1xn+k1∆x)
−
a
1 + e−k1xn
(B.41)
∆y =
a
(
ek1∆x − 1
)
ek1xnek1∆x + ek1∆x + 1 + e−k1xn
(B.42)
In order to eliminate the xn terms, equations B.38 and B.39 are substituted
into B.42 to give equation B.43. This is then rearranged to give the interme-
diate equation B.44 and the final iterative function shown in equation B.45.
∆y =
a
(
ek1∆x − 1
)(
yn
a−yn
)
ek1∆x + ek1∆x + 1 +
(
a
yn
− 1
) (B.43)
∆y =
ek1∆x − 1
ek1∆x
(
1
a−yn
)
+ 1yn
(B.44)
∆y =
(a− yn) e
k1∆x + yn − a
ek1∆x + ayn − 1
(B.45)
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The varying asymptote value itself is based upon the absolute count of
pieces of positive evidence. The function that is used for the asymptote is a
variant of the simplest equation that has an asymptote at a y value of one.
The normal version of the function is shown in equation B.46 and the variant
is given in equation B.47. In the equations, a is the asymptote value used in
the main positive evidence equation and ǫ+ is the absolute count of positive
pieces of evidence provided to the model. In equation B.47, a constant k3
is introduced that allows control over how quickly the asymptote of one is
approached. The whole equation was then squared as it was found through
experimentation that by doing this, the equation tails off in a manner that
gives a greater scope for later reacquisition phases to noticeably demonstrate
a faster rate of acquisition.
a =
ǫ+
ǫ+ + 1
(B.46)
a =
(
ǫ+
ǫ+ + k3
)2
(B.47)
However, the equation of B.48 has an undue influence over the first ac-
quisition phase; this is because the value of reacquisition asymptote in this
equation is too low. In order to counter this, a minimum asymptote value k4
is introduced, and the changing asymptote is allowed to only vary between k4
and one, giving a constraint to the asymptote value of k4 ≤ a < 1. This is
achieved in the manner shown in equation B.48, which is the actual function
used to calculate the asymptote.
a = k4 + (1− k4)
(
ǫ+
ǫ+ + k3
)2
(B.48)
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Appendix C
Proxy Ground Truth Gantt
Charts
Chapter five introduced three learning scenarios which form the environments
in which the system discussed in chapter four is tested. Each of the scenarios
had a proxy ground truth created to compare against the results produced by
the system. The proxy ground truth was created through a combination of
restricted human judgement stages and deterministic stages. The first human
judgement stage created key-frames for the scenarios, the results of which were
included in chapter five. The second human judgement stage involved creating
Gantt charts for each of the scenarios, giving the expected length of each atom
event that was produced as a consequence of the first human judgement stage.
Due to the space taken up by the Gantt charts these are presented in this
appendix.
The first scenario – the throwing scenario – is shown in figure C.1. The
second scenario – the rotating scenario – is shown in figure C.2. The remainder
of the charts, shown in figures C.3 through to C.14, show the twelve different
sequences of the third scenario – the colliding scenario. The separate sequences
of the colliding scenario are labelled with the letters A to L which correspond
to the sequences shown in figures 5.10 and 5.11.
- 244 -
emergeTop(Ball,Person)
emergeBottom(Person,Ball)
breakContactTop(Ball,Person)
breakContactBottom(Person,Ball)
moveUp(Ball)
receding(Ball,Person)
moveDown(Ball)
approaching(Ball,Person)
makeContactTop(Ball,Person)
makeContactBottom(Person,Ball)
mergeTop(Ball,Person)
mergeBottom(Person,Ball)
Figure C.1: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of all the
atomic event instances of the throwing scenario.
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Figure C.2: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of all the
atomic event instances of the rotating scenario.
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approaching(BallA,BallB)
moveRight(BallA)
makeContactRight(BallA,BallB)
makeContactLeft(BallB,BallA)
breakContactRight(BallA,BallB)
breakContactLeft(BallB,BallA)
receding(BallA,BallB)
moveRight(BallB)
Figure C.3: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence A of the colliding scenario.
approaching(BallA,BallB)
moveDown(BallA)
makeContactTop(BallB,BallA)
makeContactBottom(BallA,BallB)
breakContactTop(BallB,BallA)
breakContactBottom(BallA,BallB)
receding(BallA,BallB)
moveDown(BallB)
Figure C.4: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence B of the colliding scenario.
approaching(BallA,BallB)
moveLeft(BallA)
makeContactRight(BallB,BallA)
makeContactLeft(BallA,BallB)
breakContactRight(BallB,BallA)
breakContactLeft(BallA,BallB)
receding(BallA,BallB)
moveLeft(BallB)
Figure C.5: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence C of the colliding scenario.
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approaching(BallA,BallB)
moveUp(BallA)
makeContactTop(BallA,BallB)
makeContactBottom(BallB,BallA)
breakContactTop(BallA,BallB)
breakContactBottom(BallB,BallA)
receding(BallA,BallB)
moveUp(BallB)
Figure C.6: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence D of the colliding scenario.
approaching(BallA,BallB)
moveRight(BallA)
moveDown(BallA)
makeContactRight(BallA,BallB)
makeContactLeft(BallB,BallA)
makeContactTop(BallB,BallA)
makeContactBottom(BallA,BallB)
breakContactRight(BallA,BallB)
breakContactLeft(BallB,BallA)
breakContactTop(BallB,BallA)
breakContactBottom(BallA,BallB)
receding(BallA,BallB)
moveRight(BallB)
moveDown(BallB)
Figure C.7: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence E of the colliding scenario.
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approaching(BallA,BallB)
moveLeft(BallA)
moveDown(BallA)
makeContactRight(BallB,BallA)
makeContactLeft(BallA,BallB)
makeContactTop(BallB,BallA)
makeContactBottom(BallA,BallB)
breakContactRight(BallB,BallA)
breakContactLeft(BallA,BallB)
breakContactTop(BallB,BallA)
breakContactBottom(BallA,BallB)
receding(BallA,BallB)
moveLeft(BallB)
moveDown(BallB)
Figure C.8: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence F of the colliding scenario.
approaching(BallA,BallB)
moveLeft(BallA)
moveUp(BallA)
makeContactRight(BallB,BallA)
makeContactLeft(BallA,BallB)
makeContactTop(BallA,BallB)
makeContactBottom(BallB,BallA)
breakContactRight(BallB,BallA)
breakContactLeft(BallA,BallB)
breakContactTop(BallA,BallB)
breakContactBottom(BallB,BallA)
receding(BallA,BallB)
moveLeft(BallB)
moveUp(BallB)
Figure C.9: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence G of the colliding scenario.
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approaching(BallA,BallB)
moveRight(BallA)
moveUp(BallA)
makeContactRight(BallA,BallB)
makeContactLeft(BallB,BallA)
makeContactTop(BallA,BallB)
makeContactBottom(BallB,BallA)
breakContactRight(BallA,BallB)
breakContactLeft(BallB,BallA)
breakContactTop(BallA,BallB)
breakContactBottom(BallB,BallA)
receding(BallA,BallB)
moveRight(BallB)
moveUp(BallB)
Figure C.10: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence H of the colliding scenario.
moveRight(BallA)
moveLeft(BallA)
Figure C.11: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence I of the colliding scenario.
moveDown(BallA)
moveUp(BallA)
Figure C.12: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence J of the colliding scenario.
moveLeft(BallA)
moveRight(BallA)
Figure C.13: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence K of the colliding scenario.
moveUp(BallA)
moveDown(BallA)
Figure C.14: A Gantt chart showing the temporal relationships of the atomic
event instances for sequence L of the colliding scenario.
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Appendix D
System Settings
This appendix provides a list of each constant within the system, including
model settings, noting the value that was used. The symbols noted in each en-
try are the symbol the constant was assigned in chapter four. The Count Only
model has no settings and so is not listed.
System-wide Constants
• Window size (W ): 6 frames
• Upper Significance Threshold (τupper): 0.96
• Lower Significance Threshold (τlower): 0.01
Model Constants
• Fixed Increment
– Positive Increment (f+): 0.01
• Symmetrical Fixed Increment
– Positive Increment (f+): 0.01
– Negative Increment (f−): −0.01
• Absolute Acquire-Extinguish
– Reinforcement Learning Rate (k1): 0.5
– Non-Reinforcement Learning Rate (k2): 1.0
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• Iterative Acquire-Extinguish
– Reinforcement Learning Rate (k1): 0.5
– Non-Reinforcement Learning Rate (k2): 1.0
• Temporal
– Reinforcement Learning Rate (k1): 0.5
– Non-Reinforcement Learning Rate (k2): 1.0
• Reacquiring
– Reinforcement Learning Rate (k1): 0.5
– Non-Reinforcement Learning Rate (k2): 1.0
– Reacquisition Rate (k3): 2.0
– Reacquisition Base (k4): 0.8
• Blocking
– Reinforcement Learning Rate (k1): 0.5
– Non-Reinforcement Learning Rate (k2): 1.0
– Reacquisition Rate (k3): 2.0
– Reacquisition Base (k4): 0.8
• Inhibition
– Reinforcement Learning Rate (k1): 0.5
– Non-Reinforcement Learning Rate (k2): 1.0
– Reacquisition Rate (k3): 2.0
– Reacquisition Base (k4): 0.8
– Inhibition Increase Rate (k5): 1.0
– Inhibition Decrease Rate (k6): 1.0
– Inhibition Rule Removal Threshold (τI): 0.001
• Pre-Exposure
– Reinforcement Learning Rate (k1): 0.5
– Non-Reinforcement Learning Rate (k2): 1.0
– Reacquisition Rate (k3): 2.0
– Reacquisition Base (k4): 0.8
– Inhibition Increase Rate (k5): 1.0
– Inhibition Decrease Rate (k6): 1.0
– Inhibition Rule Removal Threshold (τI): 0.001
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